Industrial policy and development in late industrializing countries: a case study of the motor industry by Brown, Paul Gerard
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
LATE INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 
A Case Study of the Motor Industry
by
PAUL GERARD BROWN 
A thesis presented for the Degree of M.A.
at
The National Institute for Higher Education
Dublin
Supervisor: Dr. D. S. Jacobson
School of Business Administration
MAY 1988
DECLARATION
This thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for 
a degree at this or any other Academic Institution and 
is entirely my own work.
Signed: \)
Paul G. Brown. 
May 1988.
- I -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS II
TABLES V
DECLARATION I
CHAPTER 1 Industrial Development:
The Search for an Appropriate Strategy
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Neo-Classical Economics and Industrial
Development Strategy 2
1.3 Outward Looking Industrial Policies:
Some Empirical Evidence 5
1.4 The Neo-Classical Perspective Under Attack 7
1.5 Reconciling Divergent View Points:
Towards An Improved Methodology 9
CHAPTER 2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6 
2.7
Outward-Oriented Industrialization: 
The Irish Experience
Introduction
The Transition to Outward Looking 
Industrialization
13
14
Outward Looking Industrialization and the Role 
of the Irish State 16
The Performance of the Irish Economy Under 
OLI 18
DFI - Its Role m  Irish Industrialisation 25
DFI - The Controversy in an Irish Context 27
Industrial Development Policy in Ireland;
An Evaluation 34
CHAPTER 3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
Industrial Development Strategy in Late 
Industrializing Countries
Introduction
The Transition Away From Inward Looking 
Policies
38
39
Manufacturing and the Transition Towards OLI 51 
Conclusion 66
- Ill _
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
CHAPTER 5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
CHAPTER 6
CHAPTER 4 The International Motor Industry 
Introduction
The Development of the International 
Motor Industry An Overview
The World Motor Industry 1900-1970: 
The Emergence of National Blocks
Recent Developments:
The Move Towards a World Industry
The Motor Industry in the LICs
Case Study of the Development of the 
Motor Industry in Selected LICs
Conclusions
The Motor Industry in Ireland 
Introduction
The Development of the Motor Industry 
in Ireland
Traditional Components Industry
Recent Trends
Statistical Analysis
A Profile of the Irish Automotive 
Components Sector in the mid 1980s
Analysis of the Foreign Sector of 
the Industry
Conclusions
69
70
72
79
82
86
96
100
102
106
107
112
120
125
135
Concluding Arguments
6 . 1
6 . 2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
Introduction
Indirect Selective Intervention
Direct Methods of Selective Intervention
Selective Intervention and Effective 
Practice
Irish Industrial Intervention and 
Selective Intervention
Conclusion
NOTES ON CHAPTERS 1-6
APPENDICES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
139
140
141
145
147
150
152-191
192-210
211-222
- IV -
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My first thanks must go to Dr. David Jacobson at the 
NIHE Glasnevin, to whom I am indebted for the stim­
ulating and illuminating way in which he acted as my 
Supervisor. I would also like to express my gratitude 
to all the people at the NIHE, Trinity College, and 
the New York Public Library, who assisted me during 
the course of my work.
Invaluable in the quest for information not generally 
available was the help received from a variety of 
sources. I am especially grateful for interviews and 
information received from the following:-
Michael Clark,
Department of Industry, Trade & Commerce.
Antonio Feasta,
Associacao Dos Industrials De Montagem, De Automoveis Lisboa. 
Maurice Hearn,
Irish Transport and General Workers Union.
Leo Keogh,
Society of the Irish Motor Industry.
Niail Meghan,
Confederation of Irish Industry.
Declan Murphy,
Industrial Development Authority.
Nancy O'Neill,
Central Statistics Office.
Jonathon Ryan,
Coras Trachtala.
Of particular help m  the physical preparation of this 
thesis were Mary Plunkett and Anne Walsh. Thanks are 
also due to Hugo Malone and Eithne Scully for work 
carried out on earlier drafts. Finally, to Mary and 
my parents a special word of gratitude for their under­
standing and encouragement throughout my work.
- n  -
ABSTRACT Industrial Policy and Development in Late 
Industrializing Countries - by Paul Brown
In recent times, literature - favouring a neo-classical 
perspective - on industrialization in developing nations 
has been the subnect of increasing criticism. The 
opponents of the neo-classical approach argue that 
outward-looking free market policies do not offer the 
best prospects for self-sustaining growth. In a straight 
forward manner, Chapter 1 airs the views of economists 
of both perspectives. Subsequently, a framework for 
a general discussion is provided.
Outward-looking industrial policies m  Ireland, have 
led to the emergence of a vibrant foreign-owned manu­
facturing sector. As Chapter 2 points out, there is 
considerable evidence that outward-looking industrial­
ization has thus far been unsuccessful in developing 
strong native companies capable of entering export 
markets. Chapter 3 suggests that this may be a common 
experience among late industrializing countries (LICs). 
In fact, the creation of a competitive indigenous manu­
facturing base may be contingent upon a departure from 
strict neo-classical guidelines.
Chapter 4 shows that the development of the motor in­
dustry in LICs has usually taken place under the auspices 
of large transnational corporations (TNCs) from developed 
countries. Only with active state intervention have 
domestic firms - with the assistance of foreign capital 
and technology - shown an ability to compete on the 
world market. As Chapter 5 indicates, assembly of 
motor vehicles in Ireland was dominated by the sub­
sidiaries of foreign companies. This is also true
of the Irish automotive components sector, which has 
evolved in recent years. The analysis of this sector, 
contained m  Chapter 5, is based largely on unpublished 
material. It is clear that this industry suffers from 
many of the short-comings often associated with foreign 
dominated sectors of Irish manufacturing.
By way of a conclusion, Chapter 6 argues that a role 
exists for more state intervention. However, it warns 
that government intervention in the system is not with­
out risk. The task facing policy makers is to design 
a constructive role for the state. With respect to 
the Irish manufacturing industry, m  the absence of 
more state intervention, the development of export 
markets will remain beyond the reach of most indigenous 
producers.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Most societies, particularly during the formative stages of 
economic development, look upon "industrialization" as the 
primary means of improving living standards. National 
governments have demonstrated a keen interest in overseeing 
the process of industrial development. In fact, many 
economists would agree with Howard Pack and Larry Westphall, 
who consider the states development role to be the 
"principal element of industrial strategy".(1)
What constitutes an appropriate role for government in the 
process of industrialization is a question to which there is 
no universally accepted answer. In market - oriented
economies this issue has for many years generated much 
controversy in academic and political circles alike. A 
broad consensus has emerged which perceives the government 
as having an important role in laying the infrastructural 
foundations required for stimulating industrial growth. 
However, opinions have been sharply divided over whether 
governments ought to intervene with the objective of 
influencing the apparent shortcomings associated with many 
markets.
In the past, the industrial development strategy adopted by 
numerous countries, including Ireland, has been characterized 
by extensive state intervention designed to compensate for 
the limitations of the free market. Various instruments 
have been employed, often simultaneously, including tariff 
and non-tariff protection in addition to controls on direct 
foreign investment (DFI) . In developing countries, the m a m  
intellectual buttress underlying state intervention was the 
presumed efficacy of the infant industry argument. Policies, 
with the original intention of nurturing fledgling domestic 
sectors unti1 they were s trong enough to withs tand 
international competition, became so all pervasive that 
virtually all of manufacturing industry operated in an 
environment which was heavily protectionist. In hindsight, 
it is clear that the broad scope and non discriminate nature
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of the import substitution approach was not conducive to 
long run industrial growth in developing countries. As the 
1987, World Bank, World Development Report comments;
’’What ever the merits of this approach m  
specific cases, many developing countries 
have offered widespread import protection 
m  the name of support for infant industry 
m  ways likely to frustrate the objectives 
of the policy".(2)
Indeed, in many developing countries the experiment with 
import substitution has,since the 1950s, been discarded in 
favour of a strategy which appears to have been strongly 
influenced by conventional neo-classical thinking.(3) This 
promoted the widespread adoption of what have been termed 
"outward-looking" policies, which tended to stress the 
importance of market forces in preference to state 
intervention. A central feature of this strategy was the 
encouragement of free international trade; m  addition to 
the easing or elimination of restrictions on direct foreign 
investment.(4)
1.2 NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY
Conventional neo-classical economics assumes that the 
operation of free market forces will result in the most 
efficient use of the resources available to any economy.(5) 
This acceptance of the primacy of the market has the effect 
of precluding the state from pursuing an active 
interventionist role m  the process of industrialization.(6) 
Therefore, reliance on the free play of market forces limits 
the state to a more neutral, or what Evans and Alizadeh call 
a "parametric" role designed to create conditions congenial 
to private investment.(7) It is important to emphasize that 
such a "parametric" approach to industrial development does 
not by definition discount the possibility of large scale 
government expenditure on, and involvement in, the promotion
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of industry. It is the nature of intervention which is the 
crucial factor.
Parametric involvement implies significant autonomy for 
private economic agents, with state intervention 
concentrating on the provision of a regulative framework and 
infrastructural capacity. Such an approach involves the 
maintenance of incentives to private sector firms, both 
domestic and foreign. As Dicken points out, there are few 
if any market economy states which have not attempted to 
stimulate industrial investment by such means in recent 
years.(8) The objective is to establish a favourable 
environment for private enterprise with any investment 
incentives tending to be generalised to all firms and fairly 
automatically available. Paradoxically, the state provides 
the climate which enables the "invisible hand" to guide the 
process of industrial growth.
It is possible to identify two common forms of investment 
incentives, those which are capital related and those which 
are tax related. Capital related incentives include items 
such as non-repayable cash grants or loans for investment in 
plant. Rhys Jenkins is of the opinion that the willingness 
and the ability of states to give large grants to 
transnational corporations (TNCs) has become a crucial 
factor in determining the location of new foreign investment 
projects (9) Tax incentives usually take the form of relief 
from taxation of corporate profits and accelerated 
depreciation allowances. It will be shown later that both 
these forms of incentives were important components of a 
policy aimed at promoting Ireland as a favourable location 
for DFI.
It has been recognized by some neo-classical economists, for 
example: Little, Scitovsky and Scott,(10) that the state may 
have to resort to the introduction of certain promotional 
subsidies to encourage industrial activity. Unemployment 
will be a problem in many countries and, in an attempt to 
increase employment, firms may be given inducements to hire 
additional labour. Also both Balassa(ll) and Williamson(12)
- 3 -
indicate that m  special circumstances modest amounts of 
"generalized” infant industry support may be permissible.
However, m  essence,these policies must be non-selective and
non-discretionary and, most importantly any direct or
pervasive role for the state should be avoided.
This belief m  the power of free market forces tends to
result in a natural proclivity among neo-classical
economists to advocate free international trade. It is 
argued that because free trade involves opening up the 
economy to competitive pressures from abroad, it creates 
efficiency m  the allocation of resources and investment,
which protection for a small protected home market denies.
 ^ Nevertheless, it is recognized that if the operation of free 
market forces and free trade are to produce the same results 
as claimed for advanced countries, certain barriers or 
constraints blocking industrialization m  developing 
countries have to be surmounted.(13)
Neo-classical economists have argued that the process of 
industrial growth in the periphery will most likely require 
some outside stimulus from the developed core. They see the 
trickle down of modernizing attributes imparted through the 
medium of direct foreign investment as the best catalyst for 
growth. The active encouragement of DFI, it is argued,
helps developing countries by-pass constraints such as 
capital shortage, skill and technology deficiencies, while 
helping to alleviate the problem of surplus labour.(14) 
This has cultivated the view among economists such as 
Kindleberger of TNCs as the engines of economic growth.(15)
Mainstream neo-classical economists would argue that a 
combination of convincing theoretical reasons and successful 
practice leads one to expect superior performance from 
outward looking policies. They are not at all surprised 
that so many countries have changed strategies in recent 
decades, indeed Williamson points out that in 
the early 1980s only m  Africa was the old objective of 
reducing the degree of integration with the world economy 
still dominant.(16)
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1.3 OUTWARD-LOOKING INDUSTRIAL POLICIES: SOME EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE
In recent years a number of studies have emerged in 
literature which appear to give credence to the arguments of 
those who believe in the efficacy of the neo-classical 
stance. The findings of these studies indicate that 
countries which have experienced greater outward orientation 
in recent decades have performed exceptionally well with 
respect to a wide range of macro-economic indicators.
Williamson compares the growth rates of certain countries 
which he identifies as pursuing particularly
"outward-looking" or particularly "inward-looking" policies 
between 1960 and 1980. He concludes that the adoption of 
the former set of policies offers the best prospect of 
increasing growth rates.(17) In the same vein,a recent 
study by Balassa of 43 countries in the 1973-78 period of 
external shocks shows that an outward oriented policy 
stance at the beginning of the period, and reliance on 
export promotion in response to these shocks appears to have 
resulted in a favourable impact on growth performance.(18)
A study appearing in the 1987 World Development Report 
covers data on 41 countries over the period between 1963 and 
1984. The information was used to classify each economy 
into one of four groups: "strongly outward - oriented",
"moderately outward - oriented", "strongly inward-oriented", 
and "moderately inward-oriented". Each group was examined 
for two periods, 1963-73 and 1973-85. Asa result of policy 
switches between the two time periods / certain countries 
changed groups (see Appendix la).
The results of the study suggest that in almost all respects 
the economic performance in the "outward oriented" economies 
was broadly superior to that of the inward oriented 
economies. For example, the average growth rate in real 
per-capita income between 1963 and 1973 was highest in the
-  5 -
"strongly outward-oriented" economies (6.9%) and lowest in 
the "strongly inward-oriented" economies (1*6%). Despite 
the economic slow-down during 1973-85 per-capita income in 
the "strongly outward-oriented" economies grew by an annual 
average of 5.9% while in the "strongly inward - oriented" 
economies it fell on average by 0.1% a year.(19) Reference 
to Table 1.1 indicates that with respect to growth of 
manufactured exports, outward-oriented economies once again 
returned the best performance. The study concluded that: 
"This growth of manufactured exports was probably an 
important factor in producing rapid overall economic 
growth."(20)
TABLE 1.1
Growth Rate of Manufactured Exports of 41 Developing
Ecomomies Grouped on the Basis of Trade Orientation
SOO MOQ MIO SIO
% % % %
1965-73 14.8 16.1 10.3 5.7
1973-85 14.2 14.5 8.5 3.7
SOO = strongly outward oriented 
MOO = moderately outward oriented 
MIO = moderately inward oriented 
SIO = strongly inward oriented
Source: Constructed from data contained m  the
1987 World Development Report, p.p83-85.
By contrasting the evident success of economies that 
exemplify an outward looking approach with the poor 
performance of ostensibly more interventionist inward 
looking economies, academics such as Balassa and Little/and 
institutions like the World Bank have enabled the 
neo-classical view to assume the dominant establishment
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position. According to Pack and Westphall the
neo-classicals have managed to gain ascendance by: 
"diligently marshalling the presumed facts on their side of 
the debate."(21)
1.4 THE NEO-CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE UNDER ATTACK
Recently, thinking which bears a resemblance to the 
unfashionable infant industry contention, has begun to 
surface m  the literature. The focal tenet of this new 
methodology is that industry specific "selective" 
intervention can promote successful industrialization.(22) 
Contributors to this school of thought readily admit - that 
state intervention as it was practised during much of the 
import substitution era - can result m  inefficiencies and 
rent- seeking activities which distort the process of 
industrial growth m  developing countries. However, they 
would argue that the neo-classicals have failed to provide 
conclusive proof that selective intervention is at all 
times, regardless of the circumstancesi an inferior 
strategy.
They dispute the claims m  the neo-classical literature that 
the successful industrialization experienced by countries 
like South Korea and Japan, is attributable to the pursuit 
of laissaz faire outward looking policies. For example, the 
neo-classical perspective on the policy reforms of the early 
1960s responsible for transforming the Korean economy are 
called to account It is believed that the neo-classicals 
have failed to fully comprehend the exact nature of these 
reforms. Accordingly, Pack and Westphall argue that the
process of industrialization m  South Korea has been 
strongly interventionalist.
"Incentive policies having a strong industry 
bias together with credit rationing, import 
quotas, licensing controls and many other of 
the overt instruments of selective intervention 
that have been widely castigated by the neo-
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classicals have been used with apparently very 
successful results”.(23)
In particular, validation of the neo-classical position is 
found in relation to small peripheral economies like 
Ireland, Singapore and Puerto Rico. The only viable option 
open to these countries, it is argued, is the introduction of 
outward looking policies which promote greater integration 
with the world economy that leads to the possibility of 
rapid industrialization. In the case of Ireland, the 
transition to outward looking industrialization was 
initially acclaimed almost universally as an unqualified 
success.(24) However, as the 1970s progressed and serious 
flaws m  the Irish economy became visible, the efficacy of 
(what will be argued in Chapter 2 - was an extremely
neo-classical inspired approach to industrial development) 
came to be questioned. At the end of the 1970s the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC) sponsored an on-going 
study of Irish industrial development policy. An integral 
part of this work was an m  depth examination of Irish
industry as it existed in 1980/81. The research was
conducted by a team of analysts from the international 
consultancy group Telesis, led by Mr. Ira Magaziner. The 
objective of this policy review was to ensure that Irish 
industrial policy would be appropriate to the creation of an 
internationally competitive industrial base capable of 
supporting increased employment and higher living standards.
Without questioning the Irish state's policy of attracting 
foreign owned firms to accelerate the development process, 
or Ireland's attempts to industrialize as an open economy 
within the European Economic Community (EEC), the Telesis 
report made a number of recommendations with respect to the 
role of the state m  industrial development. In particular/ 
the report argued for a new departure with respect to the 
development of indigenous industry. Attention was drawn to 
the existence of obstacles or barriers which have denied
Irish exporters competitive success in the international
market place Once a firm had been created, it was argued 
that a more selective approach was required. The goal
- 8 -
should be the building up of fewer larger companies with 
strong internal capabilities.(25)
The findings of the Telesis report are in broad agreement 
with the views expressed by economists like O'Malley. While 
being what they call a late industrializing country 
(LIC) (26) which confers certain advantages- these are small when 
compared with the shadows cast by the fundamental rules of 
the game prevailing in the contemporary international 
economic system. To quote one United Nations Source:
"Economy wide restructuring requires a 
combination of state and private initiative 
and co-ordinated responses, a mix of open­
ness to the international economy and 
purposeful protection or control of domestic 
activities and markets, a match of plan and 
market which goes against some sacrosant 
principles of international economic wisdom 
as seen from the advanced countries vantage 
point".(27)
1.5 RECONCILING DIVERGENT VIEWPOINTS; TOWARDS AN IMPROVED 
METHODOLOGY
It is apparent that a pronounced dichotomy exists between 
economists advocating neo-classical policies and the 
contrasting views of those advancing the cause of selective 
state intervention or what has been termed "industrial 
targeting" (28) Empirical research concerned with the 
elucidation of this controversy is immediately confronted 
with a dilemma. The problem is to find a suitable framework 
for examining the claims of opposing factions m  what has 
developed into an extremely complex debate. The emergent 
analysis must be capable of contributing to the resolution 
of a wide range of difficult questions some of which are 
listed here:
1- Is selective intervention (aimed at alleviating 
market imperfections) by LIC governments, m  the
- 9 -
si:
>
form of (industry ) specific protectionist measures, 
ever warranted? Alternatively# must intervention be 
limited and strictly generalized across all sectors, 
as suggested by neo-classical theory?
2. Should the state become directly involved in the 
promotion of specific sectors or groups of companies 
within the economy, or does the government's only 
concern rest with improving the quality of the
i infrastructure and the provision of an environment
conducive to private investment?
3. In general, will selective intervention most likely
lead to the successful development of industries 
within LICs, and if so what general characteristics 
determine the likelihood of such success? 
Alternatively, is selective intervention
intrinsically inefficient and likely to lead to 
costly mistakes, and have the purported successes of 
selective intervention materialized despite, rather 
than because of such intervention?
4. Does selective intervention by governments require a 
specific type of administrative structure, 
characteristic of countries such as Japan and South 
Korea, which can not be easily replicated by very 
poor nations or by peripheral western European 
democracies?
5. What have been the implications for domestic 
enterprise of the transition towards more 
outward-oriented industrial policies? To what 
extent have indigenous exporters m  LICs proved they 
have the resources to establish footholds in the 
international markets which have opened up as a 
consequence of freer trade?
6. Has the impressive growth of exports in recent years 
experienced by LICs adopting a more outward looking 
approach, been dependent on foreign capital?
*
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These are the types of pertinent questions which test the 
validity of the outward looking approach or the worthiness 
of taking up an interventionist position. It is difficult 
to see how the comparative studies supporting a 
neo-classical stance can yield more than a superficial
understanding of these issues. The persuasive power of 
these studies is further reduced by a number of inherent
weaknesses.
Firstly, the links between trade strategy and macro-economic 
performance may not be as clearcut as many neo-classicals
seem to think. For example, it is recognized by the 1987
World Development Report that the direction of causality
need not be one of greater outward-orientation leading to 
enhanced economic performance.(29) On the contrary, it is 
conceivable that superior economic performance may in fact 
pave the way for outward-orientation. Therefore, the 
decisive classification m  these studies may not be whether 
an economy tends towards a more outward or inward looking 
approach, but rather the relative strength or weakness of 
the economy under consideration. In this situation,what can 
emerge is a contrast between the growth indicators of
relatively more advanced countries and/or rich oil exporting 
economies, and some of the world's most impoverished
nations.
Secondly, since these studies use a very narrow basis of
categorization (see Appendix 1A) and can include m  excess 
of 40 countries, arbitrary decisions may have to be made 
concerning which group classification any given economy 
should be assigned to Hence, demarcations can be made 
without due consideration being given to important factors 
such as historical background. For example, m  the study 
appearing in the World Development Report, Argentina is 
placed in the “strongly inward-oriented" group for the 
entire period covered. As will be shown m  Chapter 3/this 
ignores the fact that between 1976 and 1983 the industrial 
development approach adopted by the military government was
-  11 -
Extremely outward-loo king. Indeed, for these years a sound 
case could be made for the inclusion of Argentina m  the 
most "strongly outward-oriented" category. Given the poor 
performance of the Argentinian economy, this would serve 
to reduce the average growth rates in this group over the 
second time period.
Thirdly, these studies do succeed in fatally damaging the 
already tarnished reputation of the traditional method of 
import substitution. Such policies have become synonomous
with the administrations headed by controversial political 
figures like Franco, Peron, deValera, and Salazar, who have 
been portrayed as recalcitrant traditionalists in much of 
the modern literature. However, neo-classical critiques 
of import substitution cannot automatically be applied to 
modern strategic selective intervention.
The historically based cross-country approach adopted in 
this study is a worthwhile alternative to the neo-classical 
approach of measuring the effectiveness of policies. It 
yields the opportunity for a detailed examination of the 
process of industrial restructuring across a variety of 
different economies. Such analysis provides a meaningful
insight into many of the contentious issues mentioned above. 
Moreover, focusing on a particular industry should make 
the task easier and more rewarding.
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CHAPTER 2
In the years following 1958, the character of the policies 
which guided Irish manufacturing industry were strongly 
outward-looking in content Gradual trade liberalization 
culminating in EEC membership and generous state aid to 
private enterprise within a parametric context, were key 
elements which formed the edifice of Irish industrial 
development during the 1960s and 1970s. Against this 
background, m  conjunction with the repeal of the Control of 
Manufacturers Acts, the Republic of Ireland was transformed 
into an attractive location for direct foreign investment. 
Indeed, few would disagree with the assertion that private 
direct foreign investment has been the cornerstone of growth 
in Irish manufacturing industry over the last 25 years.
In the case of Ireland, the neo-classical perspective views 
foreign enterprise as having an indispensable role - with 
respect to the successful execution of outward - looking 
policies - within the context of a small open economy. 
Accordingly, the influx of capital and technology acted as a 
catalyst which sparked the process of industrialization that 
engineered the profound changes m  economic and social life 
experienced in the 1960s and 1970s.
An alternative scenario sees the TNCs - whose subsidiaries 
commenced production in Ireland - as the m a m  beneficiaries 
of the overtly parametric philosophy regarding the role of 
the state, and an increasingly pervasive free trade 
ideology. This environment favoured "branch plant" type 
operations whose commitment and overall contribution to the 
Irish economy is believed to be lacking in substance. In 
addition, notwithstanding the work of the Committee on 
Industrial Organization (CIO), the state did not fully 
appreciate the problems that greater integration into the 
world economy posed for both established and new indigenous 
manufacturing.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
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2.2 THE TRANSITION TO OUTWARD-LOOKING INDUSTRIALIZATION
1
In the post independence era, William T. Cosgrave's Cumann 
na nGaedheal government followed a policy of free trade 
which was based on export led agricultural growth. The 
Fianna Fail administration which came to power in 1932 
altered course and moved quickly in the direction of import 
substitution. Widespread tariffs were imposed and this was 
backed up by legislative measures that enhanced the 
protection of domestic manufacturers against foreign 
competition. These measures included the introduction of 
import quotas and the Control of Manufacturers Acts.
In a manner consistent with both theory and empirical 
experience, the initial results of import substitution were 
encouraging. Up to 1950 real industrial output rose 2.5 
times and employment doubled. During these years it has 
been estimated that 75,000 new jobs were created in 
industry.(1) However, post war performance was nowhere near 
as impressive. While the 1950s was a decade of fast and 
relatively sustained growth throughout western Europe, m  
Ireland/stagnation gave way to an actual decline m  output 
and employment in the years leading up to 1960.(2)
According to the literature, one of the long term dangers of 
import substitution is that it tends to promote inefficient 
industries dependent on heavy protection that have no 
comparative advantage. Irish manufacturing during the 
period of import substitution was characterized by both low 
productivity and weak export growth.(3) Both 0'Malley(4) 
and Fitzgerald(5) agree that the inability of exports to 
rise commensurately with the import of capital goods and raw 
materials precipitated the balance of payments crises of the 
1950s. These crises, together with the writings of T.K. 
Whitaker, traditionally denote the commencement of outward- 
looking industrialization m  Ireland.
As far as O'Hearne is concerned this policy change did not 
originate with the balance of payments crises.(6) While 
1958 may be the benchmark year in which one can locate an
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official change in attitudes, many of the structures of the 
outward looking approach were in place long before the
publication of Whitaker's "Economic Development". (7) It is
the opinion of Fitzgerald, that the climate of the post-war
years was not conducive to any radical re-orientation of
policies.(8) Nevertheless, while officially no change in
policy occurred, forces both internal and external were
engaged in attempts to open up the Irish economy soon after
the end of the Second World War.
For example, evidence exists which points to the existence 
of an outward — looking cadre within the Department of 
Industry and Commerce in the early post war period. In 1946# 
a bill to create a foreign trade corporation was blocked by 
more conservative elements as was a proposal one year later 
to establish an efficiency bureau.(9) In addition,
Ireland's share of Marshall aid seems to have been 
contingent upon trade liberalization.(10) Irish membership 
of the Organization for European Economic Co-Operation 
(OEEC), represented a significant movement away from the 
traditional import substitution stance. In compliance with 
OEEC directives, quota liberalization had reached a level of 
90% by 1955.(11) The creation of the Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA) in 1951, and the introduction of tax relief 
on profits earned from exports, is further proof that a 
solid foundation for outward-looking industrialization was 
laid down prior to 1958.
In the post 1958 period, moves to open up the economy 
intensified. The 1960 Finance Act extended the period of 
eligibility for export profits tax relief, from ten to 
fifteen years, with decreasing concessions for a further 
five years Unilateral tariff cuts began m  1963, and the 
Control of Manufacturers Acts were finally repealed in 1964. 
The Anglo Irish Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA) negotiated m  
1965, provided for free trade in nearly all manufactured 
products (motor car assembly was the important exception) 
with the United Kingdom by 1975. The transition neared 
completion when Ireland acceeded to EEC membership in 1973 
It was agreed that free trade in almost every manufactured
product (again motor car assembly was excluded by special 
agreement) with member countries would be phased in over a
five year period.
2 3 OUTWARD-LOOKING INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF THE 
IRISH STATE
As Ireland's integration into the world economy progressed/ 
the role of the state in the development of industry had 
much in common with the parametric or neutral approach 
favoured by neo-classical economists. It should not be 
inferred that such a role is incompatible with active 
government involvement in the promotion of industry. On the 
contrary, the state for the most part, via the efforts of 
the highly organized and well financed Industrial 
Development Authority endeavoured to insure prime conditions 
for the growth of private investment. Nevertheless, 
although certain aspects of Industrial Policy may have 
deviated somewhat from the strict neo-classical perspective, 
the state assiduously avoided any direct interference with 
the autonomy of private economic agents. In essence, the 
philosophy guiding government involvement was decidedly free 
market oriented.(12)
The IDA, particularly since the end of the 1960s, has been 
the principal tool employed by the state to implement
industrial policy. At the time of its foundation/ the
government apparently intended that the IDA should be guided 
by a free market philosophy. A Department of Finance 
memorandum concerning the creation of the organization 
included the following passage-
"One must be free from jealousy and envy ... 
one is only free from these when one has 
reached a reasonable success in life and
members should only be selected from the
latter class".(13)
In more recent times/ the IDA has voiced opposition to many 
of the findings of the Telesis and NESC reports which in
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essence are at variance with many basic presumptions of free 
market ideology. While the IDA was never intended to be a 
policy formula tor, in the past the government has tended to 
pay close attention to any advice it received from the 
Authority.
The approach adopted by the IDA has been labelled a "carrot" 
approach in so far as it has concentrated on the provision 
of incentives to foreign and native industrialists in the 
form of non-repayable cash grants, factory space, capital 
depreciation allowances and generous tax incentives. That 
state policies have contributed to the creation of a fertile 
seed-bed for private investment, particularly foreign 
investment, is supported by the following assessment of 
incentives by O'Malley:-
"The package of incentives for investment in 
industry, and exports in particular, and the 
scale and efficiency of the effort to attract 
foreign investment now amount to an industrial 
promotion effort that is one of the most 
highly intensive and organized of its type 
among competing countries".(14)
This professional excellence associated with IDA activities 
is echoed by Telesis which believed that the Authority had 
developed, "a marketing organization which is unquestionably 
the most dynamic, most active, most efficient and most 
effective of its kind m  the world."(15)
Although much has been written about the contribution of 
planning to industrial development, it will be argued here 
that economic planning Irish style was intended to be, and 
in effect was/ a rather mild form of indicative planning. As 
such, this failed to constitute any significant departure 
from a strictly parametric role. While planning does not 
relate solely to the industrial sector, it should be of some 
relevance to industry, and some indication of the state1s 
attitude to intervening in the economy.
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The first examples of Irish economic planning are to be 
found in the programmes for economic expansion- In
retrospect/ they appear as vague lists of objectives or as 
Norton describes them "a statement of mere aspirations"•(16) 
Further evidence m  support of this view is to be found m  
the National Industrial and Economic Council reports 
commenting on the first economic programme, "Economic 
planning is a method which ... consists essentially in 
defining objectives indicating the means which must be used 
to achieve them and providing for the systematic study of 
economic problems and prospects".(17)
As Susan Baker notes, Sean Lemass engaged in a process of 
legitimization with respect to the introduction of planning, 
which was aimed at countering socialist scares.(18) Lemass 
argued that planning was a programme designed for democracy 
and did not involve "coercive measures to force development 
in predetermined directions."(19) He pointed out that given 
Ireland's historical and economic circumstances, the 
voluntary private effort that was needed to generate 
sustained economic growth needed government support.(20)
The various economic programmes, in particular the first, 
had an important psychological role in so far as they served 
notice of the state's commitment to certain fundamental 
policy changes considered necessary for the expansion of 
private industry. The intangible benefits imparted by 
economic planning, give some credence to Whitaker's claim 
that it enjoyed an "undeniable measure of success".(21) 
Thus, planning was complementary with the supportive role 
Lemass spoke of, most certainly in no way contradicting the 
state's parametric approach to industrial development.
2.4 PERFORMANCE OF THE IRISH ECONOMY UNDER OLI
It is generally accepted by both conventional and more 
radical commentators, that the Irish economy experienced a 
significant transformation m  the years following the policy
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switch. Raymond Crotty, writing about one of the strongest 
advocates of the new policies - Garrett Fitzgerald, notes 
that he spoke quite frequently in the late 1960s and early 
1970s m  lavish terms about the growth experienced by the 
Irish economy. This he considered to be "Ireland's economic 
miracle."(22)
Nolan points to the doubling of the rate of GNP, reversal of 
employment and emigration trends and the development of a 
strong industrial export base as indications of the 
successful performance of the Irish economy during this 
period.(23) In addition, Wickham, a critic of Irish 
industrial policy, notes that/ m  contrast with the^1950s 
when GNP remained almost stagnant, during most of the 1970s 
Ireland had one of the highest growth rates m  Europe.(24) 
Finally, Jacobson, commenting on what he considers the 
overall success of the Irish economy during the 1960s has 
said, "It was certainly an improvement on any other decade 
since independence."(25)
A survey of OECD data on Ireland, offers further proof of 
this success story. For example, as illustrated in Table 
2.1, the annual growth rate of output was raised 
substantially m  the years following 1958 to a level of 
4.1%, with the result that the gap between the Irish and 
overall OECD growth rates had almost disappeared. In 
addition, fixed investment by business increased sharply. 
The ratio of total fixed investment to GNP rose from 13% in 
1958 to 20% in 1968.(26) Also/between 1973 and 1982 the 
average annual rate of growth of output was 4% which was 
above the average for OECD Europe during this period.(27)
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TABLE 2.1
Annual Averages 
Growth of Output 
OECD Europe
Ireland
Source: OECD Economic Survey of Ireland 1970 p.27
The increase in the volume, and the change m  the structure of 
Irish exports are further indications of the apparent success of 
the new policies. Exports of goods and services as a percentage 
of GNP which averaged 35% p.a. over the period 1954-1958 had 
reached 54% by 1982. The proportion of manufacturing gross 
output increased from 34% in 1973 to over 45% in 1982.(28) The 
change in the structure of exports is indicated by Table 2.2 
which shows the transformation m  the composition of Irish 
exports. Between 1959 and 1982 the overwhelming dominance of the 
export of live cattle has been replaced m  importance by 
machinery and electrical goods.
TABLE 2.2
Main Irish Exports As A Percentage Of 
Total Exports
Growth Of The Irish Economy
1959 1982
Live Cattle 31 Machinery & Electrical 22
Beef & Veal 10 Meat & Meat Preps 9
Textiles & Clothing 6 Dairy Products 7
Beer 5 Textiles 5
Bacon 4 Live Animals 3
Wool 4 Organic Chemicals 7
Source• Economic Conditions in Member and Associated
Countries of the Organization for European 
Economic Co-Operation and Development 
Economic Survey of Ireland 1983-1984.
1951-1958 1958-1961
4.4 4.8
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This transformation away from the export of primary 
commodities towards relatively sophisticated manufactured
products, is highlighted m  the Review of Industrial 
Performance 1986, which notes that Ireland now has the
largest share of electronics m  non-food manufactured
exports of all OECD countries . (29) On the basis of these 
findings > it is difficult to refute the arguments of 
conventional analysts m  support of the benefits which 
accrued to the Irish economy as a result of the change to 
outward - looking policies. The neo-classically inspired 
policy menu is therefore viewed in a highly favourable 
light, especially when comparisons are made with the 
stagnation and decline of the 1950s so inexorably linked to 
the limitations of the inward-looking regime.
However, a more discerning examination of the available 
facts reveals some disturbing trends. The poor performance 
of indigenous tradable manufacturing, the continual drop m  
employment, and problems arising from excessive dependence 
on direct foreign investment are manifestations which cast 
doubt on the assumed efficacy of the Irish experiment with 
outward looking industrial policies.
In line with conventional thinking, critics of protectionism 
talked about the loss of efficiency emanating from the 
production of a wide range of goods for the small Irish 
domestic market.(30) The dominant argument prevailing at 
the time was one which linked free trade with 
efflciency.(31) It was anticipated that competition would 
improve the performance of much of existing industry and new 
indigenous industries would emerge and gradually replace 
uncompetitive traditional sectors.
It was believed that any adverse effects associated with 
free trade would be curtailed by astute application of 
adaptation grants to established industry. To this end the 
Commission on Industrial Organization was appointed by the 
government m  June 1961 with the brief of examining the 
likely impact of competition on domestic Irish industry. It
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was concluded that with the exception of industries like 
cotton, linen, footwear, and motor vehicle assembly,
adaptation measures would prevent job losses. (32). In
O'Malley’s words:
"It was apparently expected that most of the 
existing industry would be able to survive in 
freer trade conditions and in many cases with 
the help of some initial adaptation measures, 
would be able to re-orient itself towards 
more efficient production for export and 
thereby benefit considerably."(33)
However/ this belief that Irish manufacturers could prosper 
m  a free trade environment did not, as Denis O'Hearn 
correctly points out, "recognize unequal power m  free
economic relations among countries."(34)
The empirical evidence suggests that Irish manufacturers
over the last 25 years in the traded sector have been unable 
to counter import penetration, or to forge new openings in 
overseas markets. Paradoxically/the best performance has 
been registered by firms m  the non-traded sector.
Sheltered from the effects of foreign competition m  a free 
trade environment, many of these companies have prospered, 
including numerous aew firms who were beneficiaries of 
government incentives. In fact/ it is firms from the 
sheltered sector that form the core of Ireland's indigenous 
industry.(35)
O ’Malley unearthed some interesting facts concerning the 
difficulties faced by indigenous manufacturers m  the traded 
sector. He discovered that in relation to industries other 
than new foreign industry, employment grew by almost 20,000 
in the period 1960-66, when a certain amount of protection 
still existed However, under conditions of more liberal 
trade since the mid 1960s, employment m  domestic industry 
has declined.(36) He argues that the industries which fared 
best in the period since 1973 belong to the non-traded 
sector. In contrast, there has been a pronounced decline m
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those areas with little or no natural protection that have 
been exposed to the full force of international competition 
intensified by EEC membership. Examples include sectors 
like chemicals, textiles, clothing and footwear.(37)
TABLE 2.3
Structural Change in Irish Manufacturing Industry
Output Foreign
Employment Employment Domestic
'73-'82 173-'82 •73 - '82 Emply.
Change Change Share Share Change Change
% % % % % %
Total Manufacturing 35 2.7 27 37 39 7.3
Chemicals 121 23.8 52 65 54.8 -10.4
Metals & Engineering 60 56.4 47 58 96.7 21.4
Food 36 - 4.5 15 14 6.6 - 6.1
Drink & Tobacco 24 2.5 39 37 -3.4 6.3
Textiles - 9.0 -43.7 23 39 -6.1 -55.2
Clothing & Footwear -24 -18.6 21 28 7.0 -25.6
Timber/Wood/Furn. -12 9.5 7 5 -24.8 12.1
Paper & Printing - 8.0 2.3 12 10 -18.9 5.3
Source: Economic Survey of Ireland OECD, 1983-84, p.38.
Further evidence in support of O'Malley's argument is found 
in Table 2.3 which compares the growth of domestic and 
foreign manufacturers between 1973 and 1982. During this 
period, although total employment increased by 2.7%, the 
number of people working in domestic manufacturing fell by 
7.3%. This erosion of employment was most apparent in 
chemicals, clothing and footwear and,in particular, textiles 
which recorded a massive drop of over 55%. The major 
domestic success story over these years was metals and 
engineering which witnessed an increase in employment of 
over 21%. Between 1973 and 1980, 7,300 jobs were created in 
this sector. This represented approximately 34% of all jobs 
created in Irish indigenous manufacturing during this
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period.(38) Most of these jobs have come from general metal 
fabrication operations, metal bending and pressing, and 
welding and repair shops which typically are oriented 
towards the supply of local markets, and from structural 
steel, where the economics also favours local suppliers. 
This is not a suitable area for export development and some 
of these companies have diversified into the U.K. market 
without providing additional ejnoloyment opportunities for 
Ireland.(39)
The inability of indigenous manufacturers to make 
significant breakthroughs in overseas markets has been a 
cause of much concern m  recent times. A survey conducted 
by Foley(40) indicates that despite the growing intensity of 
state grant assistance and advisory services, native Irish 
exporters remain relatively weak. 78% of the firms m  his 
survey exported at least some of their output/ and export 
propensity increased over time from 18% in 1960 to 31% in 
1984.(41) However, he concludes that "Everything else 
points to the weakness of indigenous exports. Given that we 
have had a decade of EEC membership, the absence of a 
substantial rise in the export propensity is 
surprising".(42)
How does one account for this poor performance by the traded 
sector under outward looking industrial policies? The 
validity of the neo-classical argument rests on the 
assumption that conditions approaching perfect competition 
will tend to prevail m  international markets. Many 
economists are of the opinion that the perfectly competitive 
industry characterized by free entry is an extreme case 
rather than the norm. The Telesis report recognized the 
existence of barriers or obstacles which prevented Irish 
manufacturers penetrating export markets, particularly those 
outside of the U.K. Factors like inadequate skill levels 
and resources to sustain long term investments m  product 
design, together with weaknesses m  marketing, distribution 
and business organization combine to limit access to 
overseas markets.(43)
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O'Malley, on the basis of work by Bain(44) and Porter(45), 
expands the point raised by Telesis, and concludes that 
native firms m  a late industrializing country with outward- 
looking market policies will be deterred from trying to 
enter any internationally traded industry m  which one or 
more barriers to entry are m  operation. He argues that 
newcomers suffer from disadvantages associated with scale, 
product differentiation, capital shortages, distribution and 
marketing problems# m  addition to external economies.(46). 
Thus, only sectors with low barriers to entry can be easily 
entered and this presents limited opportunities for 
industrial development. Because of intense competition 
between numerous LICs in a relatively limited range of
industries, latecomers have considerable difficulties m
increasing industrial employment or shares of world output, 
if they rely solely on neo-classical policies.(47)
2.5 DFI - ITS ROLE IN IRISH INDUSTRIALIZATION
The failure of Irish manufacturers to develop comparative 
advantages in tradables has meant that the growth of exports 
and the transformation of the structure of industry is
attributable to the activities of subsidiaries of TNCs. The 
attractive nature of Ireland as a location for DFI, a factor 
readily utilised by the IDA, enabled a disproportionate
amount of the available pool of transnational capital to be 
sucked into the economy Ireland offered TNCs the
opportunity to penetrate EEC markets from a lucrative tax 
shelter, and,m the process, they provided employment and
expanded exports which, for a number of years compensated
for the poor performance of native enterprise.
Wickham is in little doubt as to the pivotal role played by 
new foreign direct investment in the transformation of Irish 
industry. He notes that Ireland was one of the first
countries to base its industrialization on DFI and, on the 
basis of the number of firms attracted/has been the most
successful. During the 1960s he notes Ireland was gaming 
as many new firms as the U K (48) In spite of this trend it
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seems unlikely that the administration of the day envisaged 
that foreign enterprise would spear-head the process of
industrial development.
While Sean Lemass became increasingly vociferous in 
supporting a change towards more outward - looking policies, 
he perceived this change to be based on existing foundations 
which would enlarge "the fruits of past efforts and not 
destroy them"*(49) Bew and Patterson argue that claims made 
frequently by Lemass in favour of a dominant role for native 
producers, did not merely amount to empty rhetoric.(50) In 
the light of O'Malley's data regarding the good performance 
of native industry m  the early 1960s, Lemass may have been
justified in his beliefs. In reality it was not until the
post 1968 era,in conjunction with a redefinition of the 
IDA's role that industrial expansion started to focus on the 
attraction of new foreign investment.(51)
TNCs have assumed an important position m  Irish 
manufacturing employment. In addition, they now account for 
the lions share of manufactured exports. New foreign 
industry which accounted for only 1% of manufacturing 
employment m  1961(52)/ by 1980 employed 61,000 out of a 
total workforce of 243,000(53). Crotty observes that as 
total manufacturing employment has contracted in the 1980s/ 
foreign industry's share has continued to grow.(54) From
having only a minor share of exports m  1961, new foreign
firms exported 56% of all non-food products m  1973.(55) 
Foley recently estimated foreign firms accounted for about 
70% of total exports and at least 80% of non-food 
manufactured exports.(56)
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2.6 DFI - THE CONTROVERSY IN AN IRISH CONTEXT
While direct foreign investment has deep historical roots, 
it was not until the 1970s that the Transnational
Corporation, to use Joseph S. Nye Jnr.'s words, "came of age 
politically"•(57) There commenced a period of insistent
debate between opposing groups who held fundamentally
different perspectives on the role played by TNCs m  the 
development process. The argument m  Ireland has also been 
contentious, with advocates of DFI praising its virtues 
while many of the opposing forces seem to believe that the
pervasive nature of foreign capital in the Irish economy is 
tantamount to a parasitic form of development which has been 
called "Dependent Industrialization"•(58)
Before attempting to evaluate the claims on either side of 
the debate, it is worth reflecting on the Telesis report. 
It isolates a number of factors which are thought to 
influence the ability of foreign owned firms to help 
Ireland's industrial structure support higher income levels. 
These include whether the operation is dependent upon low 
wage levels, the presence within Ireland of business 
functions which are crucial to the competitive success of 
the business as a whole, and opportunities for linkages with 
high skilled indigenous sub-suppliers.(59)
The work of Kindleberger typifies the views of those 
economists who believe DFI to be a vital ingredient in any 
attempt to engender industrialization. According to him, 
the availability of foreign capital embodied m  the 
Transnational Corporation, offers the chance of narrowing 
the income gap between rich and poor countries.(60) While 
the conventional view acknowledges that potentially negative 
effects of TNCs exist, there is no reason to doubt the net 
benefits to LICs adopting a liberal attitude to foreign 
capital. With effective controls, the interests of the 
nations development objectives and the TNCs business 
strategy need not be in conflict.(61)
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Since the basic aim of Irish industrial development has been 
the perceived need to expand manufactured exports and this 
is the primary reason TNCs have located their production in 
Ireland, it would appear that no grounds for any conflict of 
interest exists. Mainstream economists in Ireland have 
welcomed subsidiaries of foreign companies because they have 
provided badly needed employment and new investment capital. 
They would argue that these companies have provided the 
embryo of an advanced industrial infrastructure that has 
enabled Ireland to secure a sound footing amongst the 
world's industrial nations.
Dermot McAleese has provided substantial empirical evidence 
stressing the benign impact of DFI on the Irish economy. 
For example, he has argued that American corporations have 
played a vital role in Ireland's transition from a largely 
agricultural economy in the 1950s to a fully fledged 
industrial status in the 1980s. Strong export orientation 
eased the foreign exchange constraint and accommodated 
growth in other sectors of the economy. In addition, the 
spread of manufacturing industry through the underdeveloped 
western counties brought new life to many Irish towns.(62)
McAleese argues that TNCs setting up m  Ireland have in 
general tended to offer employment prospects that are 
relatively secure and therefore should not be viewed as an 
unstable element within the economy. He has found that the 
propensity of TNCs to close down their plants is similar to 
that of domestic counterparts, and that employment recovery 
after the 1973-1977 recession was best among foreign 
firms.(63) He also quotes a study by O'Farrell and Crochly,
which shows that the closure rate of American firms is
marginally higher than the closure rate of domestic 
enterprises.(64) Parent companies, he believes, put a great 
deal of effort into choosing a production site, and on the 
evidence available to date are not likely to move from one 
location to another m  the "capricious manner prophesized by 
their critics".(65)
In addition, he has found that the linkage performance of 
TNCs tends to improve over time as familiarity with the
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local business environment grows.(66) In relation to 
American firms he notes that there has been a strong
positive inflow of capital and that initial profits have not
been repatriated but rather have been used to finance
expansion and to pay off debt (67) Furthermore, he feels
that American TNCs have brought to Ireland a marketing
network and technical and managerial expertise in key
sectors of economic activity These are factors which he
argues the Irish do not possess xn sufficient quantity
themselves. (68)
The evidence presented above suggests that the picture of 
foreign enterprises as constituting a distinct enclave 
differentiated from domestic industry is seriously flawed. 
The overall thrust of McAleese's argument is that the 
implementation of a prudent industrialization strategy has 
helped maximise the benefits of DFI. In general, this view 
has been supported by the dominant neo-classical tradition 
m  Ireland as well as successive governments. Although the 
IDA* s policies towards foreign enterprise have received 
heavy criticism from conventional sources, its assertion of 
the need to maintain consistent and pragmatic policies 
favouring DFI has prevailed. Recent policy is best 
described as one which attempts to maximise the inflow of 
capital, while tailoring incentives to ensure the secondary 
impact of this investment is enhanced.
An increasingly vociferous group of economists and 
commentators have emerged who are not sympathetic to the 
arguments expressed above. They believe that Ireland has 
been forced to depend to an inordinate degree on DFI for 
industrial growth. The majority of the firms which have 
located m  Ireland are considered to be of the 
"branch-plant" variety, operations which contribute little 
to the creation of a vibrant self-sustaining industrial 
base Attempts by the state to maximise the benefits of DFI 
to the Irish economy will not be successful because of 
conflict with the global profit-making objectives of the 
Transnational Corporation. They argue that a proper
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understanding of the way in which TNCs conduct their 
business across national boundaries, renders many of the 
neo-classical development arguments along with much of IDA 
policy redundant.(69)
Substantial and varying contributions offering empirical 
support for this position have accumulated over the years. 
Contributions range from vitriolic attacks on transnational 
capital, characteristic of passages in Raymond Crotty's book 
Ireland in Crisis, to the more measured criticisms contained 
in the writings of Eoin O'Malley. With respect to the 
primary impact of DPI, while accepting that foreign 
enterprises have provided significant employment, the 
stability and nature of these jobs are called to task. 
O ’Malley feels that an ever increasing inflow of new foreign 
firms is required to maintain the same rate of employment 
growth, and that the chances of attracting as many new firms 
as in the 1960s and 1970s seems remote.(70) A recent study 
on the electronics sector, which is dominated by foreign 
firms, has shown that there is a tendency in these companies 
for employment to grow rapidly m  relatively new firms, more 
slowly in older firms and to decline in the oldest ones. As 
more of the earlier investments mature and decline a great 
deal depends on achieving a large inflow of new first time 
investors if employment increases are to be sustained.(71)
The quality of this employment is often considered inferior 
in light of the large sums invested by the Irish state in 
educating and training the workforce Evidence presented by 
the Telesis report,(72) Wickham,(73) and Wickham and 
Murray(74) seems to indicate that the majority of people 
employed by TNCs in the past cannot be classed as highly 
skilled. Questions have also been raised regarding the 
practice of profit switching transfer pricing. It can be 
argued that this type of transfer pricing in the Irish 
context is desirable since it results in an improvement in 
the balance of payments. However, in the long run, this 
presents a false picture of reality as many of the 
anticipated spin-off and multiplier effects associated with 
export growth fail to materialise. Two additional factors 
tend to reduce the value to the Irish economy of foreign led 
export growth. Eventually/ the profits earned on exports
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will filter back to the parent country and the high import 
content of Irish manufactured exports means the net value of 
exports must be adjusted downwards.
Critics of DFI believe that the secondary impact on the 
Irish economy has been limited as a result of the branch 
plant nature of many of the firms which have located m  
Ireland. Much of the direct foreign investment that has 
occurred since the 1950s can be characterized as off-shore 
assembly. This is where the decision to locate an 
investment project is heavily influenced by locational 
factors which facilitate cost effective production for 
export. The existence of such factors is entirely
consistent with the most comprehensive conventional model of 
direct foreign investment, Dunning's eclectic theory.(75)
In the eclectic theory the propensity to invest abroad is 
determined by a set of three inter-related factors. These 
are ownership specific advantages, internationalization 
incentive advantages, and location specific advantages. As 
Jan Monkiewicz has remarked, the theory is structured m  
such a way as to provide the room for any relevant variable, 
while at the same time it does not assign any given weight 
for any specific factor.(78) Therefore/ one can argue that 
foreign investment in Germany or the U.S. is more likely to 
be governed by ownership and internationalization advantages 
than foreign investment in Puerto Rico, which will be
influenced more by locational factors.
Export oriented DFI, in which location specific advantages 
have played an important role, has tended to be heavily 
concentrated m  production with low technology content, 
labour intensive, and of low skill input. It was these
characteristics which enabled TNCs to locate the production 
process in relatively undeveloped, low wage areas, while
retaining crucial decision making activities in the core. 
Since the range of such activities is limited and because 
they are sufficently footloose to choose from a large number 
of sites, the ability of any country to attract them depends 
upon the mamenance of a favourable mix of incentives for 
TNCs to locate locally.
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A number of writers are convinced that it is this type of 
enterprise that settled in Ireland throughout the 1960s and 
1970s. According to Nolan, Ireland has followed a pattern 
of "off-shore'* development, which he argues has much in 
common with the experiences of Singapore, Puerto Rico and 
Taiwan-(77) Wickham is of the opinion that most of the new 
industry was branch-plant in character and attracted by the 
low level of wages in comparison with the rest of
Europe.(78) This view which is partially shared by
O ’Malley(79) is consistent with the eclectic approach which 
caters for the interaction of a number of locational 
advantages and does not depend on low wages per se-
The findings of the surveys investigating the reasons why 
foreign firms locate in Ireland all point in the direction 
of the importance of EEC membership* Over 80% of the 
companies in the Telesis study said they came to Ireland 
primarily because it provided a tax shelter for penetrating 
EEC markets-(80) The results of a survey relating to 
Japanese firms involving capital investments of over 30M
Irish Punts, and the creation of 1,000 jobs is found in
Appendix 2. It shows that the expansion of sales into local 
and third markets and not the availability of inexpensive 
labour, was the primary reason for choosing Ireland as a 
location.
If the m a m  intention of Japanese and American firms 
locating in Ireland was to establish a bridgehead into the 
EEC, factors like relative wages and the availability of 
government incentives were still extremely important. As 
Jacobson notes, the concern of an increasingly pervasive 
free trade ideology was that, "In order to compete on world 
markets Irish wage rates would have to be kept low".(81) 
Also, m  the face of stiff competition from other regions of 
the EEC anxious to attract foreign investment, Ireland was 
forced to introduce a battery of incentives aimed at 
ensuring a good share of a limited pool of projects.
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IDA policy was strongly grounded in the belief that 
companies more advanced than the off-shore type operations
could be enticed to set up production in Ireland, It is
possible to isolate two key elements of this policy; 
firstly, the firms attracted should be high technology firms 
which would locate their key business competitive activities 
m  Ireland. Secondly, these companies would act as a 
catalyst for the development of indigenous industry by 
extending and deepening their operations through more local 
sourcing.
These objectives have not proved easy to achieve. For 
example, with respect to the electronics sector it was 
believed that the influx of foreign companies heralded the
commencement of an Irish "Silicon Valley1', with all the
associated high technology and research and development 
activities. However, as the empirical evidence indicates, 
while the foreign sector in the Irish electronics industry 
may be more advanced than the typical Asian off-shore 
industry, there is no sign of any significant moves by the 
TNCs to locate their competitive business activities m  
Ireland.(82)
With respect to the issue of linkages both Walsh(83) and 
more recently Crotty(84) emphasize what they term the 
"enclave" nature of foreign manufacturers. The implication 
of this is that attempts at integrating foreign companies 
into the Irish economy will be frustrated. In their 
defence, foreign enterprise often cites the unavailability 
of high quality local suppliers as the reason for the 
relatively low level of indigenous sourcing. In the past/ 
attempts by the IDA to improve matters in this area have not 
met with much success. However, the initial results of the 
National Linkage Programme commenced m  1985, offer 
encouragement. For example, m  the electronics sector, by 
December 1986 over 70 foreign companies were participating 
m  the NLP, and over 40M Punts worth of extra business was 
placed with Irish suppliers during the year as a result.(85)
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2.7 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN IRELAND; AN EVALUATION
It has been shown that the industrial development strategy 
adopted by Ireland m  the late 1950s had three basic 
ideological tenets: reliance on the power of the market, 
trade liberalization, and free movement of capital. It was 
argued above that DPI played a vital role in the development 
of Irish manufacturing industry. The IDA's strategy was 
dominated by attempts to attract so called quality foreign 
industry which was expected to integrate into the Irish 
economy. While the IDA intensified its efforts to develop 
indigenous industry/ improved performance was generally 
confined to firms in the non-traded sector. The promotion
of domestic manufacturers in the traded sectors was not
elevated t to a very important position. In particular/ 
little attention was focused on the special difficulties 
faced by Irish firms attempting to break into international 
markets.
As the 1970s progressed, voices which were critical of this 
policy approach began to be heard. The NESC commissioned a 
series of industrial policy studies which, as Wickham notes, 
for the first time were not written by expert management 
consultants whose support of the IDA's private enterprise 
strategy could not be safely assumed in advance.(8 6) These 
surveys reached the conclusion that future policy must focus 
more sharply on the development of indigenous firms capable 
of reaching levels of international competitiveness. On 
this issue there was fairly widespread consensus but the 
manner in which the task should be accomplished has proved 
to be much more contentious.
By way of outlining an alternative blue-print, it was argued 
somewhat cautiously by Telesis and the NESC, and more
vociferously by Eom O'Malley, that a more active
interventionist or pervasive approach by the state was what 
the circumstances demanded. According to Telesis* the 
development effort aimed towards indigenous industry had to 
be re-organized to emphasize the building of structurally
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strong Irish companies, rather than strong agencies to 
assist weak firms.(87) Such a "hands-on" approach gives 
priority to the building up of fewer larger companies and 
greater selectivity of businesses which receive backing.(88) 
Rather than simply making grants and tax concessions 
available to private enterprises and waiting for them to 
respond with proposals for investment, the state should take 
the initiative more by directing investment into target 
industries.(89)
Ireland*s choice of target industries would generally be 
limited to the selection of specialized or niche industries, 
thus avoiding direct competition with very large firms. 
These target industries then require selective state 
intervention in order to build up the necessary 
characteristics for competitive success, such as scale, 
skills, technology and marketing.(90) It has been argued 
that this could be achieved through state enterprise, joint 
ventures between the state and private firms, building up 
selected private firms under state guidance, or by 
assembling new consortia of firms and backing them until 
they get off the ground.(91) Recent developments in policy 
towards the software industry appear to move m  the 
direction of this last option, by concentrating money and 
effort in a few successful indigenous firms. It is clear 
that these arguments amount to an explicit rejection of the 
neo-classical position.
Although as McAleese correctly points out, the state may be 
"fighting shy" of a more pervasive role(92), it does appear 
that government policy, however ponderously, is inching its 
way towards a position which shows greater awareness of the 
barriers to entry and development faced by indigenous 
manufacturers. For example, the Review of Industrial 
Performance 1986 notes that a positive environment is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the optimum 
development of industry.(93) It also speaks of the need to 
develop guidelines to insure "increased selectivity in the 
allocation of state funds in favour of firms with viable 
long term growth potential m  international markets".(94)
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Finally, the 1987 Programme for National Recovery states 
that priority will be given to the "expansion and growth of
selected Irish companies firmly rooted in the economy-"(95)
The reorganization of the IDA into completely separate 
divisions is indicative of the new approach. A new Irish 
industry division has been set up to support medium to large 
Irish companies of sufficient scale to be internationally 
competitive. It is intended that another part of the new 
structure, the small industries division/ will help small 
firms with potential to reach a size where they could be 
handed over to the Irish industry division.(96) 
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if this will represent a 
major departure from the Company Development Programme 
(CDP), which, since 1985 has been an integral part of IDA 
policy aimed at creating strong indigenous internationally 
competitive companies.
In the past the CDP has involved the IDA#m conduction with 
CTT and the IIRS, in a close co-operation with "selected" 
companies to help them identify and implement strategic 
initiatives and programmes.(97) Speaking m  1987, Padraic 
White said that the IDA are actively seeking out companies 
to support if they are "prepared to invest the money to make 
a significant breakthrough in overseas markets".(98) .By the 
end of 1987 it was anticipated that 200 firms will have been 
helped m  this fashion.(99) Clearly this thinking is 
permeated by a carrot rather than a stick mentality. The 
IDA still perceives its role as one of responding to the 
efforts of indigenous exporters rather than directing 
resources at predetermined targets. It is unlikely that the 
radical change in the Authority's structure will be matched 
by an equally pronounced alteration in its philosophy.
For the first time/the framers of Irish industrial policy 
seem to be showing signs of adopting a more cautious 
approach to foreign investment. For example, the following 
passage m  the Review of Industrial Performance 1986, points 
out some of the potential side effects of the operation of 
TNCs in the Irish economy:-
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"The "roots" of the firms in Ireland may be 
quite weak, thus making the decision to 
close easier •.. actual output, and the 
contribution to the economy is exaggerated 
due to the extent that transfer pricing is 
used (for tax purposes) to exaggerate Irish 
economy value added and the high levels of 
profit repatriation".(1 0 0)
However, a potentially dangerous supposition is embodied in 
current policy towards foreign investment. It is still 
widely believed that policies properly tailored can attract 
the so called "better quality" projects which are capable of 
yielding a good return and more security. To this end#the 
promotion of overseas investment m  Ireland will be 
"intensified on a specialised basis'1.(101) Since the pool 
of suitable foreign projects is a factor outside Irish 
control, and because of aggressive competition from other 
countries, the achievement of this goal must be in some 
doubt.
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CHAPTER 3
3.1 INTRODUCTION
By the end of the 1950s the process of industrialization 
based on import substitution - which had been adopted by 
Ireland and numerous other LICs - began to encounter serious 
difficulties. According to Nicos Mouzelis "Reliance on the 
internal market resulted m  bottlenecks which, in order to 
be ameliorated required a deepening of the industrial 
process".(1) During this crucial period a number of 
significant developments in the world economy can be 
pin-pointed. The rapid growth of TNCs which became 
increasingly willing to engage in direct foreign investment 
in LICs is perhaps the most relevant. Against this 
background, m  conjunction with the difficulties associated 
with import substitution, one can detect a shift of emphasis 
to more complex and difficult forms of investment capable of 
leading to production of exportable manufactured goods.
It can be demonstrated that during this period a general 
movement m  the direction of export oriented "outward 
looking" industrial strategies was taking place m  LICs. 
The content of, and the manner in which this policy switch 
was implemented varied somewhat in the face of the 
prevailing circumstances particular to each country. In 
Section 2 we examine the manner in which this transition was 
undertaken m  a selected group of LICs.
Section 3 investigates the restructuring of industry m  the 
wake of more outward looking policies Have the new
policies engendered growth in the domestic sector and 
promoted the development of industries m  which a lasting 
comparative advantage can be expected? Or has the
restructuring process resulted m  a weak indigenous 
manufacturing base vulnerable to competition in
international markets from both more advanced and less 
developed nations? To what extent has the expansion of 
manufactured exports depended upon direct foreign
investment?
- 38 "
The countries selected for analysis are taken from a 
generally accepted list of LICs.(2) Ireland1s fellow 
peripheral EEC members, Greece, Portugal and Spain, along 
with South Korea and Singapore from S.E Asia and the Latin 
American economy of Argentina will each be analysed.
3.2 THE TRANSITION AWAY FROM INWARD-LOOKING POLICIES:
3.2*1 Argentina
Reflecting upon Juan Peron's decade of rule between 1945-55, 
Gary Wynia remarked/ "Peron had tried to build a new 
Argentina but had only created a more desperate and 
discouraged one".(3) The import subtitution policies which 
initially promised success had by 1955 brought stagnation 
and a chronic balance of payments crisis. Unable to 
withstand the pressures arising from the emerging crisis, 
Peron was removed from power by interests who were opposed 
to national capital and the working classes, groups which 
had formed the backbone of Peron1s support. After a short 
spell m  power, the Lonardi government was replaced by the 
less moderate regime of General Aramburu. Aramburu outlawed 
the two Peronist parties, persecuted trade unionists, and 
purged Peronists from the armed forces, the civil service 
and the judiciary.(4)
The Aramburu administration reversed Peron's policy of 
opposition to the United States by promoting close 
co-operation with the Americans in both the political and 
military fields.(5) To quote Mouzelis, "By the end of 
Aramburu's provisional administration the guided-democracy 
model, complete with its strong American connections, was in 
full operation in the Argentine Republic".(6) Since the 
mid-1950s the Argentinian experience has largely been one of 
confrontation which has periodically precipitated violent 
repression.
Conflicts have arisen as a result of mutual antagonism 
between finance capital in alliance with TNCs, opposed by
certain domestic industrialists and the working classes who
traditionally have held considerable power in Argentina (7)
The military advocates of U.S. "national security
doctrines" (8 ) have tended to be staunch supporters of the
need to open up the Argentine economy. At various different
times - beginning with Aramburu and again in the 60s and 70s
- they became directly involved in attempts to bring about
closer integration between Argentina and the world economy.
But the various juntas, which in many respects have echoed
the interests of finance capital and the TNCs, have
encountered stiff resistance from those groups who have had
to bear the brunt of liberalization.
The philosophy underpinning the various post war military 
interventions in Argentina was a belief in the efficacy of 
free market policies. Aramburu’s economic policies/which 
represented an initial move m  this direction/included the 
removal of exchange controls, public expenditure cuts, 
affiliation to the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund and the encouragement of foreign investment and wage 
restraints.(9) This approach which was largely continued by 
the military sponsored Frondizi government, was stalled 
somewhat by Dr. IIlia. IIlia implemented a mildly
nationalist approach when he came to power m  1963,(10) but 
this only represented a slowing down m  the pace of change, 
not a reversal.
The armed forces intervened again m  1966 to subordinate 
fractional differences within the dominant class, favouring 
the interests of the financial bourgeoisie in association 
with foreign capital. Albert Kneger Vasena, the Minister 
of Economy, in General Ongania's dictatorship, believed m  
strong government dedicated to the implementation of a 
coherent set of efficiency promoting policies.(12) Working 
class intransigence was largely responsible for the return 
to power to civilian government m  1973. However, when the 
Peronista administration fell into disarray three years 
later, the military found themselves presented with the 
opportunity of a more determined effort at implementing 
their libera1 ideology.
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General George Videla, whose military junta assumed power 
after the collapse of the Peronist coalition m  March 1976, 
pursued an aggressive policy of economic liberalization in 
the years that followed.(13) Under the leadership of 
Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz, the government embarked on 
the establishment of a free market economy (14) The aim of 
this determined policy switch was to improve the allocation 
of resources and remove price distortions.(15) The regime 
attempted to reduce government to minimal activities, sell 
off public enterprises, cut budgets and reduce wages, remove 
all remaining restrictions of foreign investment and end the 
protection of Argentine industry from foreign competition by 
drastically reducing tariffs.(16) To this end the junta 
announced in 1978 a six year schedule outlining substantial 
tariff reductions.(17)
3.2.2 Spain
From the end of the civil war until the late 1950s Spam 
adopted an "inward looking" approach to industrial 
development. National enterprise was developed behind a 
prohibitive system of tariffs in addition to the law for 
protection of national industry which prevented foreign 
investment. This industrial policy according to Baklanoff 
had two salient features; extensive state control and 
predominantly private ownership of the means of 
production.(18) That this import substitution based
strategy had its limitations is highlighted by Anderson, who 
wrote that by the mid-1950s Franco's industrial policies had 
"neither filled domestic demand nor enhanced exports".(19)
A number of external and internal forces combined to propel 
Spain in the direction of an outward looking approach to 
industrialization. Following the signing of the 1953 treaty 
with the United States, U.S. ambassadors urged 
liberalization programmes and encouraged Spain to lift 
prohibitions on foreign investment. Such representations
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were fairly constant, and they increased m  intensity and 
publicity after 1955.(20) Internally, J. Prados Arratte 
points to the fundamental role banking interests played in 
transforming industrial policy (2 1)
During the first decades of Franco rule, Spanish 
industrialization was characterized by what has been called 
"assisted capitalism". This was prompted under state 
patronage through protectionism, transfers and subsidies; m  
addition to state control m  the basic industrial sector
complementing rather than competing with private 
industry.(22) The new policies represented a shift towards 
competitive capitalism. This move was supported by some
forces of the centre right, multinational interests and by 
the emerging business elite anxious to exploit its 
comparative advantage over traditional manufacturers.(23)
The publication of La Economica Española in 1956, is 
considered by Anderson to be a crucial landmark m  tracing 
the move away from the import substitution policies, so much 
cherished by Spanish policy makers.(24) In essence. La 
Economica Española espoused the ideology which was to be 
contained in Whitaker1s Economic Development and which 
closely followed the neo-classical free market philosophy. 
The Spanish publication preached the gospel of efficiency 
and economic rationality and emphasized that integration 
into the international economic system was the only viable 
means of inducing sustained economic growth.(25)
The radical changes made by Franco to his cabinet m  
February 1957 clearly signified his intention to alter 
Spain's industrialization policy. Franco appointed a number 
of members from the Catholic Opus Dei movement, who were
advocates of outward looking policies, to key economic
ministries.(26) The balance of payments crisis of 1959 
strengthened the hand of the neo-liberal cadre and led 
directly to the implementation of a stabilization programme 
which was drawn up m  conjunction with the OEEC and the 
IMF (27)
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The transformation of the Spanish economy into a free market 
system and the repeal of the many economic controls was 
advocated in a report by a group of experts from the World 
Bank m  1962.(28) During the 1960s,both the nomimal and 
effective rates of protection declined, the average
effective rate of protection on imported manufactured goods 
declined from 6 8% in 1962 to 31% m  1968 and various export 
incentives were also introduced during this period.(29)
The pace and extent of policy changes may have been 
moderated as a result of stern opposition from certain 
elements of the traditional bourgeoisie. For example, the 
representatives of big business m  the Spanish confederation 
of business organizations GEOE demonstrated their resistance 
to modest liberalization measures m  the early 1970s.(30) 
But as Graham points out, such resistance in no way 
threatened the evolution of the new policy regime:-
"Those reactionary to change, the imovilistas, 
failed-to hold their ground. Their unity 
was based entirely on a common agreement 
about what they did not want They had no 
formula to offer a fast evolving society, 
and could mobilise no wide popular support 
because they were swimming against the tide."(31)
3 2.3 Portugal
Self-styled dictator Antonio de O'Liveira Salazar was 
premier of Portugal from 1932 to 1968. For most of this 
period Portugal’s industrialization policy was, as in the 
Spanish case, characterized by tough state regulation of 
private industry in addition to deterrence of foreign 
investment (32) However, by the start of the 1960s there 
were indications that Portugal was beginning to adopt a more 
outward looking approach. The outbreak of guerrilla warfare 
in Angola in 1961, Portuguese Guinea in 1963 and Mozambique 
m  1964 forced Salazar to modify his nation's introverted 
economic posture (33) Quoting Xavier Pintado, Eric
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Baklanoff writes/ "Behind the facade of social and political 
immobilism under the loosening grip of an aged Salazar, 
Portugal knew deep and lasting changes during the 
1960s" (34)
In 1963 a 36 year old liberal, Luis Teixeira Pinto was 
appointed Minister of Economy, and despite considerable 
opposition to change from protectionist interests, he 
succeeded in obtaining a significant amount of 
liberalization.(35) The foreign investment law of 1965, 
allowed wholly owned foreign subsidiaries to transfer 
profits and to repatriate capital, and also provided for 
exemptions or reductions m  taxes and import duties for 
specific industrial sectors. (36)
In 1970 Secretary of State for Industry, Dr. Roger10 
Martens, spoke of the need to sweep away anachronistic 
monopolies supported by state licensing and other 
protectionist devices in order to make Portuguese goods 
competitive on the world market.(37) Nevertheless, it would 
appear that in the case of Portugal movements towards an 
outward looking policy stance were not as deep seated as m  
Spain.
A small "European oriented cadre" did emerge within the 
Caetano government, but the tenuous nature of their position 
must be clanfled. ( 38) For example, it is significant that 
none of the Portuguese technocrats, like their Spanish 
counterparts, enjoyed full cabinet rank (39) Also it has 
been argued, that notwithstanding tentative moves in the 
direction of liberalization, by 1973 Caetano was showing 
signs of resorting to a traditional stance (40)
On the 15th of May 1974/ the new government which took power 
following the revolution outlined the broad contours of its 
economic policy. Decree law 203/74, envisaged that changes 
would have to take place m  order to stimulate internal and 
external investment, and the need for total liberalisation 
of foreign trade is reaffirmed several times.(41) 
Nevertheless, while the opening up of the economy was to
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continue/ the role of the state was broadened and the years 
that followed witnessed a wave of nationalization and worker 
take-overs.
This process occurred in a haphazard manner and,taken 
together with decolonization and the international 
recession, the Portuguese economy was plunged into the 
depths of despair. The loss of her colonies resulted m  a 
huge influx of Portuguese nationals returning from 
Mozambique and Angola which created problems in the labour 
market.(42) The main medium term goal of the government 
returned by the elections of 1980 was sustained investment 
led growth. It was intended that this would take place 
within a more market orientated economy.(43)
3 2.4 Greece
In Greece, the occupation by Germany and the subsequent 
civil war had resulted in unprecedented destruction of the 
economy by the end of the 1940s.(44) The Communist Party 
was banned m  1947 and a bitter struggle ensued. With 
British and American assistance the Communist insurgents 
were finally defeated m  1949.(45) The right wing forces 
which emerged victorious, excluded all left wing 
sympathizers from the state apparatus and forged strong 
links with the USA (46) As Mouzelis notes:-
"Given the large amount of economic and 
military aid which in the context of the 
Truman doctrine they poured into the 
country both during and after the civil 
war, their influence on forming the Greek 
polity in the late 1940s and 1950s was 
considerable".(47)
In addition, the army was purged of all republican and/or 
left wing officers and was organized by the Americans into 
an apparatus which exercised enormous power m  post-war 
Greece.(48)
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During the 1950s industrial policy focussed primarily on the 
encouragement of import substituting policies and most 
industries were heavily protected from foreign competition 
According to Costis Hadjimichalis, the dominant features 
during the 1950s were the impact of American aid and greater 
privileges for the private sector, m  particular foreign 
capital.(49) U.S aid stimulated the modernization of plant 
and machinery and enhanced productivity.(50) Beginning with 
Law 2687/53 which was passed in 1953, foreign investment and 
capital received constitutional rights protecting 
repatriation of capital, interests and profits, which could 
not be amended by ordinary legislation.(51)
During the 1960s, influenced by prospective entry into the 
EEC and because the domestic market was too small to provide 
the basis for continued industrial growth,(52) the 
authorities began to put greater emphasis on the 
encouragement of export oriented industries. Mouzelis 
speaks of what he terms a Greek brand of "neo-evolutionist 
ideology", which engendered an obsession with closing the 
gap between Greece and her future Common Market 
partners.(53) This liberal philosophy he argues, has 
sustained an industrialization strategy which was careful to 
provide the most favourable conditions for private 
investment.(54)
3.2.5 Singapore
The Peoples Action Party (PAP) which came to power m  
Singapore in 1965, emerged under the approving eye of the 
British colonial authorities.(55) It is significant that 
more radical elements both within the PAP and society m  
general were marginalized before the colonial masters gave 
an independent state their blessing. Some of the more 
militant leaders of PAP were arrested by the British in 1957 
and other radicals split off in 1961 to form the Socialist 
Front. According to Banks, what was left behind was the 
more "moderate anti-communist wing of the original
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party”.(56) As Tony Smith argues, the U.K., because of its 
alignment with the U.S., had m  its best interests the
installation of a regime which would not prove hostile to 
the western restructuring programme.(57)
Outside the context of close economic integration with 
Malaysia,the official import substitution policies of the 
late 1950s and early 1960s had little chance of success. 
The strategy since independence has been to rely heavily on 
DFI to promote industrialization.
The Pioneer Industries Ordinance (PIO) of 1959 which 
tentatively embraced foreign capital was replaced by less 
tentative legislation shortly after independence in 1967. 
Also, labour legislation enacted m  1968 reduced industrial 
unrest and gave employers more flexibility m  hiring and 
firing.(59)
Singapore has been ruled consistently since independence by 
the Peoples Action Party with premier Lee Kuan Yew at the 
helm. Doubting the value of opposition parties, Lee has 
tried to run the country through an efficient managerial 
style apparatus. Ensuring that Singapore continues to be an 
attractive location for DFI is still a priority with PAP. 
This was made clear by Goh Clok Tong when m  1984 he warned 
university students "that foreign firms did indeed look at 
the political stability of a country before other factors 
like the cost of doing business there".(60)
3.2.6 South Korea
It is not widely appreciated that modern industrialization 
began m  Korea during the colonial period 1910-1945, when 
the Japanese government managed the peninsulas economy as an 
integral part of its empire. Manufacturing growth was rapid 
and extensive,though heavily dependent on Japan.(61) During 
the late 1940s and 1950s, the industrial base grew at a 
respectable rate owing to import substitution investments 
in light manufacturing and non-durable consumer goods.(62)
Therefore it would appear that Pack and Westphal are correct 
m  arguing that South Korea, despite its relatively poor 
economic position, had a comparatively strong industrial 
base of physical and human capital at the outset of the 
1960s.(63)
During the years of the first Republic between 1948 and 
1960, one of the main leaders of the struggle for 
independence, Syngman Rhee, was m  power. Rhee's extreme 
anti-communist views found favour with the Americans who 
pumped substantial economic and military aid into South 
Korea during this period. George Delury has remarked that 
the Rhee administration was "marked by pervasive corruption 
and favouritism".( 64) Against the background of
deteriorating economic conditions, student riots during the 
1960 General Election forced Rhee to quit. Subsequently/ a 
constitutional amendment was adopted which provided for a 
cabinet system of government.(65)
But the experimentation with democracy was to be brief. In 
1961 a military coup was carried out by a small group of 
officers headed by Major General Park Chung Hee. The 
military leaders retired from active service and were 
subsequently elected to important government positions. In
conjunction with a new breed of mainly western educated
technocrats, they constituted the core of leadership in the
government. The end product was a fused military and
civilian leadership structure which paved the way for export- 
oriented industrialization in South Korea.(6 6)
It has been argued that the distinguishing feature of the 
Park regime was its unrestrained commitment to economic 
growth. Unlike Syngman Rhee, Park believed that in human 
life "economics preceeds politics".(67) To this end 
intensive liberalizations were introduced. Exchange rate 
policy was simplified and efforts were made to ensure that 
the currency was not over valued.(6 8) The importation of 
capital goods and intermediate products were exempt from 
tariffs and exporters were given access to capital and a 50% 
reduction m  taxes on income earned through exporting.(69)
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However, evidence exists which disputes the claim that the 
radical change in policies embodied a neo-classical, outward 
looking approach to industrialization.
During the early years of export-led growth in South Korea, 
import restrictions were reduced gradually in a very
selective manner, suggesting an awareness on the part of the 
state that liberalization must reflect the competitive 
strength of the evolving local producers. Restrictions on 
DFI were extensive and industrial policy has been strongly
reminiscent of Japanese policy, with many decisions taken on
the basis of long term objectives and in disregard of short 
term efficiency as indicated by existing prices. In
general, the state has played an active and central role in 
the allocation of resources.(70)
A study by Luedde-Neurath,(71) suggests that Korea's export 
orientated development success was neither preceeded nor
accompanied by significant across-the-board liberalization, 
and that market forces were not given a free reign to
allocate resources. In reality/ there was a twin import 
policy, liberal towards inputs for exports and highly 
protective towards the domestic market. In addition, there 
was a tendency to cross tie the domestic and export market 
by making access to the protected domestic market 
conditional upon satisfactory export performance.(72)
O'Malley concurs with these views and notes that South
Korean indigenous manufacturing industry has made 
considerable progress in overcoming barriers to entry in 
international markets. He feels that this success has not 
been obtained by relying on the pure outward-looking, free 
market strategy, but rather may be attributable to 
significant departures from this strategy.(73) Quoting 
Allen,(74) he identifies three stages common to the 
industrial development strategy of South Korea, which 
involved departures from free market policies. Firstly, 
careful selection of an industry, followed by prevention of 
competition at the infancy stage and finally, careful 
nursing to competitive stature.(75)
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By the end of the 1970s it began to be voiced among certain 
elements that the economy was failing to respond in the 
desired manner to the efforts of the planners. In 
particular, it was felt that the investments made m  heavy 
industry had been less than successful.(76) Government 
intervention, it was argued in the time honoured 
neo-classical fashion, undermined the efficiency of resource 
allocation and impeded private initiative; thereby impairing 
economic flexibility.(77)
Park Chung Hee was assassinated m  October 1979, most likely 
by right wing elements who viewed his continued leadership 
as an obstacle to liberal reforms. The subsequent military 
coup headed by Major General Chun Doo Hwan was directed 
against senior generals who were suspected of involvement in 
the assassination of Park.
Many of these senior generals and high ranking government 
officials were forced into retirement.(78) Nonetheless, the 
new administration pushed ahead with liberal reforms which 
included a softening of the attitude towards DFI. Although 
the Rangoon bombing of October 1983 wiped out five key 
members of the new cabinet, a replacement team was assembled 
which proved if anything even more dedicated to the liberal 
cause.(79)
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3.3 MANUFACTURING AND THE TRANSITION TOWARDS OLI
Generally speaking, the expansion of exports over the last 
25 years in the countries surveyed above has been 
impressive. In fact, although manufacturing output has 
slumped in recent years, exports have continued to grow 
albeit at a reduced rate. (See Table 3.1). As Appendix 3A 
indicates, the structure of these exports has undergone a 
profound transformation over the last two decades. In 
particular, primary commodities other than fuels, minerals 
and metals have contracted in importance. While the export 
of machinery and transport equipment has assumed a position 
of greater relevance most distinctly in South Korea, 
Singapore, Spam and Portugal.
TABLE 3.1
Growth Of Manufacturing And Exports In 
Selected LICs
% An. Av. Gr. % An. Av. Gr. Ex's. Goods & Svcs. 
of cf
Manufacturing Exports As % of GDP
'65-*80 *80-'85 '65-'80 *80-'85 1965 198i
Argentina 2.7 1 . 6 4.7 3.2 8 15
Greece 8.4 0.9 1 2 . 0 2.5 9 22
S. Korea 18 8 9 0 27.3 13.0 9 36
Portugal 8.9 4 4 3.4 1 0 . 0 27 39
Singapore 13.3 2 . 1 1 2 .0* 5.9 NA NA
Spain 6.7 0.3 18.6 8 3 11 23
* = 1970-1980 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
Is this manifest deepening of the industrial process a 
harbinger of the successful development of a vibrant 
manufacturing base, complete with comparative advantages in 
many fairly advanced traded sectors? Or does the data
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presented above tend to gloss over deep seated problems 
encountered during the restructuring process? Has foreign 
capital been involved to any great extent m  the development 
of new export markets?
3.3.1 Spain
According to Lobo the Spanish economy which between 
1961-1974 was "placed on the road to prosperity"(80) 
transformed into a "nightmare" for policy makers as the 
1970s progressed.(81)
TABLE 3.2
Growth Of Spanish Industrial Production 
By Sector 1960 - 1973 (Base 1970 « 100)
Sector 1960 1973
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 50 168
Textiles 59 1 0 1
Chemical & Petroleum Products 26 124
Basic Metals 25 165
Metal Products 20 152
Source: United Nations Statistical Year Book
1974, p.48.
As shown in Table 3.2, manufacturing experienced significant 
growth during the 1960s and early '70s. In fact, in 1971 
the growth of Spain's industrial production was at 20.4% 
greater than that of Japan's 16.4% and far ahead of the 
highest growth rate in the EEC of 12.6%.(82)
In contrast, during the period 1973-1981 manufacturing 
employment declined by 15.3% or a loss of 517,150 jobs.(83) 
From Table 3.3 it can be seen that the crisis was most 
intense m  the basic industries It would seem that the
main body of established Spanish manufacturing had great 
difficulty resisting import penetration as trade
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liberalization became more pronounced. A feature which was 
not dissimilar to the experience of Irish manufacturing
under much the same circumstances-
TABLE 3.3
Shifts In Production, Employment And 
Productivity, Spain 1973-1981
Production Employment Productivity
Food, Beverages &
Tobacco 5.03 -2-21 7.4
Textiles -1.12 -4.18 3.2
Clothing & Leather -0.88 -3.40 2.6
Wood & Furniture -0.02 -2.29 2.3
Paper & Printing 3.82 -1.40 5.3
Chemicals 4.20 -0.69 4.9
New Metalic /
Mineral Products 1 15 -0.76 1.9
Iron & Steel -
Base Metals 0-76 -1.74 2.5
Machinery &
Transport Equipment 1.67 -1.69 3.4
Source: Barquero in Hamilton (ed.)
Industrialization in Developing and 
Peripheral Regions, p.121.
Lieberman has estimated that the total numbers employed in 
wholly owned foreign subsidiaries in Spam amounted to a 
modest 21,278 on Jan 1 1979.(84) In net terms DFI m  Spain 
represented only 2.97% of gross fixed capital formation in 
the period 1965 to 1969, 2.23% for the period 1970-1974 and
1 8% for the period 1975 to 1979.(85) On the basis of this, 
Lieberman concludes that the extent to which DFI has 
stimulated the economy has not been spectacular. However, 
the role played by foreign capital assumes greater 
importance if one uses more liberal definitions of what 
constitutes DFI.
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By Baklanoff's evaluation, from 1960 to 1974 Spain received 
over $0 . 6 billion in net private long term capital from
abroad of which direct investments comprised no less than
$106 million.(8 6) By 1973, 202 of the nation's largest 500 
firms had some degree of foreign ownership and 117 were
either majority owned or 50:50 joint ventures.(87) Besides, 
accumulated DFI from 1960 to 1975 tended to be attracted 
primarily to those industries which have shown the greatest 
growth in productivity and exports.
It was also found that in 1973 foreign capitals share in 
what is termed the net-worth of certain sections of Spanish 
industry reached the following levels: Equipment 42%;
Non-Ferreous Metals 21.5%; Chemicals 36.8% and Motor 
Vehicles 56.7% (89) In addition, a survey of Japanese DFI
m  Spain between 1971 and 1984 indicates that substantial 
investments have taken place in transport, equipment,
chemicals and allied products, electrical equipment and 
non-electrical machinery. (See Appendis 3B). Also it has 
been estimated that by the 1980s, of the 30 largest Spanish 
industrial firms no fewer than 17 had either majority or
minority foreign interests.(90) This clearly demonstrates 
that in recent years a pivotal role existed for foreign 
capital in many of the key growth areas of Spanish industry.
3 3.2 Greece
The statistics outlined above (see also Appendix 3A) with
respect to Greek industry fail to uncover a number of 
interesting facts regarding the structure of Greek
manufacturing For example, one characteristic of Greek
industrial development has been the persistence of a
plethora of small family units. The census of industrial
establishments of 1958 found that only 0.7% of the 
establishments in the manufacturing sector ( 7 4 9 out of 
109,793) employed 50 employees or more.(91) As Table 3.4
indicates this figure had risen to only 2 .2% by 1979.
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TABLE 3.4
Persons Employed Per Size Of Establishment 
Greece, Spain & Protugal (Percentages)
Firms Employing Over Average
1-9 10-49 50-99 10 0 Plant
Greece (’79) 91 3 6.5 1 . 6 0 . 6 5.2
Portugal(* 71) 78.9 15.9 2 . 6 2.7 15.6
Spain (170) 76 6 18.5 2.5 2.4 15.0
Source: Hadjimichalis, Uneven Development and
Regionalism, p.162
Table 3 4 shows the contrast which exists between Greece and 
both Spain and Portugal. The Portuguese figures for 1971 
show that 5.3% of establishments employed more than 50 
employees. The corresponding figure for Spain m  1970 was 
4.9%. In addition, the average plant size m  Greece is 
significantly lower than the averages prevailing in Spam 
and Portugal. Hadjimichalis notes that until the 1970s 
these small units were mainly concentrated in the more 
traditional sectors such as footwear and leather, and 
operated with low productivity. In contrast, recent trends 
indicate an improvement in productivity and specialization 
has increased to include modern sectors such as aluminium 
products, plastics.(92)
This offers support for arguments by Mouzelis regarding the 
weak nature of native Greek enterprise. He believes that 
since the 1950s, Greek indigenous capital, whether m  its 
mercantile or finance form, proved unwilling or unable to 
orientate itself towards the manufacturing sector in what he 
terms the key branches, such as chemicals and metalurgy.(93) 
In the 1960s DFI was, he claims, directed mainly at these 
sectors, with the result that its impact was greater than 
its relatively small size would indicate.(94) This view is 
supported by Keefe who argues that foreign capital has been 
"highly visible m  the small area of modern industry".(95)
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He estimates, that between 1953 and 1977, nearly 54% of 
foreign investments m  Greece were in the mechanical 
engineering sector and 15% in chemicals.(96)
The share of foreign capital in GNP increased from 2.15% m  
1962 to 11.6% in 1978.(97) However, Keefe is of the opinion 
that no significant amounts of foreign investment capital 
entered the country during the 1974-1984 period.(98) This 
position is contradicted by Evangelica Dokopoulou who argues 
that m  both current and real terms the stock of FDI has 
expanded more sharply during 1975-1980 than in the period 
1961-1975.(99) Dokopoulou thinks that foreign operations m  
Greece have been shifting away from investment to serve the 
local market towards the establishment of export platforms.
The number of foreign subsidiaries m  the major 200 
manufacturing and mining firms, rose from 45 m  1973 to 55 
m  1979. This would tend to give credence to the view that 
the prospect of full EEC membership acted as a stimulus for 
TNCs to serve the Middle East market.(100) This analysis is
supported by OECO data which shows a particularly rapid
increase in exports to middle eastern countries between 1975 
and 1980 when the proportion of total Greek exports to these 
countries increased from 10% to 23%.(101)
3.3.3 Portugal
During the period 1968-1973, the years of the Caetano 
administration, industrial production expanded by almost 9% 
p.a and in 1973 the level of gross investment reached 22% 
of GDP.(102) Political instability, a large influx of
African migrants and the prevailing turbulence in the 
international market place precipitated a decline m  
Portugal's economic fortunes. Industrial production
increased by only 2.4% m  1974 and fell by 5.4% m  
1975.(103) Supporters of free market principles in
Portugal, for example, economist and Prime Minister, Anibal 
Silva, believe that an austerity programme sponsored by the 
international monetary fund in the early 1980s has been
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responsible for turning the economy around.(104) Opponents 
contend that recent growth (see Table 3.1) has a weak 
foundation because the economy had been m  such bad 
condition the only way to go was up. They argue the 
improvement is based largely on external factors such as the 
large subsidies from the EEC, and ignores structural 
problems in the Portuguese economy.(105)
Murtena outlines a number of restrictions and difficulties 
faced by Portuguese industry. These constraints he argues 
have prevented the emergence of vibrant indigenous 
enterprises capable of creating and sustaining comparative 
advantages. They include the proliferation of inefficient 
and badly structured small productive units, relative 
technological backwardness and lack of entrepreneurial 
talents and managerial capacity in specific fields.(106)
The performance of Portuguese manufacturing industry m  
recent years has not been uniform across the various 
sectors. As Table 3.5 confirms m  a number of industries 
such as metal products and transport equipment the 
production indices are well below their 1980 level. 
However, pulp, paper and paperboard have done well, while 
chemicals, textiles and non-metalic mineral products 
returned a steady performance. In light of the squeeze on 
consumer demand engendered by austerity measures, export 
growth seems to have been necessary for increased production 
and certain sectors fared better at breaking into overseas 
markets than others.
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TABLE 3.5
Production In Portuguese Manufacturing 
1983 - 1985 (Base 1980 = 100)
1983 1984 1985
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 106 98 98
Textiles 1 02 106 119
Leather 124 119 113
Wood and Wood Products 106 10 2 106
Pulp, Paper & Paperboard 117 124 143
Chemical Products 105 1 1 2 1 2 1
Non-Matallic Mineral Products 115 115 119
Metal Products 92 87 78
Machinery 127 95 90
Electrical Machinery 119 108 1 1 2
Transport Equipment 79 63 63
Motor Vehicles 82 66 66
Source* Calculated from data m  Indicateurs Des
Activities Industrielles, Organisation De 
Co-Operation Et De Développement Economiques. 
Pans, various years.
I n  the 1960s and 1970s Portugal was an attractive site for 
DFI for the following reasons: low wage levels, membership
of EFTA, the transfer of profits and capital were assured by 
law and the Portuguese government provided political 
stability and outlawed labour disputes.(107) Large 
transnational companies like International Telephone and 
Telegraph, Timex, Ford, Firestone, Heinz, Renault, Grundig 
and British Leyland boosted foreign investment in Portuguese 
industry during the 1960s . Flows of foreign direct
investment increased from £5m m  1971 to £7m in 1972 rising
to £10m m  1973.(108) Eugene Keefe estimates that as of mid
1976 there were some 100 to 125 firms of American origin in 
Portugal, with a total investment somewhere between $200m 
and $250m.(109) He notes that in virtually all cases of 
nationalization - and other forms of intervention which
commenced after the revolution - foreign firms were 
officially exempted.(1 1 0 )
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Foreign investors assumed a dominant position in electronics 
and electrical industries and also had significant 
participation in chemicals, transport equipment, pulp and 
paper, automobiles and ready made clothing-(111) While the 
actual inflow of capital may not have been large, as in 
Spain and Greece, this investment was directed at sectors
which in recent years have become key growth areas m  the 
Portuguese economy. It is likely that a large proportion of 
export growth m  Portugal has resulted from the application 
of foreign capital and technology to a low wage structure. 
For example, in terms of labour costs m  textiles, during 
the early 1980s Portugal was very competitively placed (see 
Table 3.6). The average manufacturing wage m  recent years 
for Portugal is also below the level of Spain and Greece, on 
par with South Korea and only marginally above the level 
recorded in Singapore. (See Table 3.6).
TABLE 3.6
International Wage Costs In 
Textiles And Manufacturing
Textiles 
Ireland = 100
Avg. Wages m  
Manufacturing % 
Increase l78 - '83
Avg. Hourly Wage m  
Manufacturing 1983 
Value in US$
Netherlands 257 Portugal 3.74% $1.50
Italy 160 Greece 5.13% $2.33
Greece 70 Spain 3.74% $3.10
Hong Kong 39 Singapore 14.56% $1.29
Portugal 38 S. Korea 8.61% $1.53
Source: Telesis Report p 307, and Worldwide Economics
Indicators, Business International Corporation, 
New York, 1984.
3.3.4 Argentina
In the face of the political ferment it has been forced to 
endure, it is hardly surprising that the Argentinian economy 
has performed indifferently m  recent decades. Many
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Argentine conservatives believed that protection of the 
manufacturing sector in conjunction with the expansion of 
the public sector and constraints on foreign investment 
were largely responsible for the low rates of growth
experienced m  the 1960s and 1970s. The military junta 
which came to power in 1976, in contrast to the failed 
attempts of its predecessors managed to implement wide 
ranging liberalization measures. However, manufacturing 
industry did not respond in the manner anticipated, to the 
free market shock treatment.
Data contained in the Latin American and Carnbbean Review 
indicates that m  the first years of the 1980s, 
manufacturing production slumped. According to Burns, 
traditional labour-intensive and natural — resource based
industries suffered more than most under the Governments
open economic policies of the late 1970s and early
1980s.(112) As Table 3.7 indicates manufacturing recovered 
in 1983. This improvement was directly related to a policy 
U-turn by the military administration. Faced with mounting 
unrest, the regime was forced to reintroduce import
restrictions and these moves were subsequently strengthened 
by the civilian Alfonsin Administration.(113)
Table 3.7
Selected Industries Argentina 1982 - 1983
(Base 1970 = 1 0 0)
1982 1983
Drinks 106.9 115.1
Textiles 79.2 92.7
Clothing 49 . 1 53.0
Paper 102.5 114.7
Industrial Chemicals 132 .1 150.6
Rubber Products 107.8 142.6
Plastic Products 108.5 124.3
Electrical Machinery & Equip. 64.8 71.8
Transport Equipment 81.1 89.9
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística Y Lenson
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Industries which had been mos t  severely affected by the 
earlier liberalisation policies such as textiles and 
clothing, expanded quickly when import controls were 
restored. Modern sectors like chemicals, rubber and
plastics also responded to the protectionist measures.
In Argentina, the modest inflow of direct foreign 
investments m  industry during the 1930s and early 1940s was 
halted abruptly when Peron implemented his nationalistic 
policies.(114) While Peron was forced to become less
hostile towards foreign capital in the early 1950s, it was 
not until the election of Frondizi in 1958(115) that one can 
identify a significant inflow of DFI. Law 14.780 of 1958 
provided congenial conditions for foreign capital wishing to 
invest in Argentina.(116) This investment was mainly 
directed towards relatively technologically complex areas of 
manufacturing such as chemicals, automobiles and 
non-electrical machinery.(117)
Authorizations of foreign investments increased
significantly towards the end of the 1950s.(118) Foreign 
firms share of industrial production, which fluctuated 
between 18% and 19% from 1955-1959, reached 24.7% by 
1962,(119) and rose to 28.0% m  1964.(120) The Ongama 
regime, particularly from March 1967, applied an economic 
program that "represented the hegemonic domination of 
foreign monopoly capital".(121) It has been reported that 
the authorities were confident that foreign investments 
which during 1967 represented 10% of total new industry 
investment would increase rapidly.(122) At the end of the 
decade a more conciliatory policy towards national capital 
started to prevail,(123) and the new foreign investment law, 
No. 205 57 of November 1973, brought forward by the Peromst 
coalition represented a certain tightening of the conditions 
for foreign investment.(124)
The law on foreign investments decreed by the junta in 1976, 
as well as the law on the transfer of foreign technology and 
the new industrial promotion law, underlined the regimes 
liberal attitude to foreign capital.(125) Table 3.8 clearly
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demonstrates that between 1975 and 1982, Argentina attracted 
a significant amount of U.S. direct foreign investment.
TABLE 3.8
U.S. PFI In Argentina 1955 - 1985 
(US?m in Book Value)
Year Total Manufacturing
1955 418m 218m
1960 47 3m 214m
1965 992m 618m
1970 1 .0 2 2m 669m
1975 1,154m 764m
1980 2,494m 1,584m
1982 2,979m 1.718m
1985 2.785m 1,578m
: Constructed from tables in the Statistical
Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 25. Editor 
James W. Wilkie UCLA, Latin America Center 
Publications, University of California,
L.A. 1987, pp. 693-703.
These figures are somewhat in excess of estimates from other 
sources. For example, one source examining the figures for 
the years between March 1977 and March 1980, put total 
foreign investment at £58 million.(126) Regardless of the 
actual quantity, it is at least certain that foreign 
investments have tended to be directed towards the modern 
sectors of Argentine manufacturing.(127) In addition, it is 
likely that these investments concerned import substitution 
practices as much or more than export-oriented production.
3.3.5 Singapore
Outward - looking industrialization in Singapore like the 
Irish experience, has been characterized by high dependence 
on export based DFI. Since independence, Singapore has 
never favoured rules that limit foreign equity ownership, or
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íTABLE 3.9
DF I By Japanese Firms In Singapore By Sector
Minority
Paper & Wood 3
Concrete 2
Paints 2
Food & Beverages 2
Textiles 1
Plastics 2
Shipbuilding 1
Non-Electrical Goods 4
Others 5
TOTALS : 22
Majority +
Wholly Owned
Audio Equipment & 
Consumer Durables 14 
Electronics 8
Precision Equip 16
Electrical Equip. 7 
Pharmaceuticals &
Chemicals 4
Cement 2
Metal Materials 6
Others 2Q
85
Source: Constructed from data contained in - Japanese
Overseas Investment, (Toyo Keizai Shinposha,
Ltd., Tokyo 1986), pp. 85-103
We can infer that the main strength of indigenous based 
manufacturing m  Singapore is located in the more 
traditional sectors. The production of the more advanced 
technical products is almost entirely the preserve of U.S. 
and Japanese companies with only a limited supporting role 
for native enterprise. This is unlikely to change without 
significant changes in policy.
The dependence on DFI for continued manufacturing and export 
growth and the weak position of domestic manufacturers was 
demonstrated by the events of the mid 1980s. In 1985 the 
inflow of new foreign investment rapidly slowed down as 
Singapore's operating costs were undercut by other countries 
in the region.(134) The economy shrank by'almost 3% between 
mid 1985 and mid 1986, and there was negative growth in 
manufacturing for the first time in over 25 years.(135)
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mandate technology transfer, and capital has always been 
able to move quickly m  and out, (128) In 1970 wholly owned 
foreign companies accounted for 57% of exports and these 
together with joint ventures accounted for 83% of total 
exports By 1978 wholly owned foreign firms accounted for 
84% of all manufactured goods exported from Sxgnapore.(129)
Annual foreign investment inflows averaged between $775 
million and $1.1 billion between 1980 and 1984. 40% was
channelled into new investments and 60% went to 
expansions.(130) The United States is the source of 50% of 
all foreign private investment in Singapore. Total U.S. 
investment by the end of 1984 had reached $5 billion.(131) 
Sizeable portions of total foreign commitments are in 
petroleum, computer equipment, electronic components and 
metal engineering industries.(132) Small scale local
enterprises have not been able to compete effectively in 
these more advanced sectors. Instead, indigenous capital 
has tended to enter less technological, labour intensive 
industries which involved only minor initial fixed capital 
outlays.(133)
The findings of a survey of Japanese investments m  
Signapore between the early 1960s and 1985 give a good 
indication of the nature of indigenous manufacturing in this 
country. Of 107 investments by Japanese companies, 85 
involved the creation of either wholly owned or majority 
owned subsidiaries and 22 were minority Japanese interests. 
Table 3 9 shows the sectoral breakdown of these two groups.
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"Over the past 25 years the Republic of Korea's 
economic growth has been spectacular. The 
nation has advanced m  a single generation 
from one of the world's poorest countries to 
the threshold of full industrialization, 
despite the need to maintain one of the 
world's largest military establishments".(136)
The driving force behind the outstanding growth performance 
of the South Korean economy has been an energetic indigenous 
manufacturing base. The domestic sector was diligently
nurtured with the goal of creating strong competitive 
companies oriented towards the production of tradable 
commodities. An attestation to the efficacy of this
approach, is the recent emergence of a number of South
Korean transnational corporations.
Ironically, over much of the last 25 years government policy 
focused * on restricting the operations of foreign 
enterprises. It was believed that limitations were
necessary to prevent the emasculation of local capital. 
Indeed, a number of foreign investors including Gulf Oil and 
Dow Chemicals have pulled out of Korea in the past because 
they found it difficult to conduct business.(137) Foreign 
investment was allowed only in those areas of manufacturing 
included on a positive list and majority 
foreign participation in projects was normally 
discouraged.(138)
Until the early 1980s at least, inflows of foreign capital 
to the manufacturing sector have tended to be modest in 
comparison to countries like Singapore. Between 1962 and 
1983 the total amount of accumulated new foreign investment 
has been estimated at only £408m.(139) As far as Japanese 
investment is concerned the bulk of participation was 
confined to joint or minority ventures. For example, in a 
survey of 140 investments by Japanese firms in Korea between 
the late 1960s and 1985, only 22 involved majority 
participation.(140)
3.3>6 South Korea
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Notwithstanding the relatively low volume of DFI, Joseph 
Chung is of the opinion that foreign capital has played a 
crucial role m  the development of South Korean 
manufacturing (141) Some evidence exists showing that 
significant amounts of capital have been invested across a 
wide spectrum of South Korean industry by Japanese companies 
(see Appendix 3). In the light of this information, it 
seems possible that the success of a number of local 
manufacturers is attributable in part to capital and 
technology link-ups with foreign enterprise. Nonetheless, 
Nigel Harris shows that, in general, foreign investment m  
South Korea "followed accelerated growth rather than leading 
to it".(142)
3.4 CONCLUSION
The international economy m  the post WW2 era witnessed deep 
and lasting changes m  the structure of manufacturing 
industry This alteration was fueled by an explosion of new 
products, new technologies and the phenomenal growth of the 
transnational corporations. This process, which was in the 
main spearheaded by American enterprise, necessitated closer 
economic integration between nations. Against the
background of an increasingly pervasive free market 
ideology, trade barriers began to be dismantled and laws 
restricting DFI were relaxed. The American government was 
to the forefront in attempts to encourage the introduction 
of policies it argued were essential to cure the ills of 
stagnation and BOP crises which plagued many LICs The new 
outward-looking approach offered the prospect of banishing 
the negative symptoms that were the legacy of excessive 
inward-looking protectionism.
This new strategy of industrial development won enthusiastic 
support from key groups and individuals within the countries 
examined in this chapter. These modernizing elements were 
in general able to stifle opposition from recalcitrant 
sections of society who had been the principal beneficiaries 
of import substitution policies. The new regime, it was 
believed, would instil greater efficiency in traditional
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manufacturing and facilitate the emergence of industries 
involved in the production of more technically complex 
tradable commodities. While it is generally true that the 
new policy successfully attained the goal of expanding the 
export of manufactured products, the belief that this 
advance would be synonomous with greater efficiency and 
growth within indigenous industry proved to be erroneous.
There is evidence, persuasive m  the case of Argentina and 
Spain, that m  the face of mounting liberalization/ large
sections of manufacturing industry struggled to exist. They
suffered from a failure to resist import penetration and the
inability to re-orient production in the direction of new
overseas markets. In the case of Argentina this resulted m
the hasty re-erection of protectionist barriers while in
Spain it has led to a painful process of adaptation. Where
successful comparative advantages have emerged, it has
largely been as a result of the application of imported
technology within the context of a low wage economy. With
respect to the impressive performance of the textile
industry in Greece and Portugal, it is far from certain that
continued reliance on a free market strategy will create the
most positive outcome. In textiles, rationalizations and
technological advances are giving rise to increased
competition from developed market economies, while at the
other end of the spectrum, a threat has started to emanate
from very low wage economies.
The evidence suggests that the decline m  traditional
sectors has - with the exception of South Korea - not been 
matched to any great degree by the growth of a crop of new 
technologically-inclined indigenous exporters. The ability 
to annex portions of the international trade m  more complex
areas of production has been heavily reliant on the ability
to attract new foreign investment. Or to entice existing
foreign firms serving the local market to expand into
overseas markets. It was shown that while exposure to DFI 
m  many cases" was far below the Irish level, it was
nonetheless of great importance. With respect to Spam, 
Greece, Portugal and Argentina it was demonstrated that/
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although comparatively small in volume/ foreign capital was 
concentrated in the key sectors in terms of output and 
export growth. With respect to Singapore it would be 
anachronistic to assume anything less than a pivotal role 
existed for foreign enterprise in the drive towards 
industrialization.
In the case of South Korea during the Park era,the role of 
the state veered fundamentally from what was considered the 
basic neo-classical approach to export - led growth. Park 
believed that to achieve the objective of sustained economic 
growth the economy must be subject to planning and 
adjustment by the state.(143) State intervention in 
industry was not without historical precedent in the 
Republic of South Korea. For example, m  1948 almost 70 
large enterprises and public utilities were under government 
control, 52 were managed directly by the government
and 17 by state appointed managers.(144) However, these 
were crude forms of intervention more concerned with the 
machinations of political patronage than moulding a dynamic 
manufacturing base for the future. The evidence of the Park 
era indicates that the state made a purposeful attempt at 
directing the economy m  a manner thought most likely to 
yield tangible long term results. For industry this 
entailed selective intervention aimed at building up strong 
indigenous companies and maintaining some control over the 
inflow of foreign capital. According to Harris, "In the 
sixties and seventies the state (in S. Korea) dominated the 
entire process of rapid economic growth"(145) "and even m  
the early eighties, the government was still busy 
intervening to force mergers, specialization and 
monopolies" (146)
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CHAPTER 4
4 .1 INTRODUCTION
The emergence in recent times of a group of LICs has - 
as was seen in the previous chapter - posed a number of 
questions for the analysis of the world economy. In a recent 
article, Jenkms(l) examines the motor industry in a selected 
group of what he terms "semi-industrialized" countries m  
order to shed more light on some of the controversies which 
emerge from the more general discussion of economic develop­
ment in what we have more appropriately termed LICs.
Jenkins warns of the dangers of generalizing from the 
experience of one industry.(2) But, in this instance, the 
argument runs from the general to the particular and it is 
hoped that a sectoral study of the motor industry can 
contribute to a better understanding of some of the issues 
and contradictions which the general analysis manifests.
Some of the questions which Jenkins concludes arise out of a 
study of the literature on the growth of the LICs include:
How significant is the growth of the LICs for the 
world economy?
Does their emergence signify a major change in the 
international division of labour?
What are the factors underlying industrial growth in 
the LICs?
Are these primarily external or internal?
How important have government subsidies and other 
forms of incentives been in export promotion’
To what extent has the growth of LICs been assoc­
iated with the activities of TNCs?
Has industrialization been associated with a 
significant indigenous base of accumulation?(3)
To focus attention on some of the above questions within the 
context of the motor industry, it is necessary to gain some 
understanding of the way in which the motor industry has 
developed both internationally and within the LICs. The 
examination of the industry m  the LICs will be centred on
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case studies of the same countries as m  the more general 
discussion in Chapter 3.
4.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MOTOR INDUSTRY; AN 
OVERVIEW
The basic concept of the automobile has hardly evolved at 
all during its first century. A hundred years after the 
first prototypes, the motor vehicle is still a four-wheeled, 
internally powered, transport apparatus for road use, 
designed to carry a driver and a few passengers. Tecimical 
advances have provided utility, performance, operating 
economy and personal comfort far beyond the dreams of the 
original automakers, but the concept of the motor vehicle 
remains much as it was m  the early 1900s. In contrast to 
the product, the industry has evolved through a series of 
"dramatic transformations, from a small group of artisans 
and tmkerers concentrated m  France and Germany to a vast 
worldwide enterprise organised on totally different 
principles.M(4)
The first of these transformations was the breakthrough m  
the production process by American manufacturers 'in the 
early years of the century which facilitated the creation of 
a mass-volume industry. The second occurred during the 1950s 
when European manufacturers combined mass production with an 
emphasis on product differentiation and successfully 
challenged the Americans for the first time. The third 
began in the 1960s when Japanese companies made 
breakthroughs in production organization which allowed the 
production of high quality products at competitive 
prices.(5)
According to an MIT report each breakthrough is 
characterized by three elements: firstly, an innovation
with respect to some aspect of production systems or 
products, which facilitated the second element, an explosion 
of demand m  the domestic market, which m  turn gave rise to 
the third element, a sudden and powerful threat to producers 
in the rest of the world.(6)
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In a manner which closely resembled the above sequence of 
events, U.S., European and Japanese manufacturers m  that 
order all managed to become significant producers and 
exporters of motor vehicles. For a variety of reasons: for 
example, protectionist measures, government legislation and 
the threat of competition, the major companies if they were 
to retain markets or secure access to developing markets 7 
had to invest in overseas assembly plants.
DFI was initially defensive in nature and was directed 
towards supplying heavily protected domestic markets which 
operated in isolation from each other. In LICs this 
promoted an excessive amount pf "market fragmentation", a 
trend which Jenkins has explained on the basis of 
Knickerbocker's theory of "oligopolistic reaction".(7) 
During the post war era of economic development(via import 
substitution)host governments/ intent on developing a local 
manufacturing industry/ introduced "local content" 
legislation, which forced the TNCs to increase the amount of 
local components used.(8 )
As was documented in the previous chapter, commencing in the 
late 1950s/ and gathering momentum in the years that 
followed, the policies of many LICs began to be increasingly 
orientated towards the promotion of exports. A number of 
LICs turned their attention towards the motor industry and a 
variety of policies aimed at expanding exports were 
introduced. This period was one of immense change within 
the international industry. Jenkins argues that the 
seventies were characterized by what he terms the 
"increasing unification" of the 3 core blocks to create a 
single world industry.(9)
Increased competition stemming from the phenomenal success 
of Japanese companies built up pressures to reduce costs. 
As the 1970s progressed/ it came to be widely believed that 
the motor industry was entering a "maturity phase" and in 
keeping with Vernon's "product life cycle" theory,(10)
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future trends would be towards locating an increasing part 
of the manufacturing process in LICs- It was expected,
therefore, that trends within the industry in conjunction 
with the change of policy by LIC governments, would shift
the locus of production m  the direction of peripheral
locations/ although still firmly under the control of TNCs.
The MIT report termed this a possible "fourth 
transformation". (11) Skilful positioning m  the
relatively small but fast growing LIC markets would enable 
producers to gam the advantages of local minimum production 
back to the industrialised countries.' However, m  recent 
years, the concept of a "dematurity scenario" has come to 
the fore. Such a view places a much higher priority on
flexibility rather than efficiency in the production 
process.
4.3 THE WORLD MOTOR INDUSTRY 1900-1970; THE EMERGENCE OF
NATIONAL BLOCKS
4 31 Early American Dominance;
The first autos were basically experimental prototypes 
designed mainly for the amusement of the wealthy. 
Production volumes gradually increased to batches of similar 
but rarely identical vehicles. This was largely a result of 
the tendency of production to concentrate on luxury designs, 
for which only a very small demand could exist and therefore 
no need for mass production technigues arose. This, 
according to James Flinck, was reinforced by the policy of a
number of European governments offering bonuses to those who
/
purchased large, heavy duty vehicles, suitable for military 
use m  the event of war.(12) The situation at that time was 
shaping up somewhat differently m  the U S. While the 
pattern in Europe was one of hand building by individual 
designers, the building of cars m  the USA had an industrial 
appearance about it right from the start.
i
One explanation of this given by Rhys, (13) was that the 
decline m  the bicycle forced leading makers and their
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component suppliers to concentrate on the production of 
automobiles and to make them m  larger numbers and at lower 
prices. In the U.S.,the railways preceded the roads, so no 
trunk roads existed and those that did were totally unsuited 
to motor cars. Consequently, the American pioneers were 
forced to concentrate on producing very light cars which 
would be able to use the poor quality roads. The production 
of light cars was suited to bicycle makers and the 
horse-drawn carriage business, which had the necessary 
machinery and technical knowledge*
In the USA the engineering industry as a whole had developed 
a system of standardised part interchangeability which was 
not apparent in Europe at the time. In 1906 / Henry Leyland 
won the Dewer prize for engineering, when 3 Cadillacs were 
taken apart and assembled into 3 new vehicles which were
then driven 500 miles without mechanical failure.(14) In
Europe, at the time/ manufacturers endeavoured to make all 
their own parts and components. The practice of
subcontracting in the U.S. allowed the manufacturer to use 
his capital in establishing his vehicle assembly capacity, 
and at the same time to purchase low cost parts and
components produced by outside specialists with relatively 
long production runs.
It was left to Henry Ford and his associates to combine
these and other ideas into a new manufacturing system which 
was to lead the motor industry into the age of mass
production.(15) This enabled Ford to tap the huge potential 
of a large and relatively well off middle class which
inhabited an environment which was geographically and 
socially ideal for the expansion of privately owned 
transport. To quote Rhys: "In short per capita purchasing 
power allied to low cost parts and products and production 
methods meant the establishment of a large industry".(16)
Thus, the transformation sequence outlined above was 
precisely the American experience. The new production
techniques gave rise to unheard of scale economies which
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reduced costs and stimulated demand. The American
manufacturers were well positioned to service the overseas
markets, and very quickly were able to capture a significant
market share. As Maxcy points out, it is not always
realised that the American dominance of the world motor
industry occurred prior to 1914. In the three years before
that date, the U.S. average annual production was 3,581,000
vehicles or 78% of the world total. That superiority was
maintained throughout the mter-war years* for although the
American share fluctuated fairly widely, it never fell below
70%. Indeed m  1929, when U.S. output reached its peak for
the period of 5.3 million vehicles, it represented a
remarkable 84% of world production.(17)
Exports grew quickly, passenger car exports reaching about 
7.5% of production m  1914.(18) The United States m  the 
1920s and 30s was by far the largest exporter of cars; 
however, the option of manufacturing m  the U.S. and
servicing world markets through exports was not to prove a 
long term proposition. First/Ford(19) and later General 
Motors(20) set up overseas assembly plants. The two mam 
factors which favoured this trend, were differential tariff 
rates between fully built-up units and parts(2 1)/and savings 
in transport costs.(2 2)
But as the tariff barriers imposed by European governments 
grew higher the American producers were faced with a major 
dilemma. They either attempted to manufacture locally or 
abandoned their assembly operations and with them their 
markets In the markets outside of Europe at the time, 
rising tariffs, although unsavoury, did not give rise to the 
same concern because no local manufacturers seemed capable 
of posing a significant threat to market shares. Withm 
European markets, national producers with good growth 
potential stood well poised to challenge and defeat the 
Americans if the latter tried to continue local assembly, 
which was fast becoming an uneconomic proposition. The 
American producers were left with no alternative but to 
engage m  full local manufacture wherever possible.
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The American movement into manufacturing in Europe would 
have been even greater m  the mter-war period if the door 
to direct foreign investment had been as open in other 
countries as it was in Germany and Britain. For example, 
both General Motors and Ford were denied the opportunity to 
establish manufacturing operations in Italy.(23) It is a 
widely held belief that this drive towards overseas 
manufacturing by the American companies would not have been 
necessary m  a situation of free - market competition. 
Indeed, Ford's manufacturing operations had higher delivered 
costs in Europe (excluding tariffs) than their counterparts 
in Detroit, even though the European facilities were 
thousands of miles closer to the market and paid lower 
wages.(24)
4.3.2 The European Challenge:
Although a European producer, the German firm of Daimler 
became the first transnational in the motor industry, with 
the acquisition of a wholly owned subsidiary in Austria, in 
1902. The drive towards overseas production by European 
producers did not begin until after World War 2. Rolls 
Royce attempted to set up production m  the U.S. m  1919, m  
Springfield, Massachussetts, when they acquired an American 
subsidiary but this venture ended in failure when Rolls 
Royce of America was liquidated in 1931.(25) Morris made a 
disastrous attempt at manufactunnq m  France(26) and 
Citroen, Renault and Fiat all made excursions abroad but 
with limited success.(27)
These foreign investments were small scale, tentative 
attempts to secure a foothold m  neighbouring and jealously 
guarded national markets. Ultimately, they were all 
abandoned except for those in Belgium, and the first 
successful foreign investments by European firms took place 
outside the EEC countries.(28)
In the early 1950s, the European motor industry consisted of 
a relatively large number of small manufacturers m  isolated
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markets producing a wide range of vehicles, which differed 
significantly m  technical design. Because of a) their 
relatively small size and b) the protection afforded to 
national markets, European producers were denied the 
advantages associated with large scale production which 
their counterparts m  the U.S. were advantageously 
exploiting. When the tariff walls in Europe began to 
crumble during the 1950s> the diversity of the European motor 
industry became its greatest strength. Now that each 
manufacturer could sell its specialised products in all the 
markets of Europe, an adequate scale to fully capture
production economies was suddenly available.(29)
The growing strength of the European producers in the 
immediate post war period presented the American
transnationals with stiff competition in the peripheral 
regions for the first time As if anxious to make up for 
lost ground, the Europeans showed little hesitation in 
entering into full manufacture m  Latin America at a time 
when the U.S. firms seemed to be content to rely on assembly 
operations. One company which took the plunge into 
manufacturing early/ and subsequently enjoyed spectacular 
success/was Volkswagen of Germany.
Volkswagen do Brasil, a company set up in 1953, was
producing 365,472 units m  1973, nearly half the total 
output of the country that year. Indeed by the mid 1970s 
Volkswagen's Brazilian subsidiary had produced no fewer than
1.5 million beetles.(30) Volkswagen de Mexico founded in 
1964 in similar fashion quickly established itself as the 
largest producer in Mexico. Other European producers such 
as Renault, Fiat, Daimler-Benz, Citroen and Peugeot also set 
up production facilities in Latin America. The arrival of 
the Japanese companies on the scene as the 70s approached 
was to give the region a very crowded appearance.
4.3.3 The Emergence of Japan
Although the origins of the Japanese motor industry can be 
traced back to the first years of the twentieth century,(31)
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Duncan estimates the industry's total output up to 1925 at 
only 922 vehicles.(32) This period was characterized by 
relative disinterest by the Japanese government(33) and by 
the Zaibatsu, the leading industrial and financial families. 
During this period m  Japan, the car was viewed more with 
curiosity than as a practical mode of transportation-(34) 
Nonetheless, the sudden increase in demand following the 
destruction of much of the tramway system by the 1923 Tokyo 
earthquake, prompted Ford and General Motors to establish 
local assembly plants.(35)
In the face of weak local competition Ford and General 
Motors came to dominate the Japanese market.(36) However, 
the Japanese government was determined to confront the 
difficult task of building a national motor industry. The 
Americans were gradually forced out of assembly as 
production ceilings were imposed, tariffs on parts raised 
significantly, and import and exchange permits were 
gradually phased out. Ford and General Motors tried hard to 
establish some form of manufacturing presence in Japan.(37) 
But a variety of proposals were turned down by the 
authorities. Japanese firms such as Nissan and Toyota 
showed considerable interest m  joint ventures with the 
American companies as a means of gaming access to advanced 
technology. The official view, however, was that such 
knowledge could be obtained without granting ownership 
rights to foreign transnationals.(38)
TABLE 4.1
Japanese Production Of Cars And Commercial Vehicles
1950 - 1984
Cars C.V.s
1950 1,594 30,003
1955 20,268 48,664
1960 165,094 316,457
1965 696,176 1,179,438
1970 3,178,708 2,110,449
1975 4,568,120 2,373,471
1980 7,07 3,108 4,004,776
1984 7,073,173 4,391,747
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Source: Constructed from data in the Society of Motor
Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) World Automotive 
Statistics 1985, pp 41-46.
As Table 4 1 above indicates, the initial results of the 
Japanese nationalist experiment were not that encouraging. 
In 1955, 20 years after the Americans were forced out, local 
production of cars stood at little more than 2 0,0 0 0 . 
Despite this slow beginning, by 1970 this figure had soared 
to over 3 million. In the same way, exports of cars 
rocketed from 7,013 in 1960 to 1,407,340 by 1972.(39) This 
was largely a result of the growth in importance of the U.S. 
market from the late 1960s onwards, and by 1973 Toyota and 
Datsun between them sold 530,000 units annually.(40) 
Similarly, the Japanese share of the European market grew 
from 0.6 per cent in 1970 to 7.3 per cent by 1979.(41)
It is important to emphasise that the successful 
breakthrough by Japanese producers was not solely based on 
mass production of low cost vehicles. The initial Japanese 
efforts around 1960 to export at a very low price, failed to 
get off the ground. These cars were not exactly what 
consumers wanted and would not sell merely on the basis of 
price.(42) Instead Japan's entry into the international 
market arose through fine tuning of manufacturing systems to 
combine high volume output with quality and low labour 
content.
The United States Department of Transportation estimated 
that in 1983 the Japanese held a $1,000 to $1,500 per car 
cost advantage over American producers.(43) Writing in the 
same year, motor correspondent John Holusha believed that 
there were few analysts who would disagree that the Japanese 
have: "taught the world a lesson on how to produce reliable, 
efficient automobiles at less cost than had been thought 
possible.(44)
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The intervention of the Japanese government had profound 
effects on the development of the Japanese motor industry. 
Without the guidance given to the industry by the Ministry 
of International Trade and Investment MITI, and the 
protection afforded to local producers by the exclusion of 
DFI, it is unlikely that firms such as Toyota and Nissan 
could have grown so quickly• In the absence of such 
intervention, Japan may have become a significant producer 
of motor vehicles, but almost certainly a large proportion 
of that output would have been controlled by the American 
and European producers- The total shut-out of direct 
foreign investment was eased slightly in the early 1970s 
when after sustained pressure by America, some limited joint 
ventures were allowed.(45)
By the beginning of the 1970s Japan had firmly established 
itself as an important part of the core, in contrast to the 
fragile part of the periphery it had been in the 1930s. It 
was together with North America and Europe, part of what 
Jenkins has termed: "the 3 major blocks of the motor
industryMr. (46)
4.4 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE MOVE TOWARDS A WORLD INDUSTRY
The trend m  recent times has been towards a continuation of 
the internationalization of capital within the industry, 
with the formation of what Jenkins has called a "world motor 
industry".(47) According to Jenkins, one of the main 
characteristics of this phase has been the process of 
standardization which has taken place within the 
international industry. Is is now no longer the case that 
the industries in the three major producing areas, North 
America, Europe and Japan, have distinct regional 
characteristics The "downsizing" of passenger cars in the 
United States, the "dieselization" of commercial vehicles 
and the "radialization" of all the major tire markets all 
point in the same direction of greater homogeneity within 
the international motor market. The culmination of this
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process are the "world cars" developed by General Motors and 
Ford.(48)
As the seventies progressed there was an emerging view about 
the future of the car industry which became virtually the 
new orthodoxy. This argued that growing competitive 
pressures required a far greater use of economies of 
scale.(49) The prediction was that the 1980s would witness 
a great shake out of firms, with only the largest managing 
to survive. In the words of Lee Iococca the industry would 
witness a: "third Industrial Revolution".(50)
It was anticipated that once set up, these giants would 
proceed to integrate their assembly and manufacturing 
networks so as to minimize costs and maximize revenue, while 
offering an essentially similar range of products. 
Standardization was to be the order of the day. As Sinclair 
points out it was envisaged that: "Brazilian workers would 
build engines for American consumers' small cars, Spanish 
consumers would buy cars designed for Germans m  Detroit and 
assembled by Portuguese from components manufactured over 
three continents".(51)
The strategy of setting out to design a car with the express 
intention of using the same basic model to serve several 
markets, surfaced during the 1960s. Indicative of this new 
approach was the decision by Ford to integrate its European 
operation so that the same models could be made and sold in 
the U.K. and on the continent. General Motors after some 
initial hesitation followed suit.(52)
With the launch of the new Escort in 1980, Ford created an 
ideal structure as far as scale economies are concerned. 
Final assembly was located in Saarlouis in Germany, where 
capacity was 300,000 units a year and the Halewood plant in 
Britain which had an annual capacity of 250,000.(53) Both 
these plants were supplied with engines by the Bridgend 
plant which was scaled to produce 500,000 engines a 
year.(54)
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This trend continued, with Ford starting Escort production 
in South Africa while General Motors extended its Chevette 
and Kadett range from Europe to Brazil and even, through the 
Isuzu company, in which it had obtained a 34% share, into 
the Japanese market. As Peter Waymark notes, potentially 
most significant of all, versions of both the Escort and 
Chevette were manufactured in the U.S.(55) This was a move 
which until the advent of the oil crisis would have been 
inconceivable. The U.S. car industry was coming under 
increasing pressure to design more compact "European cars". 
The possibility arose that the same basic model could be as 
relevant m  the U.S. as m  any other market, hence the 
"World Car" concept gained credence.
General Motors showed most faith in the "World Car" concept. 
While the Chevette represented a partial move m  this 
direction, it was in essence a European car which was 
adapted for use in other markets. The J-car project on the 
other hand was intended from the beginning to have world 
wide application. The initial research and development was 
carried out at G.M.'s international project centre in 
Warren, Michigan. The U.S. divisions and two foreign 
divisions were incorporated to work on the design features, 
with particular emphasis being placed on evolving body 
structures capable of accepting common components.
Two basic J-cars emerged from this process, one for the U.S. 
and the other for the non-American markets. The five U.S. 
versions corresponded to the existing General Motors car 
divisions While looking different on the exterior they had 
the same basic body structure in addition to sharing many 
common components.(56) The non-U.S. J-car was made m  
Europe as the Vauxhall Cavalier and the Opel Ascona Apart 
from the badges and minor variations the models were 
identical.
Largely as a result of the failure of the "world car" to 
capture the imagination of consumers world wide, evidence
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has begun to accumulate, which while still accepting the 
importance of international sourcing together with scale 
economies and standardization, places greater emphasis on 
what have been termed dematurity factors. The rapid and 
diverse changes which have been impinging upon the motor 
industry question the validity of the world car concept.
A more correct view may be one which forsees a growing 
spectrum of technological alternatives becoming available to 
meet a greater diversity of user needs, leading to a much 
higher priority being placed on flexibility rather than 
efficiency in the configuration of the production process. 
Speaking in 1982, Elerhard Von Keunheim of BMW/ stated that 
"the microprocessor has ended the days when it was necessary 
to be a mass producer of cars".(57)
This alternative scenario would predict that the motor 
industry has entered a dematurity phase in which medium 
sized and small producers stand a much greater chance of 
survival, through skxlful exploitation of particular 
technologies and market niches. For example, Ray Horrocks 
addressing the Fourth World Motor Vehicle Conference m  
Geneva, in 1982 believed that "we will see automated "batch" 
production proving to be as cost effective as out and out 
volume manufacture, but with the added advantage of 
manufacture being able to respond much faster to shifts in 
demand".(58)
4.5 THE MOTOR INDUSTRY IN THE LICs
The first cars to appear in LICs were direct exports from 
the mature producers, who set up their own networks of 
dealers, both to sell the cars and to provide service and 
repair facilities.(59) In many countries assembly
operations were established in the inter-war period. This 
involved the export of kits usually known as CKD (completely 
knocked down) units. This had the advantage of lower 
transport costs and enabled modifications to be made to suit 
the conditions of particular markets. Examples of this type
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of operation were the assembly plants set up in various 
locations throughout the world by Ford and General Motors
during the 1920s an 1930s.
In the period from 1955 to 1965,the transition from assembly 
operations to full local manufacture took place in a number 
of LICs This move towards local manufacturing resulted
from the interaction between government promotional 
activities and the growing rivalry between U.S. and European 
TNCs for new markets. High tariff protection m  addition to 
import restrictions and local content legislation meant that 
in many cases the only alternative to local manufacture was 
to abandon the market.
Initially the giant American TNCs were hesitant to undertake 
manufacturing m  LIC markets and as Jenkins notes, went as 
far as closing down a number of assembly plants.(60) 
Nevertheless, as the 1950s progressed it quickly became 
apparent to Ford and General Motors that failure to 
undertake manufacture in markets with future potential, 
would lead to the government carrying out its plans with the 
aid of the European transnationals.
Therefore, the development of national automotive industries 
m  these LICs was marked by strong participation by the 
large U.S. and European TNCs who tended to fragment the 
highly protected domestic markets which resulted in low 
efficiency and high costs. As Jenkins notes: "Production 
was almost exclusively intended for the domestic market and 
the integration of the local subsidiaries into the 
international operations of the parent companies, was purely 
as a market for imported parts and components".(61) In 
short, the motor industries in LICs (with the exception of 
S. Korea and possibly India) were developed in relative 
isolation under the guidance of transnational capital.
In the 1970s the situation was modified substantially when 
motor vehicle manufacturing, developed on the basis of 
import substitution, began to orientate itself towards the 
export of automotive parts and vehicles. Indeed as Jenkins
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notes the 70s witnessed a move in the direction of new 
plants being built expressly for production for export to 
world markets. For example, the Ford Fiesta plant set up in 
Spain m  1976 together with the more recent General Motors 
plant set up there and recent Brazilian and Mexican plants 
all were designed to export a significant proportion of 
their output These plants were designed to produce at 
efficient levels of output incorporating the most up to-date 
technology.(62)
This would indicate that production was becoming 
increasingly concentrated in the LICs, because these low 
factor cost locations offered the most efficient means of 
manufacturing a product which was becoming more and more 
standardized. However, in most instances/ the TNCs have 
sought reductions in local content requirements as a "quid 
pro quo" for the expansion of exports. While a significant 
amount of growth of the industry in the LICs has taken place 
it is not at all clear that this represents any significant 
alteration m  the international division of labour.
»
The growth of the motor industry m  LICs in recent decades 
is illustrated by reference to Table 4.2 below. Vehicle 
production in LICs increased dramatically from practically 
nothing m  1950 to over 3 5 million in 1980. Their share of 
total world wide vehicle production increased from 2 .4% m  
1960 to 9 5% in 1980. However, the share of total world 
vehicle production for this group of LICs in 1985 had 
dropped to 8 .6%. This was largely associated with the 
stagnation and decline experienced by various nations in 
Latin America.
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TABLE 4.2
Share Of LICS In The World Vehicle Production 
1950 - 1985 (000 Units)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1985
Spam -------- 58 536 1,182 1,417
Brazil -------- 133 416 1,165 966
Argentina -------- 89 220 282 137
Mexico 22* 50 193 490 398
India 15* 51 63 114 230
Yougoslavia -------- 16 131 284 258
South Korea -------- -------- -------- 123 378
TOTAL * 37* 397 1,579 3,640 3,787
World Production- 10 
LICs As % Of World
,578 15,661 29,667 38,495 43,660
Production: 0 2.4 5.3 9.5 8.6
* Assembly
Sources: 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1980 Figures from Rhys
Jenkins, "Internationalization of Capital and the 
Semi-Industrialized Countries: The Case of The 
Motor Industry. Review of Radical Political 
Economies, Vol 17, 1985, p. Calculated from 
Production Figures in SMMT Annual Report 1986.
On the basis of data up to 1980, Jenkins examines how far 
changes in the distribution of manufacturing capacity have 
been accompanied by changes in world exports. He concludes 
that LICs only accounted for 3.1% of the value of 
international exports in 1980 and that their share of 
exports of finished vehicles was only 5% for this year.(63) 
In 1979 he notes that LICs accounted for only 3.7% of car 
imports and 3 4% of parts and accessory imports into OECD 
countries.(64)
This leads Jenkins to conlude: "It appears that the semi -
industrialised countries have, as yet, not made a major
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impact on the international division of labour m  the motor 
industry. Despite their growing share of world output, 
their importance in terms of world trade m  vehicles and 
parts is limited and their significance as exporters to 
the major developed country markets is negligible. The 
major changes in the international division of labour m  the 
world motor industry m  recent years have taken place within 
the advanced capitalist countries and have involved the 
semi-industrialized countries only peripherally".(65)
4.6 CASE STUDIES OF THE MOTOR INDUSTRY IN SELECTED LICs
For comparative purposes the national industries we examine 
here correspond to the general economic analysis m  Chapter 
3. While this overlooks countries such as Brazil and Mexico 
it includes the largest exporter Spam and the country which 
is often viewed as having the best chance of emulating the 
Japanese experience. South Korea. The motor industry in two 
of the countries i.e. Greece and Singapore, would not 
appear significant and in any event detailed references to 
them in the literature are rare and so they will be omitted 
from the analysis below.(66) It is intended that this 
analysis will help us towards a better understanding of the 
issues raised by the questions posed at the start of this 
Chapter.
4.6.1 Argentina:
After a failed local attempt at assembly in the early part 
of the century, Ford set up an assembly plant m  Buenos 
Aires m  1916, General Motors and Chrysler followed suit in 
the 1920s.(67) In the early 1950s/the Peron government 
attempted to promote the development of a vehicle 
manufacturing industry. In 1951, decree 25.056/51 declared 
the motor industry of national interest and granted exchange 
and import privileges for a period of 5 years.(68) Although
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a mojE liberal attitude towards DFI began to emerge in the mid 
1950s, until 1959 no Argentinian government managed to
persuade a major manufacturing company to set up a 
manufacturing plant m  the country.
Changes m  the laws and attitude towards DFI m  1958, 
together with specific legislation to promote the 
development of the motor industry, contained in decree 3693 
of 1959/ stimulated a move in the direction of local 
manufacturing. (69) The immediate response to the decree was 
no fewer than 23 proposals to manufacture vehicles in 
Argentina.(70) The official rationale appears to have been 
that free competition would yield the best results. Jenkins 
quotes a senior government official as saying, "From the 
struggle for a hungry but restricted market, the most 
competent and efficient firms should emerge, without any 
prior exclusions and without any discretionary powers on the 
part of government officials which would permit erroneous 
interpretations".(71)
In 1960, majority foreign owned firms accounted for only one 
third of Argentine vehicle output, but by 1965 this share of 
output had been increased to about 60%*(72) There was also 
a tendency for TNCs with minority holdings to increase their 
share over time. In a situation of excess capacity it was 
not long before foreign competition forced weaker national 
producers out of the market. By 1968 foreign ownership of 
the Argentine motor industry was almost complete.(73) This 
period also saw an increase of foreign control m  the parts 
industry, where foreign firms by the early 1970s had doubled 
their share of a decade earlier.(74)
While production of vehicles reached a peak of 293,742 units 
m  1973, labour productivity was low and prices way above 
the prevailing international average.(75) Market
fragmentation, intensified by frequent model changes, 
resulted in in-efficiencies. In the early 70s the 
government introduced legislation aimed at curbing the 
proliferation of model changes and introduced measures aimed
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at increasing exports. The introduction of export
subsidies, when taken in conjunction with substantial
devaluations in 1971 and 1972 led to an increase in exports
from $17 million in 1971 to $94 million in 1973.(76)
Decree 680/73 required car manufacturers to increase their 
exports by relating expansion of the domestic market to the 
achievement of certain export targets. Initially at least, 
as much because of subsidies and a favourable exchange rate 
as of the decree, exports increased to $132 million m  1974. 
Nonetheless, despite the continued existence of the decree, 
exports fell in the following years.(77) One explanation 
for this downturn in exports is that because access to the 
domestic market was linked to the volume of exports, when 
domestic demand fell during these years/ the incentive to 
export to maintain market shares diminished.(78)
The aggressive liberalization policies adopted by the Junta 
in the post 1976 period filtered through into the motor 
industry. Tariffs were lowered to 55% for trucks and to 45% 
for cars. In addition, the restrictions introduced on the 
production of new models, parts, and foreign ownership were 
all removed.(74) In general, Jenkins concludes that the new 
policy was "designed to make the Argentine industry more 
responsive to foreign competition".(80)
TABLE 4.3
Production Of Passenger Cars & Commercial Vehicles 
Argentina 1977, 1981, 1984 & 186
CARS CVs TOTAL
1977 168,000 51,014 218,014
1981 138,000 23,140 161,140
1984 141,000 25,451 166,451
1986 143,094 27,404 170,498
Source: SMMT, World Automotive Statistics 1986 & 1987.
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The information contained m  Table 4.3 above indicates the 
difficulties that the Argentine motor industry has faced 
since the mid 1970s. While there has been a slight 
improvement since 1981, output has come nowhere near the 
peak level of 293,000 reached in 1973. Exports in 1983 
which totalled 5,202 represented only 3.2% of production, a 
figure which compares very unfavourably with the 18.8% of 
Brazilian output which was exported in this year.(81) There 
would appear to be little evidence to suggest that recent 
liberalization measures have benefited the industry to any 
appreciable extent. The poor performance of recent years 
has hit parts and components producers most severely as 
Jenkins notes:
"Transnational terminal firms will be able to 
continue making profits either by exporting 
to Argentina or assembling vehicles using 
imported parts. The parts producer/ however, 
is often largely dependent on the terminal 
firm for the greater part of its market and 
will suffer".(82)
Spain:
According to George Maxcy, the Spanish government was 
determined to create a national motor industry in the post 
war period Since it was felt the country lacked the 
technical and financial resources to develop the industry on 
its own, the government set about creating the conditions 
needed to induce DFI Low wages, anti-strike legislation,
tariffs and local content requirements ensured a steady 
inflow of investment.(83)
TABLE 4.4
Vehicle Production In Spain 
1960-1986
1960 1970 1980 1983 1986
58,000 536,000 1,182,000 1,288,721 1,532,623
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Source: SMMT, World Automotive Statistics, various years
This strategy met with considerable success. By 1973 eight 
TNCs had invested in the Spanish motor industry,(84) and/in
1974/ production of cars stood at 722,000 and CV's
111,023.(85) The government played an active role m  the 
negotiations with the TNCs via the Instituto de Industna
(INI) and held a majority interest m  what was the second
largest producer SEAT. In general, the evolution of foreign 
producers usually followed the path outlined by Maxcy "One 
of joint ventures to start, with the local partner producing 
foreign models under licence, and then the MNE increasing 
its share in the partnership over time as the local content 
and output increased".(86) Fiat, Chrysler, Renault and 
Citroen all increased their control over local partners 
during this period.(87)
TNCs and their local partners accounted for 96% of Spain's 
output of 819,000 vehicles m  1973.(88) As Maxcy notes, 
within the space of twenty years Spam had become the 
world's ninth largest producer, and exports had expanded 
rapidly in the early 70s to reach almost 20% of the total 
vehicle output in 1973.(89) But the domestic market was 
still heavily protected and fragmented, and the likelihood 
was that Spanish producers would be unable to withstand more 
open competition.
With future EEC membership in mind, in December 1972 the 
Spanish government began liberalizations of the motor 
industry aimed at increasing the attractiveness of 
exporting. Local content rules were reduced from 70% to 50% 
if exports increased/ and export-orientated" concerns were 
given tax concessions and access to official sources of 
credit.(90) According to Maxcy/ these policies contributed 
to the decision made later by Ford to establish a major 
subsidiary in Spain.(91)
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Maxcy's argument is supported by Jenkin’s findings 
concerning Ford's decision to locate a new car plant in 
Valencia.(92) Jenkins concluded that low wages and low 
labour costs were relatively unimportant factors m  
determining investment decisions. He quotes a study by Ford 
m  the early 70s where the cost of producing the 4 door 
Escort at four different European locations was compared. 
Although wages were lower in Spam, efficiency was less and 
material cost higher than the other locations which meant 
there was only a negligible advantage in terms of direct 
costs associated with a Spanish site. The mam reason why 
production costs were lower m  Spam was an export subsidy - 
amounting to 13% of the value of exports - paid by the 
Spanish government.(93)
Total vehicle production m  Spam which reached 1.2 million 
by 1980 had risen to approximately 1,290,000 by 1983. As 
can be seen from Table 4.5, General Motors, who set up a 
plant in Zaragosa, were producing almost 250,000 cars a year 
many of which were for export. Indeed, of total car 
production for 1983, exports amounted to 674,000 or 
approximately 55%.(94)
TABLE 4.5
The Production Of Passenger Cars And Cvs 
In Spam By Manufacturer 1983 (000)
Cars
Fasa-Renault 313.7
Ford España 227.8
Seat 250.0
Citroen Hispana 132.7
CVS
Motor Iberica 20.3
Metalúrgica S.A 17.8
Mevosa 9.2
Esana-Sava 13.9
Source: European Marketing Data and Statistics 1985.
(Euromonitor Publications Ltd , London, 1985), 
p.124.
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Portugal:
In Portugal/ assembly began in 1963. FBU imports were 
restricted and duties on ckd imports decreased the greater 
the local content of the final product (95) By 1974 annual 
production had reached 69,000 cars and 18,314 CVs.(96) 
Among the 18 firms assembling vehicles were a number of 
European concerns with minority shares in local enterprises 
and wholly owned Ford and General Motors subsidiaries. In 
addition, Toyota1s 27% share in a joint venture with a local 
company represented the first DFI by a Japanese company in 
motor production facilities within Europe-(97)
The Portuguese assembly industry was similar to Ireland in 
that/ weak and uncompetitive, it depended heavily on 
protection for its survival. Free trade agreements with the 
EEC which provided for the extention of import quotas, 
offered little prospect for the survival of the industry 
with the inevitable freeing of trade when montonums 
ceased. With this in mind at the end of the 70s the 
Portuguese authorities envisaged a significant amount of 
rationalization and a move towards output that would be 
"concentrated m  technologically advanced assembly and 
component units firmly integrated into the European 
production structure".(98)
To this end the Portuguese government entered into an 
agreement with Renault m  1980 which tied the French company 
to a 70% stake m  an extensive expansion programme.(99) 
Assembly of cars was to be stepped up from 10,000 to 80,000 
units per year and, in addition, an engine plant with an 
annual capacity of 220,000 units, many for export, was set 
up in Oporto. Local content in the assembly plant was 
scheduled to increase from 20% to 60% and to 80% in engine 
production (100)
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TABLE 4 . 6
Assembly Of Cars And CVs In Portugal
1980 - 1985
Cars CVs Total
1980 45,457 -------- --------
1981 60,910 57,910 118,820
1982 64,841 54,100 118,941
1983 65,903 29,128 95,031
1984 61,151 23,107 84,258
1985 60,979 26,548 87,527
Source: Associacao Dos Industrials De Montegem De
Automoveis Lisboa.
As shown in Table 4 .6 above, car assembly has remained 
fairly stable since 1981 but assembly of CVs has fallen, and 
thus overall, output dropped from 118,820 in 1981 to 85,527 
m  1985. With respect to cars, exports reached 9,844 or 
16.1% of output in 1985.(101) We can see from Table 4.7 
below that/although Renault increased its share of the 
market from 56.4% in 1983 to 57.8% m  1985/it has come 
nowhere near its target level of 80,000 units per year. On 
the basis of this evidence/the future viability of assembly 
in Portugal must be in doubt. The best approach as in the 
case of Ireland, may be the development of components 
exports.
TABLE 4.7
Assembly Of Cars By Manufacturer;
Portugal 1983- 1984-1985
1983 1984 1985
Renalut 37,200 36,901 35,251
Citroen 11,300 9,057 8,685
Piat 9,900 10,207 9,473
Ford 3,400 3,345 4,321
GM 3,600 1,223 2,883
Mini-Moke 400 360 327
Sado 100 60 35
TOTAL 65,900 61,153 60,979
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Source: Associacao Dos Industrials De Montagem De
Automoveis Lisboa.
Certain elements in the Portuguese government have started 
to question the wisdom of the large scale intervention 
involved in the Renault deal. The relatively poor increases 
m  assembly and engine production reflect an unsatisfactory 
return on investment. A recent boom in consumer spending 
has boosted output in the assembly industry.(102) But m  
future it is likely that more attention will be devoted to 
the promotion of automotive components. Portuguese 
component manufacturers#it appears*can compete successfully 
with their Spanish counterparts and have begun to make 
inroads into the expanding Spanish market.
South Korea:
Until the 1970s/the South Korean motor industry consisted of 
the assembly m  modest amounts of cars such as the Ford 
Cortina. Car output m  1970 was a mere 14,500,(104) and in 
1974 output of CVs was approximately 19,180.(105) In line 
with its ambitious plans for industry in general, the Korean 
government decided that the country should have its own 
motor industry independent of the TNCs. Plans for an 
independent motor industry in Korea revolved around the 
Hyundai motor company which was established in 1967 by the 
Hyundai group which had wide interests in engineering, 
shipbuilding, construction and international trading.(106)
-  94 -
At first Hyundai assembled ckd kits from Ford U.K. operating 
at 50% of capacity. The company produced about 7,000 cars 
in 1973 which represented approximately half of all cars 
assembled in South Korea that year.(107) As a result of 
government encouragement/the company decided to develop and 
manufacture its own car called the "Pony". The technology 
and design incorporated in the vehicle came from overseas 
with 95% local sourcing all under licence.(108)
The Pony was produced in a new plant which m  essence was a 
scaled down version of western plants. According to Maxcy 
output rose from 30,000 m  1976 to 110,000 m  1979, of which 
an excess of 20,000 was exported to over 40 countries.(109) 
The government had ambitious plans for the expansion of the 
industry m  the early 1980s. The goal was to produce 2 
million vehicles by 1986 made up of 1.4 million cars, 0.4 
million commercial vehicles and 0.2 million buses of which 
it was hoped 1.4m would be exported.(110)
TABLE 4.8
Passenger Car Production South Korea 
1980 - 1985 (Units)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
57,200 68,800 94,500 128,500 158,503 264,458
Source* World Marketing Data and Statistics, (Euromonitor 
Publications Ltd , London) various years.
Against the background of instability in the international 
industry South Korea returned a poor performance during the 
first years of the 1980s. Passenger car production was 
below its 1979 level until 1983. In this year/production of 
all motor vehicles reached 221,000 units, 10% was exported 
including 20,400 cars.(Ill) These figures were far below 
the projected targets and cautious voices began to be 
raised. The Asian and Pacific Review commented at the time
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that the industry was stuck with considerable excess 
capacity which would only "Balloon as new or expanded plants 
were opened".(112) Nonetheless, the South Korean industry 
has performed well since 1983 As Table 4.8 shows, car 
production doubled between 1983 and 1985. Total vehicle 
production was expected to reach 685,000 during 1987,(113) 
moving quickly towards the revised government target of 1.5 
million by 1989.(114)
Hyundai (Mitsubishi have held a 15% equity share since 1982) 
astounded observers in 1985 when it emerged as the number 
one importer to Canada, pushing aside Toyota and Honda with 
its Pony sub-compact. Also, within 7 months of entering the 
U.S. market/Hyundai had once more confounded the critics by 
clocking up sales of the Pony Excel - a front wheel drive 
sub-compact - in excess of 75,000 units. Indeed, the 
company is talking about introducing larger models.(115) 
Apart from Hyundai, the South Korean motor industry consists 
of two other main assembler/manufacturers. Daewoo Motors a 
50-50 joint venture with General Motors, and Kia Motors who 
in the past have forged strong technical links with Honda, 
and in 1987 sold a 10% equity share to Ford.(116) Daewoo 
recently began sales m  the U.S.A. of a sub-compact car 
marketed as the Pontiac Lemans. Daewoo have been followed
by Kia Motors who are selling a mini car called the Ford
Festiva m  the American market.(117)
CONCLUSIONS
MITS possible fourth transformation characterized by an 
industry reaching maturity with a standardized product/ has 
shown few signs of unfolding. Domestic investment by the 
major TNCs is still well above spending on foreign
productive capacity. In addition, recent trends have been 
towards increased DFI by European and Japanese companies m  
the United States and by Japanese companies in Europe. 
While it is true that a certain amount of growth has come to 
pass m  LICs in recent years, it is difficult to find
compelling evidence that DFI was primarily motivated by
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perceived cost of production advantages. That is not to 
suggest that cost pressures have not impinged on the 
decision making process of the large TNCs. Cost
considerations have forced these companies to rationalize 
production in optimum sized plants
As Maxcy argues, international sourcing of parts is not to 
be confused with the wholesale shifting of production to low 
wage countries. Huge worldwide sales cannot be sustained 
without production in widely dispersed optimum sized 
units.(118) How else, he asks, can one explain why General 
Motors has produced an engine in Australia, Brazil, Austria 
and Japan and supplied its European subsidiaries from the 
first three countries?(119)
The implication of this argument is that the cost of 
production does not vary greatly from one location to 
another. While labour costs may be significantly less in 
LICs, recent trends within the industry have been in the 
direction of increased capital intensity. A study of the 
Japanese industry in the 1980s revealed that the labour 
costs associated with engine production amounted to less 
than 5% of total costs. (120) If, as was the case with Spam, 
we assume labour efficiency and productivity to be lower 
generally in LICs, then the benefits of lower labour costs 
will be largely cancelled out. Empirical backing for this 
position is found in the results of a survey of overseas 
investment by Japanese automotive manufacturers contained in 
Appendix 4.
With respect to the assembly/manufacture of cars and
commercial vehicles, Japanese overseas investment decisions 
have not been influenced by the availability of cheap
labour. The survey (see Appendix 4) refers to 33 separate 
investment decisions by 10 Japanese companies in 16 
locations, between the late 1950s and 1985. In only one
case was the utilization of inexpensive labour cited as a'
reason for investment. This concerned a decision by Isuzu 
to become involved m  truck production in China during 1985.
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This questions the extent to which past and contemporaneous 
DFI by terminal producers m  the motor industry has been 
influenced by wage costs. Initially/ DFI was prompted by 
tariffs and local content rules that rendered LIC market 
shares contingent upon local production. Lately, consistent 
with industrialization policies in general, there has been a 
predilection on the part of LIC governments to attach 
greater weight to the expansion of automotive exports. This 
policy has met with a moderate amount of success for two 
reasons.
Firstly, there has been a distinct overlapping of interests 
between host nations and TNCs. Governments have proved 
willing to lower tariffs and relax local content rules in 
return for commitments to establish plants of optimum size 
oriented to a greater extent towards exports. This is a 
proposition which TNCs, because they have developed a 
preference for allocating overseas investment m  a 
complementary and balanced manner, have demonstrated a 
willingness to accept. Secondly, state grants, export 
subsidies/ and other incentives aimed at making exports more 
profitable have emerged as strong bargaining chips m  
negotiation between governments and TNCs regarding 
investment decisions.
Therefore, it could be argued that, though not for price 
based reasons, but rather as a result of government 
incentives, the investment by TNCs m  LICs still constitutes 
a move towards a new international division of labour.
Of the countries we looked at, only m  South Korea has the 
motor industry evolved outside the control of the TNCs from 
advanced nations. In Argentina, Spain and Portugal, the 
dominant factor m  the development of the industry has been 
foreign capital. In general, with the exception of some 
specialist producers, local firms have either vanished or 
surrendered control to subsidiaries of TNCs. Even those 
indigenous manufacturers who have enjoyed success, such as 
Seat and Hyundai, have relied to some extent on assistance 
from major TNCs. Such a view concurs with Bloomfield's 
assessment of the development of the industry m  LICs:
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“While the world production pattern has become 
more dispersed, the control of the industry
remains firmly in the hands of large multi­
national companies In this way/ unlike the 
textile industry, the original motor manufact­
urers, if not the original countries, have not 
been undercut by products made elsewhere".(121)
It is revealing that one country in the survey of LICs above 
which has experienced a significant amount of indigenous 
based development, South Korea, is the country in which 
government intervention was the most pervasive.(122) Here, 
the authorities were explicit in their intention to limit, 
the scope of the TNCs, an approach which closely resembled 
that of Japan outlined above, although m  the case of South 
Korea it has yet to be demonstrated that the assistance of 
transnationals can be entirely dispensed with.
Hyundai has made impressive inroads into the export markets 
of the world and will soon commence overseas assembly.(123) 
However, if it is to become a major power in the industry it 
must prove it is capable of designing and engineering a 
range of new cars and components. Whether Hyundai as Maxcy 
put it "can jump the major international hurdles",(124) 
remains to be seen? however, the company has managed to 
establish a niche from which it appears determined to 
expand. For example, m  contrast to Honda - who took more 
that a decade to achieve a market share of 5.4% by the mid 
1980s - Hyundai quickly established a strong presence in 
Canada's automotive market. In 1985 Hyundai's share of the 
local Canadian market stood at 9.1%.(125) This was a 
remarkable success for a manufacturer with less than 20 
years m  the business and no marketing experience m  the 
competitive North American sales environment.(126)
* i
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CHAPTER 5
rt
Until the early 1980s, as Jacobson notes, the motor industry
in Ireland was remarkable for the fact that there had been
no m  depti) analysis on any aspect of its history,
development and structure.(1) Reviewing long awaited
contributions by John Moore, Motor Makers m  Ireland(2) and 
John O'Donovan, Wheels and Deals(3), he concludes that while 
to some extent filling the gap, both books nevertheless 
leave much ground uncovered.(4)
Moore argues that while economic and social points of view 
may be of some relevance, the history of the Irish motor 
industry should be looked upon as the story of engineering 
innovation.(5) But as Jacobson strenuously retorts, the 
development of the Irish motor industry does in fact raise a 
whole range of wider issues. While many of these issues/ 
though important/ are of interest mainly to the economic 
historian, for example the impact of Ford's decision to 
cease manufacturing at Cork during the early 1930s, more 
recent developments are of concern to the economist studying 
contempory industrial development m  Ireland.(6)
The central topic this chapter will focus attention on - is 
the transformation that the Irish motor industry has 
experienced since the advent of export oriented 
industrialization. It was widely recognized, for example by 
the Committee on Industrial Organisation,(7) that the 
freeing of trade would undermine the viability of local 
assembly Although various schemes were constructed, the
ultimate demise of the industry was almost universally 
accepted According to Jacobson, the state and the TNCs, who 
controlled local production, appear to have "acted together 
to eliminate assembly. But few other than the militant 
workers of the industry opposed this."(8) More hope was 
held out for the traditional component manufacturers who 
supplied the assemblers with items such as springs, glass, 
batteries, etc. However, despite generous state aid(9) 
these companies proved unable to develop alternative 
overseas markets.
y
5 . 1  INTRODUCTION
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Internationally, the motor industry was also undergoing 
transition Within Europe, the formation of the EEC had 
accentuated the move towards greater integration of the 
industry which facilitated the sourcing of parts in 
different locations. EEC membership and locational factors 
favourable for foreign investment led to the attraction of a 
number of firms involved m  the manufacture of automotive 
components for export- In recognition of the potential for 
expansion, the IDA and CTT have set about actively promoting 
the automotive components sector since the late 1970s. For 
example, in 1979 the IDA attended the Frankfurt motor show 
and CTT took a stand at the Geneva vehicle equipment 
exhibition. The objective was to promote Ireland as a 
suitable location for the manufacture and export of 
automotive components.(10)
The IDA, as evidenced by the following extract from one of 
its promotion brochures, is not slow to point out what it 
views as the recent success of, and potential in the future 
for the Irish industry:-
"Over the past number of years Ireland has 
seen the emergence of an important and 
growing automotive components industry 
which is supplying products to many of the 
leading original equipment manufacturers 
of the world .. . The industry worldwide 
is being asked to make rapid changes- While 
this changing picture will pose new 
challenges for the industry it will also 
provide lucrative opportunities for the 
companies in specialist product areas 
which can provide working solutions to 
the problems of the 1980s. Ireland is 
well placed to attract a share of the new 
investments made for this purpose".(11)
IDA statistics indicate that significant growth m  terms of 
employment and export has taken place in this sector in
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recent years. As Jacobson points out, IDA figures show that 
current numbers employed in the industry constitute almost 
4% of the total manufacturing workforce and that exports 
have grown in domestic currency terms by over 40% m  1984 
and by another 14% m  1985.(12) In addition, the Programme 
for National Recovery 1987 estimates that up to 3,000 
additional jobs could be created m  this industry based on 
achieving increased shares of the automotive components 
market for Japanese European car manufacturing.(13) Before 
analysing in detail these important trends, the historical 
background to the motor industry in Ireland shall be briefly 
examined.
5.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOTOR INDUSTRY IN IRELAND;
The origins of the motor industry in Ireland can be traced 
to the coach building industry and certain elements of the 
engineering industry which became interested in the 
manufacture of automobiles around the beginning of the 20th 
Century. In these early years the advent of the motor 
vehicle had an expansionary effect on coach building in 
Ireland. This was largely due to the fact that many coach 
builders were compensated for the loss of their horse drawn 
carriage trade by the emerging demand for motor car bodies. 
However, the introduction of mass production techniques had 
an adverse effect on coach building which precipitated the 
decline of the trade.(14)
All attempts at locally designed motor car manufacture met 
with little if any success. This cannot be attributed to 
any lack of engineering expertise on behalf of these early 
pioneers. Jacobson suggests that locational disadvantages/ 
allied to a shortage of capital, prevented the necessary 
improvements in production techniques and efficiency even 
where the local market justified such improvement.(15) In 
many respects this resembles the failure of local producers 
in peripheral regions to grow in the early decades of the 
20th Century.
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It is the opinion of Jacobson that even an extremely active 
Irish government of Ireland could not have altered the 
pattern of development experienced by the industry m  the 
early decades of the century Any viable project demanded a 
company with the requisite capital and expertise, in 
conjunction with an established international distribution 
network. (16) As was noted in Chapter 4 the Ford motor 
company displayed an ability to expand production overseas 
almost from its inception and had a number of plants set up 
abroad before World War 1.
As early as 1913 Ford displayed an interest in a potential 
factory site on the River Lee near Cork, though it appears 
no attempts were made to purchase any land.(17) Eventually 
a site was secured m  1917 with the intention of building a 
plant to produce tractors. Jacobson has questioned the 
traditional view that Ford's decision to locate in Cork was 
largely a result of Henry Ford's sentimental attachment to 
the area. In his opinion, the decision to continue to 
develop in Cork despite the end of World War 1 was connected 
to the aftermath of the First World War and the impact this 
had on capital flows between the United States and the 
U.K. (18) It was also an important part of the location 
decision that tractors, and not cars were to be produced and 
exported from Ireland.
The Ford plant commenced production of tractors in July 
1919. After reaching modest levels of production the
manufacture of tractors was halted in 1923 and instead 
production on Model T. Ford cars and parts was initiated. 
In late 1928 the tractor manufacturing equipment which had 
been shipped across the Atlantic to Dearborn was sent back 
to Cork and tractor production recommenced with 15,000 units 
rolling off the assembly lines in 1930. But the great 
depression and the advent of protectionism heralded the 
demise of tractor manufacturing m  Cork and the last Irish 
tractor was produced in 1932.(19)
The manufacturing equipment was soon on its way again, this 
time across the Irish sea accompanied by a relatively large
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number of workers formerly employed in the Cork plant, 6,000 
of whom had been made redundant after the cessation of
tractor production.(20) After 1932/ only assembly of
commercial vehicles and cars was located at Ford's Cork
plant.
While Ford was the only manufacturer or assembler in the 
Irish Free State until 1932, after this date a number of 
other firms set up assembly plants. Within a short space oi 
time there were 20 such operations. (21) They owed their 
existence almost entirely to government tariffs and 
especially quotas which necessitated local assembly if a 
market presence was to be maintained. Since minimum 
economies of scale were never even remotely attainable given 
the small size of the local market and the state of the 
prevailing technology, and since manufacturers insisted that 
only enough ckd units be supplied to satisfy the home 
market, export prospects were limited with the result that 
efficient levels of production could never be reached.(22)
The continuation of protectionist measures kept the assembly 
industry alive until the policy changes of the post 1958 
period began to take effect. It was accepted that trade 
liberalization would destroy what was in essence an 
artificial entity. In particular, since in the mid-1960s 
80% of the vehicles assembled in Ireland were of British 
origin, it is clear that if the 1965 Anglo-Irish Free Trade 
Area (AIFTA) agreement had been fully implemented in 
relation to motor vehicle assembly the industry would have 
ceased to exist within about 3 to 4 years.(23) In the 
mid-1960s the Irish assembly industry was as dependent as 
ever on quota restrictions and high rates of import duty on 
fbu vehicles vis a vis ckd parts.
The unions were very much aware of this fact and lobbied the 
government to take action aimed at protecting the 
industry.(24) Accordingly the government in consultation 
with the unions, assembly companies, British manufacturers 
and the British Board of Trade introduced during 1967 a
-  104 -
scheme to control the importation of FBU vehicles. This 
scheme effectively replaced the system of quotas which
ceased to operate on the 1st of July 1966, with the
commencement of the AIFTA. This scheme received legal 
backing under the Motor Vehicle Registration of Importers 
Act 1968.(25)
Prior to EEC membership, the scheme came under close 
scrutiny by the Commission who were of the opinion that it 
did not conform with the principles of free trade operating 
within the Community. Agreement was reached allowing a
modified form of the scheme to remain m  operation until the 
31st of December 1984, but from that date all quota
restrictions would have to be removed. Also, the special
provisions which existed for British manufacturers were to 
be extended to all EEC producers. This moratorium called 
Protocol 7, came into effect on the 1st of January 1973.(26)
Not surprisingly the Irish assembly industry was
characterized by limited exports during these years. At the 
start of the 1970s, exports stood at approximately 3,000 
units per annum. Up to 1978 this figure varied between
3,000 and 7,000 units per year. At the end of the 1970s 
there were 3 companies assembling cars for export "mainly to 
the U.K. and 1 company began exporting commercial vehicles 
to that market. The bulk of this trade represented a 
servicing of the parent firm's requirements to fill a small 
amount of local U.K. demands for a particular model.(27) A
substantial growth in exports occurred in 1979 when the 
export figure was approximately 19,000, compared with 4,443 
in 1978. This represented an export value m  currency terms 
of £45 million.(28) Nevertheless, this must be compared 
with the Gross value of imports for 1979 which stood at £500 
million.(29)
It seems likely that this spurt m  export growth in 1979 was 
only of a temporary nature and did not in any way signify 
any emergent comparative advantage on behalf of the Irish 
industry As Jacobson points out, these exports
corresponded with the "tail-end of a model's life-cycle,
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2where such small numbers were being sold that it did not 
justify allocation of resources in the larger plants."(30) 
Indeed, by 1976/ 13 of the 16 firms still involved in 
assembly intended to stop as soon as it was possible and any 
superficial interest the others had was soon to evaporate. 
For much of the 1970s assembly existed in Ireland only 
because it was subsidised by FBU trading which was permitted 
when local assembly accounted for over 5% of the market.(31)
The position of the Irish motor vehicle assembly industry m  
the mid 1970s was aptly described by the Management 
Consultant Partners and Associates report to the Secretary 
of the National Prices Commission in November 1976:
"The general picture, therefore, is of an 
industry lacking severely in financial 
autonomy, highly dependent on its foreign 
trade connections for the necessary re­
sources to carry on and making a very 
poor return on the assets employed ....
There has been no real reinvestment m  
recent years, and there is clearly no 
confidence in making any long term 
commitments at the present time."(32)
5.3 THE TRADITIONAL COMPONENTS INDUSTRY
A number of firms manufacturing components were set up 
behind the tariff barriers of the 1930s. They supplied 
local assemblers and owed their existence to quota 
restrictions on the importation of their products, or on 
regulations governing local assembly. Irish Dunlop Ltd., 
tyres, J. Brockhouse Ltd., springs, Battery Makers of 
Ireland Ltd., and Lancegaye Ltd., windscreen glass, appear 
to have been the largest enterprises. All these firms had 
close connections with U.K. companies and were probably 
controlled by same despite restrictions imposed by the Con­
trol of Manufacturers Acts.(33)
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All these companies were subsequently taken over by U.K. 
firms, in what may be considered to be a direct result of
the new free- trade policies which forced these firms to
attempt to reduce their dependence on the local assembly
industry which clearly had no long term future. This was a
task which proved beyond the capability of most firms, even
though the application of state aid eased the process of
adjustment. In line with most of established industry,
traditional component manufacturers struggled in the harsh
competitive environment engendered by free trade. Among the
companies that have closed m  recent years are Crossland
Filteers, British Leyland, Daly's and Chloride. In
addition, Triplex closed their Waterford factory and the
prospects for the Templemore plant are not encouraging.(34)
5.4 RECENT TRENDS
5.4.1 AN INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION _ _ ' -
Over the last decade it is possible to divide the Irish 
automotive industry into 5 segments:
1. The declining assembly sector and the manufacturers 
of components associated with the supply of assembly 
operations.
2. The specialist vehicle sector, together with the
manufacture of trailers and bodies.
3. The manufacture of auto related products and
accessories primarily geared for the domestic market.
4. The manufacture of components for export to the
leading original equipment manufacturers OEMs or 
"terminal" car producers. This group corresponds 
to the CTT definition of the automotive components 
sector. (See Appendix 5A)
5. The manufacture of products and components (mainly
for export) for what may be termed the Trans­
portation industry m  general.
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The official government statistics issued by the Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) relating to NACE category 35 "the 
manufacture and assembly of motor vehicles (mcl. parts and 
accessories)", clearly indicate the dramatic decline of the 
assemblers and traditional component manufacturers in the 
final years of the moratorium. From Table 5 1 it can be 
seen that with 1980 as the base, industrial production fell 
from 102 0 in January 1981, to 34.8 m  April 1986.
TABLE 5.1
Nace Category 35, Industrial Production; 
Base 1980 = 100
Jan *81 
1 02 . 0
June '81 
93 6
June '82 
84.1
June '83 
77.3
Jan '84 
66.2
Dec 184 
48.1
June '85 
43.1
Dec ’85 
42.1
Apr '86 
34.8
Source: Census of Industrial Production
The close-down of the assembly operations and the drop in 
the numbers working m  the related sectors supplying parts 
is reflected m  the employment data contained in Table 5.2. 
This shows that total employment in this NACE category is 
estimated to have fallen from a level of 6,400 in March 1981 
to 2,800 m  December 1985.
TABLE 5.2
Nace Category 35, Employment 1981-1985
Mar '81 Mar ’83 Dec '84 Dec '85
6,400 5,200 4,600 2,800
Source: Industrial Employment Earnings and Hours Worked.
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5 . 4 . 2  S P E C IA L IS T  VEHICLE MANUFACTURING:
While it is true that Ireland without extensive protection 
could never hope to sustain a motor vehicle assembly or 
manufacturing industry, there is no overbearing economic 
reason why the manufacture of specialist vehicles should not 
be suited to an Irish location. In recent years buses, 
ambulances and armoured cars have all been manufactured 
successfully m  Ireland. For example, Hanlons has employed 
up to 300 people at its plant m  Longford town producing 
ambulances for export mainly to the U.K. In addition, the 
company has started to penetrate the middle east market.(35) 
Also/companies such as Mangan James & Son Ltd., Edenderry 
and CRV Engineering Ltd., Dundalk have for some time now 
been involved m  the production of vehicle bodies.
Although the specialist vehicle is a niche market with 
potential, recent experience leads one to question the 
wisdom of channeling investment into projects of this kind. 
The Delorean and Auto Montan-werke fiascos stand out as 
chastening reminders of the inherent difficulties associated 
with building a vehicle from scratch and then marketing it 
successfully in an increasingly competitive business 
environment. The IDA engaged m  protracted negotiations 
which were concerned with locating the production of the 
exotic Delorean sports car in the 26 counties. But the 
Irish authorities proved reluctant to match the huge grants 
offered by a British administration anxious to attract new 
industry to employment blackspots in Northern Ireland. This 
led eventually to the construction of a plant to manufacture 
the vehicle m  West Belfast. After overcoming initial 
technical problems, a number of cars finally rolled off the 
assembly line. However, the vehicle encountered numerous 
problems in the American market. Weak selling techniques and 
poor marketing were unable to resolve these 
difficulties.(36)
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The circumstances surrounding the setting up and subsequent 
demise of John Delorean1s Belfast plant have been well
chronicled. However, the failure of Auto Montan Werkes
"Buncrana Beetle" has received much less scrutiny. In 1981/
the IDA announced that it had concluded discussions with
Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm (MBB). A new Irish subsidiary
Auto Montan-Werke (ATW Ltd.) was to be formed with the
intention of manufacturing a two wheel drive amphibious
vehicle m  Buncrana, Co. Donegal.(37) In the early stages
250 were to be employed with hopes for significant expansion
in the future. The project involved a capital investment of
6 million Punts, and the first models were expected off the
production line at the end of the year.(38) Mr. John
Kerrigan, the IDA Engineering and Automotives Manager at the
time was quoted as saying/ "Buncrana is about to become the
centre of the company's operations and a new Irish motor
industry comes into existence".(39)
The project never lived up to expectations. While it was 
hoped that in the region of 1,000 would be employed/the 
numbers at work never went above the 100 mark. (40) The 
company closed down late m  1984 without attaining anything 
like the annual production targets of 15,000 to 18,000 units 
which had been set for the third phase of the project.(41) 
Why did this project which began with a wave of publicity 
peter out when so much had been anticipated?
There were some problems with the earliest vehicles, but 
these difficulties were sorted out and production, which 
included all research and development and modifications 
being carried out locally, commenced successfully.(42) The 
vehicle which was named the "Chico" was priced competitively 
in relation to other one-ton trucks or jeeps,(43) and 
successfully survived a stringent German road worthiness 
test. The vehicle's adaptability is vividly portrayed by 
the following description of some of its multiple uses which 
it was felt would make it attractive to the small Irish 
farmer:
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"He could plough or spray with it, later 
bring his mild churns to the creamery, 
fodder cattle m  remote outlying areas, 
and later bring the family to town, and 
with slight modifications he could even 
go out poaching on the lake that night"-(44)
However, despite the fact that market research indicated a 
potential niche m  the market for the "Buncrana Beetle", 
sales at the required level never materialized. This was 
not a result of any deficiencies in product quality. It 
came out just at a down-swmg in the market when the 
intended customers, public utilities, local authorities and 
the farming sector were suffering from declining 
budgets. (45) But it is not certain that had the product 
entered the market during an upturn that sales would have 
taken off. It is possible that the "Chico" project~in a 
similar manner to the Delorean sports car-was stymied by 
marketing deficiencies. The establishment of an R & D and 
the production system capable of creating a viable commodity 
which can excite consumer interest is only a prerequisite 
for success. The ultimate test is the ability to penetrate 
markets often under conditions which are not the most 
congenial.
5.4.3 AUTO RELATED PRODUCTS:
This group consists of a number of small, mainly Irish 
companies manufacturing products complementary to the use of 
motor vehicles. Sales orientation is predominantly m  the 
direction of the domestic market. Companies m  this group 
include, Anti Skid Controls (vehicle safety systems), Casey 
Michael Ltd , Phoenix Enterprises Ltd. (upholstery,
sun-roofs and roof-racks), Tool and Gauge Ltd. (car alarms),
and Moremiles Tyre Services Ltd. (remoulds). It may be
possible to develop the export potential of some of these
companies. Nevertheless, most future prospects seem to 
depend on the demand for auto related products in the local 
market.
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5 . 4 . 4  EXPORTERS OF AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS;
These firms can be broken down into two distinct groups. 
Firstly, companies (in category 4 above) manufacturing 
original equipment for European motor manufacturers whose 
products include mirror glass, acoustic trim, turbo-charge 
impellers and wiring harnesses. Secondly, companies (in 
category 5 above) who are involved in the manufacture of 
products for the mobile transportation industry, for 
example, tipping gear, hydraulic motors and pumps, truck and 
refrigeration units. It is worth noting at this point that 
CTT include only firms from category 4 in their export and 
employment statistics. But the IDA includes both categories 
4 and 5 in addition to the auto related products and 
specialist vehicle sectors in their figures for the 
automotive industry.
These companies are mainly subsidiaries of German and U.S. 
TNCs which have set up production in Ireland since the 
middle of the 1960s. The IDA and CTT have claimed that 
these new foreign firms have transformed the declining Irish 
motor industry into a vibrant and growing sector. However, 
the analysis of this transformation is confronted with 
problems relating to the availability of statistical data of 
a unifor'm nature. It is not a problem unique to this 
particular industrial study. As Joe Cogan notes, attempts 
to survey the Irish electronics industry are severely 
hampered by a "very confused statistical situation."(46)
5.5 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INDUSTRY:
The CSO data/ as published in the Census of Industrial 
Production/ is deficient as it reflects only the decline of 
assembly and traditional component manufacture in the last 
decade. Even if the IDA and CTT figures were grossly
exaggerated, the growth generated by the new firms should 
have boosted CSO output and employment figures somewhat. In
order to get a better understanding of this process of
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transformation it is necessary to investigate further the 
nature of the CSO data and then to examine additional 
sources of information.
The most detailed breakdown of the relevant NACE category, 
35,_ is contained m  the table outlining goods manufactured 
in each industrial sector. This is Table 8 m  the Census of 
Industrial Production 1983 which was published in May 
1987.(47) Given below in Table 5 3 is a breakdown by 
product for the years 1979, 1980, 1982, and 1983.
It is difficult to see how the output associated with 
transnational component manufacturers (which we know were 
starting or increasing production during this period) could 
be contained to any significant extent in the breakdown of 
NACE category 35 shown in Table 5.3. One possibility is 
that some firms could be represented under the headings 
"other parts" and "all other products". However, the 
combined total of this group for 1983 was approximately 
£15.5m which when one includes items like replacement parts 
and accessories manufactured by small local firms, leaves a 
very small amount to be accounted for.
TABLE 5.3
Net Selling Value In Irish Pounds 
Nace Code 35 Extended Coverage
( £ 0 0 0 )
1979 1980 1982 1983
Motor Vehciles Complete
Cars/Station Wagons/Estates 94,115 101,000 83,329 80,807
Commercial Vehicles (Incl.
buses, lorries, etc.) 20,555 21,583 53,259 41,884
Trailers & Caravans 11,356 7,348 5,889 4,848
Motor Bodies 5,044 4,457 6,043 7,271
Other Parts 3,016 4,224 4,494 5,289
All Other Products 1,973 4,224 9,398 10,386
Repair Work, General Job­
bing & Commission Work 24,469 30,696 36,102 34,284
Work m  Progress 4,199 1 6,046 4,579 4,011
Non-Respondents Est
Gross Output 752 953 1,115 465
Total Gross Output 165,429 181,522 204,637 189.309
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♦Gross Output is stated exclusive of excise duty.
Source: Constructed from information contained in the
Census of Industrial Production for the years 
above.
Also, Table 6 of the Census of Industrial Production 1983, 
gives some interesting data on the grants received from the 
IDA by firms in this NACE category. Of 105 firms listed, 61 
are IDA grant aided. Of these 61, only 6 have received new 
industry grants, whereas 47 received small industry grants 
and 8 other forms of IDA assistance.(48) We know from 
information included m  various IDA Annual Reports (see 
Appendix 5B), that most of the new foreign component 
exporters obtained significant new industry grants. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that many of these TNCs are 
included in the relevant CSO NACE category.
In recognition of the limitations associated with the 
published data, the CSO, IDA and CTT were approached and 
asked if they would be willing to make available more 
detailed information. While the need to retain
confidentiality prevented direct responses to many of the 
more pertinent questions, 3 additional sources of 
information on the Irish automotive sector have been 
compiled for this dissertation.
1. A special study undertaken by the Engineering 
Department of the IDA m  response to a quest­
ionnaire which was forwarded to them. This 
involved a study of 119 companies from all 
segments of the industry covering the years 
1977 to 1986
2. Research conducted by the CSO on a specially 
constructed group of firms designed to bypass 
the problems associated with locating firms m  
numerous separate NACE categories.
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3. Data provided by CTT on a defined group of ex­
porting automotive component manufacturers,
the overwhelming majority of whom are sub­
sidiaries of TNCs.
The findings of the IDA survey with respect to recent trends 
in employment and output are presented m  Table 5.4 below 
These statistics > when viewed m  conjunction with the 
published CSO data, indicate quite clearly that there are 
two trends working in opposite directions. The decline m  
assembly and traditional component employment over the 
period has been counterbalanced by increased employment and 
output in other areas of the industry. For example, 
according to Census of Production data outlined m  Table 
5.2, employment fell by 3,600 between 1981 and 1985. But 
the IDA statistics show that total employment dropped by 
only 1,200 over this period and indeed started to increase 
again during 1986. In addition, despite a substantial drop 
m  employment between 1984 and 1985, there was a large 
increase in output, a sign of increasing investment and 
productivity growth.
TABLE 5.4
Employment And Output In The Irish Automotive Sector
1978 - 1986
Year Employment Output 
(Sales £000)
1978 7.800 
8,200 
8,700 
8,600
8.800 
9,000 
8, 300 
7,400 
7,550
33.000
85.000 
102,000 
128,000
129.000
186.000
184.000
260.000 
270,000
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985 
1986*
* Estimated figure to November 30th 1986.
Source; Engineering Division IDA in response to 
questionnaire designed for this project.
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If one assumes, firstly, that employment m  assembly has all 
but ceased to exist (only a small number of Japanese trucks
were assembled locally in 1986), and, secondly, that
employment m  the traditional component sector associated
with this assembly has also largely dissipated, then the
growth in employment and output which has been experienced
in recent years must be accounted for by the other sections
of the industry listed above. The IDA data and CTT
statistics (see below) show that output and employment in
this sector has risen in recent years* It is thus clear
that a significant proportion of this increase must be
attributed to companies which have been placed m  various
different NACE categories other than 35.
In an attempt to find out more about the nature of this 
transformation it is useful to examine information provided 
by CTT. The automotive components section of CTT utilised a 
very precise definition of the automotive components
industry which corresponds to group 4 listed above (see
appendix 5b ). This group of firms account for the 
employment and export figures found m  Table 5.5.
TABLE 5.5
Employment And Exports Of Automotive Components Industry
Year Employment Exports
(£0 0 0)
65,628
71,005
90,999
119,000
136,200
1981 3,141
3,190
3,404
3,489
4,124
1982
1983
1984
1985
Source: Automotive Components Section CTT
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The growth in exports and employment outlined in Table 5.5, 
is consistent with trends m  the direction of greater 
sourcing in the international automotive industry. The 
manufacturers which had set up in the late 1960s and during
the 1970s had by the beginning of the 1980s started to
expand production in response to increased demand by the 
terminal European producers In addition, a new wave of
companies, many of which were German, began entering the 
industry. According to the IDA, exports of automotive 
components increased from £80m in 1978 to over £260m m
1985 (49) The discrepancy between these and CTT figures 
results from the inclusion of companies from group 5 m  the 
IDA estimates. Firms like Tilitsons, Thermo King,
Highlife/SPS and Unilok, which, like the firms m  the CTT 
list/export most of their output, but which produce for 
specialized sectors of the industry, or for other industries 
in addition to the automotive industry, are the m a m  reason 
why the IDA figure for 1985 is £124m in excess of the CTT 
estimate.
The CSO provided data for two periods 1965-67 and 1977-83 
for a distinct category of products. This category includes 
both car assembly and what might be considered traditional 
component manufacturers, i.e. group 1 above, together with 
group 3, the after-market services and group 4, i.e. CTT 
exporters, but excluding group 2, i.e. specialist vehicles 
etc. and group 5, l e. transportation equipment. This is 
what may be defined as the core of the car and car 
components industry as opposed to the broader definition of 
the automotive industry. (See Appendix C)
TABLE 5.6
Gross Output And Persons Engaged- 
Special CSO Group 1965-1967
Year Persons Engaged Gross Output
(£0 0 0)
1965 4,503 26,894
1966 4,606 26,510
1967 3,970 27,279
Gross output was used to estimate the persons engaged 
Source: Special survey conducted by the CSO May 1987
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The output and employment estimates for the above period 
outlined in Table 5.6 were almost exclusively attributable 
to the following product categories* Car tyres, car 
assembly (passenger and station wagons, etc.), batteries and 
accumulators, spark plugs, springs and vehicle safety 
systems. Therefore, we can conclude that car assembly and 
related component manufacture taken together employed 
between 4,000 and 4,500 during this period with an average 
output of approximately £26m.
TABLE 5.7
Gross Output And Persons Engaged; 
Special CSO Group 1977-83
Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Persons Engaged
6,433
6,379
6,354
5,995
5,573
5,370
4,820
Gross Output 
( £ 000 ) 
134,600 
152,300 
156,900
170,400 
174,700
172,800
170,200
Persons engaged estimated on the basis of gross 
output.
Source: Special survey conducted by CSO May 1987
Table 5.7 covers the period when the traditional sector 
began its decline while concurrently the export of 
components to OEMs started to expand. In 1976 at the peak 
of assembly 2,229 people were employed in the assembly of 
cars and vans.(50) If we assume that a further 2,000 people 
were involved in the manufacture of traditional components 
for use largely by the assembly firms, then m  1977
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approximately 2,200 were employed in the new components 
sector. It is likely that by 1983 a significant proportion 
of the traditional employment had been lost, perhaps m  
excess of the 1,600 drop in the number of persons engaged 
recorded in Table 5.7. If this assumption is correct/the 
numbers employed in the new exporting firms would be fairly 
close to the level stated for that year by CTT, namely 
3,404.
It is of course true that the total number of persons 
engaged in the special CSO group is somewhat below the 
numbgers employed in NACE category 35, for 1983, which stood 
at approximately 5,200.(51) However, it should be
recognized that for 1983/ between 50% and 60% of the output 
of this NACE category, for example, commercial vehicles, 
caravans, repair work and general jobbing, etc. would be 
excluded from the specially constructed group. When full 
account is taken of this fact it is apparent that a certain 
amount of growth must have taken place amongst firms 
exporting components to OEMs.
Also, since employment fell m  this NACE category by 2,000 
from 1983 up to the time that assembly ceased at the end of 
1984, if this is taken to represent the numbers employed in 
assembly and traditional component manufacture for 1983, we 
are left with a bedrock figure of 2,800 employed m  the 
manufacture of components for export. Although this is 
about 600 below the employment level indicated by the CTT 
figures for this year, it is still a significant total and 
one which most likely has expanded since then.
To conclude, m  1985 the industry in broad terms was 
constructed along the following lines. Employment in group 
1 was near to zero. At least 3,500 to 4,000 were engaged in 
group 4. About 1,700 appear to have been employed in group 
5, and groups 2 and 3 accounted for at least 1,500. This 
yields a minimum of 6,700 employed in all areas of the 
industry in that year
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5.6 A PROFILE OF THE IRISH AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS SECTOR IN 
THE MID-1980S
According to the IDA the automotive components sector 
consisted of approximately 100 firms employing about 7,400 
people in 1985. Virtually half (49%) of the companies in 
the sector were foreign owned. The breakdown by country of 
origin/ as of January 1984/ is given in Table 5.8. The 
foreign sector is dominated by German and American 
companies. The presence of U.S. subsidiaries can be largely 
explained on the basis that these TNCs viewed Ireland as a 
convenient location within the EEC which provided access to 
the integrated European motor industry. The prevalence of 
German firms is more difficult to comprehend. What factors 
attracted significant numbers of German automotive component 
companies to set up production in Ireland during the 1970s 
and early 1980s?
TABLE 5.8
Nationality Of Foreign Automotive Component 
Companies In Ireland
1984
Germany 18 
U.S. 15 
U.K.
Australia 1
New Zealand 1
Austria 1
Belgium 1 France 1
Source : Automotive components Ireland. 
(IDA, Dublin, 1984)
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These German firms have tended to be family-owned companies 
which have traditionally occupied a dominant position m  
small German towns. The decline in the available workforce 
in these towns, which started to manifest itself towards the 
end of the 1960s when migration to the larger cities was 
rampant, presented these companies with a dilemma if they 
wished to expand. A move to the urban centres entailed not 
only increased labour costs, but also costs associated with 
operating in a form of environment quite different from that 
to which they had become accustomed.
At this time the IDA was deeply interested in attracting new
industrial investment to small Irish towns where a surplus
of well educated workers sought employment. Such locations
proved eminently suitable for the small German entrepreneur. 
With the added bonus of a matrix of IDA inducements these 
companies had the opportunity to replicate their German 
experiences in rural Ireland. Here they found an 
environment supportive of private investment which offered 
future political and economic stability m  conjunction with 
a quality labour force which had little history of trade 
union involvement.
In particular, the west and north-west of the country appear
to have been favoured locations. There are notable
exceptions one of which is Kromberg Ireland which has its
wiring harness plant m  the Waterford industrial estate. 
When an urban location is picked by these German firms it 
has tended to be in what may be considered the smaller 
cities or large towns like Waterford, Galway and Carlow. It 
is clear that the metropolitan Dublin area has not been a
favoured location for these companies With this in mind, 
it is worth noting that while industrial relations have been 
a major problem for one of Kromberg' s m a m  rivals, Packard 
m  Dublin, Kromberg has not experienced anything like the 
same difficulties at its Waterford plant.(52)
In recent times, foreign enterprise has been the dominant 
growth factor m  much of Irish industry. For example, in
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the electronics sector, some 85% of employment and an even 
larger proportion of output (nearly all of which is 
exported) is provided by foreign companies.(53) A glance at 
Table 5.9 is enough to confirm that the automotive sector 
adhered to this general pattern of Irish industrialization. 
In fact the picture closely resembles the extreme dependence 
on foreign enterprise characteristic of the electronics 
sector.
TABLE 5.9
Structure Of Output And Employment In Automotive Sector
Output Employment
Foreign Firms £239.4m (92%) 6,200 (84%)
Domestic Firms £20.6m (8%) 1,200 (16%)
9
Based on 1985 figures
Source: Engineering Division IDA m  response to 
questionnaire designed for this project.
The data contained in Table 5.9 refers to the global IDA 
definition of the industry. It shows that employment and 
output is heavily concentrated in the hands of foreign firms 
which account for no less than 92% of output and 84% of 
employment respectively as of 1985. In common with the 
electronics sector, the bulk of this output is exported. 
While it has not proved possible to obtain information on 
output or exports of individual firms, Table 5.10 lists 
those companies whose exports exceeded £10m each during 
1985.
- 1 1 2 2  -
TABLE 5.10
Automotive Component Manufacturers With Exports
Exceeding £10M
Packard 
Kromberg 
Thermo King
Tilitson
Schlegel
Highlife/SPS
CSP
Semperit
Source: Automotive Components Section CTT
Since the combined output of the 8 companies m  Table 5.10 
is at least £80m, these firms must account for a minimum 31% 
of the sectors total output for 1985. This means that these 
firms from groups 4 and 5 are responsible for a share of 
output almost 4 times that of the entire domestic sector for 
the year 1985. This clearly demonstrates the small size of 
the 50 or so indigenous firms.
Table 5.11 gives the destination by country of the CTT group 
of exporters for the years 1983 to 1985. The major export
market is Germany, a result which is not surprising when one
considers that over 50% of the firms in the group are German
owned. But the overall impression is one of a significant
amount of diversification with opportunities for increasing
exports m  the future to France, Spain and Sweden. However,
considering the recent growth of the Spanish motor industry,
the relatively small volume of exports to Spain is somewhat
disappointing.
A large increase m  exports to the United States took place 
between 1984 and 1985. This is an encouraging trend, but it 
remains to be seen whether scope for future growth in the 
American market is heavily dependent on a favourable 
exchange rate. No figure appears for Japan, because only 
one company, Donnelly Mirrors, exports to this location. 
Future growth of the components sector in Ireland depends on 
improving competitiveness and quality enabling companies to 
carve out openings in the Japanese market and particularly 
the newly arrived European subsidiaries of Japanese TNCs.
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TABLE 5.11
Breakdown Of Exports To OEMS By Country
1983-1985 (£000)
1983 1984 1985
U.K. 21,509 31,134 31,500
Germany 38,431 42,159 50,700
France 5,814 9,299 11,000
Spain 640 875 1,300
Sweden 2,736 3,471 4,400
USA 1,403 1,857 7,800
Others 20,473 30,400 28,000
Source: Constructed from data supplied by CTT.
Extensive evidence exists which supports the claims of 
growth in the automotive components industry made by sources 
like the Society of the Irish Motor Industry- If one 
concentrates on employment creation and export growth, then 
the performance on the surface at least looks very 
impressive. But this assessment leaves a number of
important questions unanswered which are pertinent to policy 
appraisals of individual sectors and industry in general. 
For example, in the Irish automotive industry the role of 
indigenous enterprises has been extremely limited. Irish 
firms are small and have made practically no contribution to 
the growth of exports. As the Telesis and more recent 
government reports have strongly argued, sustained high 
levels of income require the development of a vibrant 
indigenous base.
In the case of the automotive industry the IDA and CTT are 
committed to future growth based on the performance of 
existing and new foreign enterprises, with a low-key role 
envisaged for indigenous manufacturers. The majority of 
these foreign companies have received substantial aid from 
the IDA and have of course benefitted from the favourable 
tax environment prevailing in the Irish economy. It should 
be pointed out that many of these companies commenced 
production after the abandonment of the tax free exports
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policy. What needs to be addressed is the question of 
whether some form of comparative advantage is resulting in
the emergence of an industry which is viable m  the long
run, or whether the presence of these companies is a
reflection of government - sponsored economic policies and
locational factors dependent on the maintenance of policies
amiable to transnational capital.
It is thus essential that a more detailed overview of the 
foreign sector is undertaken. This will enable us to assess 
the long run implications for the sector and will yield some 
pointers for industry m  general. On the basis of the 
available data the performance of these companies will be 
examined with respect to the following 5 factors:
1. The degree of marketing control enjoyed by 
foreign companies in the Irish automotive 
industry.
2. Linkages with the local economy, i.e. break­
down between inputs bought locally and inputs 
imported.
3. Extent and nature of research and development 
activities performed m  Ireland.
4. Profile of the nature of the employment which 
has been created.
5. Cost associated with the active promotion of 
the automotive industry in Ireland.
5 7 ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN SECTOR OF THE INDUSTRY:
5 7.1 Degree Of Marketing Control
As was noted previously, the local assemblers m  Ireland 
were constrained by agreements they had with the 
manufacturers which prevented the possibility of exports as
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they received only enough ckd units to supply the local 
market.(54) It is necessary to investigate the extent to
which the present subsidiaries are limited to certain
markets as a result of decisions made by their parent
companies. A lack of export diversity is sometimes viewed
as an indication of the dependent nature of foreign
controlled industrialization, whereby the autonomy of the
local "branch plant" is severely curtailed by policy
decisions made at company headquarters. The greater the
number of locations to which a subsidiary exports, the
greater is the likelihood that the local company has a more
independent role within the corporation's structure.
TABLE 5.12
Foreign Firms Exporting To 1,2, 3 
And 3+ Locations 1985
Export
Locations
1 Location
2 Locations
3 Locations 
3+ Locations
Value Of 
Exports 
£
33.36m 
4.39m 
21.20m 
189.70m
No. Of 
Companies
31 
4
25
32
% Of 
Firms
34%
4%
27%
35%
Source: Engineering Division IDA in response to
questionnaire designed for this project
Table 5.12 which refers to the IDA sample, indicates that 
although 65% of firms export to 3 locations or less, 
including 34% to only 1 location, the 35% of firms which 
export to more than 3 locations account for about 75% of the 
total value of exports. The implication of this finding is 
that foreign subsidiaries in the Irish industry have a 
significant amount of scope with respect to where they are 
allowed to export their output. Therefore one might expect 
to find a substantial amount of marketing activity in these
firms.
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TABLE 5.13
Degree Of Marketing Control Of Firms In The CTT Group
No of Firms
No Marketing Control 
Limited Marketing Control 
Extensive Marketing Control
9
5
12
Source: Automotive Components Section CTT.
In Table 5.13 the CTT list of component exporters are
grouped in accordance with the degree of marketing control
(i.e. the extent to which they have sole responsibility for
export locations) experienced by these firms. While 40% of 
firms had no marketing control/ 16 companies or 60% of the 
group enjoyed some form of marketing control. Of the 11
firms listed as having extensive marketing control, 3 held 
control for the U.K. and Scandinavia, 2 held marketing 
control for Europe, 2 held control for the world except
Germany, 1 held control for the world except the USA and 3 
held what was termed full marketing control. CTT believe 
that the degree of marketing control will generally be
extended over time if the performance of the Irish
subsidiary is judged to be satisfactory by the parent 
company.(55)
5 7.2 Linkages With The Local Economy:
Irish industrial policy has tried to develop business
relationships between the TNCs which have been established 
m  Ireland and domestic firms which could act as suppliers 
to them. In view of the extensive attention which the IDA 
and CTT have devoted to the development of the automotive
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sector, based largely on the encouragement of overseas 
investment, it is worthwhile to examine the extent of 
integration with respect to backward linkages exhibited by 
these overseas companies.
TABLE 5.14
Sourcing Of Inputs In Automotive Sector 1985
Inputs Sourced Inputs Sourced 
Locally Abroad
Indigenous Firms 73.9% 26.1%
Foreign Firms 3.35% 96.65%
Source- Engineering Division IDA in response to 
questionnaire designed for this project.
Table 5.14 which refers to the IDA group of companies, shows 
the sharp contrast between the foreign and domestic sectors 
in relation to the local sourcing of inputs. 
Notwithstanding the difficulty faced by foreign firms of 
obtaining quality local inputs* the figure for this sector is 
extremely low. For example, as far back as 1974, foreign 
owned companies in the non-food sector sourced on average
11.2% of all inputs locally.(56) Also, m  Metals and 
Engineering in the late 1970s/ foreign firms purchased over 
8% of their inputs m  Ireland.(57) The low propensity to 
source locally recorded in Table 5 14 should be a major 
cause for concern.
5.7.3 R & D And Marketing Facilities:
The Review of Industrial Performance 1986 recommends that in 
future, priority must be given to encouraging foreign 
projects which locate key competitive factors m  
Ireland.(58) In many cases significant marketing and R & D 
capabilities will be crucial to long term success although
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m  certain instances the key function may be optimal scale, 
and technology manufacturing. The motor industry at present 
is characterised by a keen interest in initiatives that 
either reduce cost or add value.
This trend has given rise to an opening for the application 
of new technologies in areas such as new materials, 
electronics, turbo charging and high speed tyres. In 
particular, the move to control emissions in Europe will 
create a demand for improved carburettors and fuel 
injectors, better ignition systems, sensors to monitor 
oxygen levels in the exhaust gasses and better exhaust 
systems. In addition, the use of plastics and ceramics is 
set to grow substantially in the coming years. Under these 
conditions R & D is crucial to the continued expansion of 
automotive component manufacturers. The presence of R & D 
and marketing functions is considered important as this will 
deepen the roots of these companies m  the Irish economy as 
well as providing highly skilled employment.
TABLE 5.15
R & D And Marketing Facilites In Irish 
Automotive Sector 1985
No. of Firms 
Marketing and R & D 17
Marketing (Only) 48
R & D (Only) 3
No Marketing and no R & D 29
TOTAL: 97
Source* IDA Engineering Division in response to 
questionnaire designed for this project.
Table 5.15 reports the findings of a survey done for this 
dissertation of 97 firms in the IDA group and shows that 
some form of marketing is practised by approximately 65% of
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companies m  the study. However, m  1985 only 21% of the 
firms were found to be engaged in any form of research and 
development. Furthermore 29 of the firms surveyed have 
neither R & D or marketing facilities of any kind. Since it 
is possible that this group might be composed of those firms 
accounting for the bulk of output and employment, i.e. the 
foreign firms, we need to relate the findings in Table 5.15 
to output and employment.
TABLE 5.16
Proportion Of Output And Employment Related To Marketing 
And Research And Development Automotive Sector 1985
Proportion of Value & Proportion No. & Proportion 
Firms Involved In* Of Output Of Employment
Marketing & R&D (17%) £126m (48%)
Marketing Only (49%) 
R&D Only (4%)
No Marketing/
No R&D (30%)
£ 69m (27%) 
£ 13m (5%)
£ 52m (20%)
2,800 (37%)
2,200 (31%) 
400 (5%)
2,000 (27%)
TOTAL OUTPUT £260m TOTAL EMPL. 7,400
Source: Engineering Division IDA in response to
questionnaire designed for this project
Table 5.16 shows that the 68 firms which all have some form 
of R & D or marketing functions account for 80% of output 
and 73% or 5,400 of those employed in the sector. In fact 
the 17 firms which have both marketing and R & D  control 
almost half the sector’s output and 37% of the employment. 
It is fair to conclude that production is not concentrated 
in the hands of those companies who are devoid of R & D and 
marketing capabilities. But it should be kept in mind that 
the mere presence of activities classified as research and 
development or marketing gives no guarantee that the 
facility is of any great importance. As noted in Telesis, 
company research and development can cover "engineering work
- 130 -
on a new design for the switch which turns the machine on or 
off for the European markets, or it can involve systems
architecture".(59)
5.7 4 Profile Of The Nature Of Employment Created;
The view has been expressed that those employed m  the 
traditional assembly industry were considered a relatively 
highly skilled and well paid section of the Irish working 
class.(60) In contrast/ much of the new industry would 
appear to provide job opportunities requiring/ on average/ 
less skill/tending to be oriented in the direction of less 
expensive female labour,(61)
An estimate of the numbers employed during the middle of the 
1970s/ for various job classifications in the assembly 
industry is shown in Table 5.17. Apart from maintenance 
craftsmen who accounted for approximately 5% of those 
employed, operatives in the car assembly industry did not 
serve an official trade apprenticeship. However, unskilled 
operatives were trained m  plants to undertake one or more 
tasks.
TABLE 5.17
Profile Of Employment In Car Assembly Industry 1976
Skill No. Employed %
Spot Welder 195 9
Metal Finisher 195 9
Spray Painter 216 10
Assembler 1,081 50
Storeman 259 12
Unskilled Labourer 108 5
Maintenance 108 5
TOTAL 2,162 100
Source: Report to Secretary of the Prices
Commission 1 9 76 .
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Operatives were not considered fully skilled until they had 
worked m  the plant for one year. Although the assembly 
operatives generally worked m  one area of the plant, there 
was a high degree of flexibility and operatives could be 
shifted from one task to another without difficulty. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the assembly industry 
provided employment which was constituted predominatly of 
skilled and semi-skilled labour.
Table 1 of the 1983 Census of Industrial Production 
indicates that for a total of 5,132 persons employed m  NACE 
category 35/ only 298 were female, most of whom were clerical 
staff.(62) Therefore/ the areas of production covered by 
this category have been almost exclusively the preserve of 
male employment.
It has not proved possible to obtain figures covering the 
breakdown of employment by skill and sex for the new 
automotive component manufacturers. But/ arising out of 
numerous interviews with people involved in the sector, some 
inferences about the likely structure of the workforce can 
be made. Although it is impossible to state categorically 
that the work performed in the new plants has a distinctly 
lower skill content, it is most certainly true that current 
skills are less recognized than those prevailing under 
assembly. It was a common belief that the nature of 
employment in much of the new industry, as m  the burgeoning 
electronics sector, was congenial to a female workforce. For 
example, Kromberg m  Waterford have a high proportion of 
females in their workforce. It was also argued that many of 
the redundant assembly workers who subsequently obtained 
replacement employment m  component manufacturing, had 
difficulty adapting to the new work environment.(63)
The assembly industry was characterized by a long tradition 
of high wage levels under conditions of protection The new 
component manufacturers/ on the other hand/exist in a free
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trade environment in the midst of increasingly intense 
worldwide competition. It was noted m  Chapter 4 that while 
wage levels in the terminal industry seem to be relatively 
unimportant, it is far more likely that labour costs are of 
significance in relation to component manufacture. It is 
interesting to examine the trends m  average wages between 
assembly and component production.
Because the component manufacturers do not form a distinct 
NACE category it is not possible to obtain an official 
estimate of the average level of wages in this sector. 
However, expenditure surveys on a number of product 
categories are conducted by the IDA. This analysis of 
manufacturing industry contains information on "wage cost per 
employee" for the product sectors investigated (see Appendix 
V of the 1983 survey). The IDA agreed to provide
information which was based on a survey of two separate 
groups of companies m  the automotive industry (see Appendix 
D). Group A covered a survey of 16 firms/ the majority of 
which were subsidiaries of TNCs/ although the list may have 
included some bodybuilders/car assemblers. Group B was 
composed of 5 firms from the specialist vehicle sector and 
the manufacture of components for the transportation 
industry.
The average wage cost per employee in the 21 product sectors 
contained in Appendix V of the 1983 expenditure survey was 
calculated at £10,064. On the basis of the information 
provided by the IDA/the average wage costs per employee were 
estimated to be £8,155 and £7,399 for groups A and B 
respectively m  1983.
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Jacobson has stressed the importance of grant and taxation 
incentives to the development of the components industry in 
Ireland.(65) Information collected from various IDA Annual 
Reports contained m  Appendix 5 relates to 32 firms from the 
foreign sector who received new industry grants up to and 
including 1983. As of 1983/ total payments allocated to 
firms m  designated and non-designated areas (66) stood at 
£18,759,818 and £20,206,000/respectively. By 1983 the total 
amounts of allocated funds actually paid out, was 
£10,659,199 m  designated areas and £10,972,079 to firms m  
non-designated areas. This group accounted for 9.7% of all 
new industry grant payments to firms in designated areas; and 
2.8% of all payments m  non-designated regions for 1983. In 
addition, a number of firms such as Siseir, Eurosil, Rubber 
Mountings Ltd. and Eline Ltd., have received payments from 
the Small Industries Programme. Also, relatively small 
amounts have been paid out to a number of component 
manufacturers under various other IDA schemes such as 
Enterprise Development Programmes, Product and Process 
Development grant payments and interest subsidies.
CTT have provided information relating to 13 firms (in 
Appendix 5E) showing the number of jobs that have been 
created m  these companies as of 1985. By combining this 
information with the data on IDA grant payments it is 
possible to construct rough estimates of cost per job in 
this sector. Two methods are used. The first approach 
calculates the cost per job on the basis of total grants 
approved m  relation to the firms in the sample. The second 
method uses total grants paid out by 1983 to calculate a 
cost per job figure.
On the basis of total grants allocated the cost per job 
works out as £6,581 and on the basis of grants paid by 1983 
it is £4,024. This compares favourably with estimates for 
other sectors. For example, Mechanical Engineering £6,283, 
Plastic Products £8,969 and Chemicals £9,341,(67) are
5
5 . 7 . 5  C ost A s s o c ia te d  W ith  P ro m o tio n  O f The S e c to r :
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estimates of grant costs per 30b which are all greater than 
the sample of CTT automotive component exporters. It must
be pointed out that the exclusion of one firm, i.e. Packard,
from the sample entails an upward revision of the cost per
30b estimate.
5.8 CONCLUSIONS
The structure of the Irish motor industry in a period of 10 
to 15 years has undergone a remarkable change. From an 
operation designed to maximise the local input of assembly 
of ckd units, it has become an industry based primarily on 
the manufacture of automotive components for export. The 
numbers employed and the output of this industry varies 
depending on the definition one uses. Sources such as the 
Society of Irish Motor Industry, would argue that by 1987 
the numbers employed had reached nearly 4% of the total 
manufacturing workforce with output approaching £300m.(68)
These figures, which concur with IDA statistics, utilise a 
very liberal definition of what constitutes the automotive 
components industry. From the perspective of attempting to 
identify a distinct sector for the purpose of meaningful 
analysis more precise definitions need to be used. One 
needs to look at the individual sub-sectors because each 
will have different potential for future development. In 
this respect the CTT approach which clearly identifies a 
group of companies exporting components to terminal 
producers is to be preferred. It is difficult if not 
impossible to analyse and design policy if the area of study 
is not free from ambiguity.
Disaggregation m  this study took place along two 
dimensions. Firstly, an attempt was made to sub-divide the 
industry to give a clearer picture of what was going on and 
what actions may be needed to remedy potential or existing 
faults. The most urgent requirement with respect to the 
industry is to achieve closer links between Irish industrial 
development agencies. This will help eliminate wasteful
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overlap and hopefully lead to a consensus of what should 
constitute a distinct sub-sector. Secondly, a
differentiation was made between the foreign and domestic
sectors which indicated an alarming discrepancy m  terms of
output, employment and export orientation between indigenous
and overseas enterprises.
It was demonstrated that the core of this industry were 
groups 4 and 5 whose firms were almost exclusively highly 
export oriented subsidiaries of American and European TNCs. 
There is little evidence to suggest that these firms are 
from the "cutting edge" category supposedly favoured by the 
IDA in recent times. In particular, the low level of 
linkages with the domestic economy is somewhat alarming. In 
1985 inputs sourced locally by foreign firms were just above 
3%. This is significantly below levels of sourcing 
associated with the assembly industry in the 1970s.(69) The 
relative importance to Irish manufacturing that this group 
represent/ warrants a determined effort to maximise the 
potential benefits to the Irish economy. Perhaps what is 
required is the extension to the National Linkage Programme 
to these firms in conjunction with the parallel development 
of a native sub-supply industry.
In keeping with the findings for the electronics industry, 
the foreign firms in this sector appear to have made only 
limited moves towards locating in Ireland the key central 
business activities. The encouraging features reported 
above in relation to marketing and marketing control need to 
be treated with caution. When one considers that there is a 
relatively small number of potential customers for firms in 
the CTT group m  particular i.e. the main terminal 
producers, then it is likely that the marketing function 
will tend to be centralized involving a small number of 
people who are close to the core of the parent company.
Because of the relatively small size of some of these 
companies this function may be performed by one individual. 
If this person takes control of the Irish subsidiary the 
marketing function may be listed as being located in
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Ireland. In reality, however, this function rests not with 
the location but with the individual and as such is 
dependent on their domicile in the country. It is unlikely 
that most firms are following the path of Donnelly Mirrors 
(a wholly owned subsidiary of Donnelly Mirrors Incorporated, 
Holland, Michigan), which enjoys extensive autonomy for the 
entire world outside of the U.S.A., and has successfully 
penetrated the Japanese and Eastern European markets.
The findings relating to the incidence of R & D activities 
are somewhat disappointing. In recent times, the manufacture 
of car components has been characterized by increased 
spending on research and development and setting up or 
expanding research facilities. According to a survey by the 
Japanese Auto Parts Industry Association of 112 companies 
between 1977 and 1981 R & D spending grew by 78% and the 
ratio of research and development spending to sales was up 
from 1.9% to 2.1%.(70) As with foreign industry in general 
the incentive for component manufacturers in Ireland to 
conduct extensive R & D is extremely limited. Most firms 
have based their investment decision on anticipated 
locational advantages. In the modern component industry the 
important variables are quality, cost, speed of delivery and 
reliability.
The various incentives and the well educated workforce have 
made many of the Irish component manufacturers competitive 
by international standards. For example, in 1986 Kostal's 
Abbeyfeale plant, producing electrical relay and circuit 
systems mainly for Mercedes and BMW was operating at an 
efficiency level 15-16% above that of its German parent 
plant.(71) However, there is little indication that more 
firm roots are being laid down for the future which may not 
be bright when grant and tax concessions expire.
The Irish industry may lose out in the future if these TNCs, 
(when present products become obsolete) decide to switch the 
production of new components to more fa v o u ra b le  locations. A 
good example of this is the manufacture of wiring harnesses. 
Many experts believe that advances in technology will lead
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to a drop in the demand for this product which in many 
respects forms the backbone of the entire Irish automotive 
industry. For example, m  1985 in the CTT group of 
exporters, the manufacture of wiring harnesses in two m a m  
locations accounted for almost 50% of employment m  this
group. It may transpire that firms such as Packard, who have
experienced industrial relations problems in recent times
may decide against making substitute products m  Ireland m  
the future.
Since 92 of the 97 firms in the industry in 1985 were 
involved to varying degrees with exports (see Table 5.12), 
support is found for Foley's claim that the majority of 
domestic enterprises sell at least part of their output in 
overseas markets. The Irish firms are concentrated m  
groups 2 and 3 /and notwithstanding a few exceptions,they are 
weak enterprises oriented towards the domestic market.
Participation by native firms in groups 4 and 5 has been
negligible and it is doubtful whether the continuation of
past policies will yield more than a token contribution to 
output and exports in this area. The necessary original R & 
D for entry into the international automotive components 
industry has not (and most likely will not) occur within the 
present structure. Technological innovation must be an 
important part of attempts by Irish manufacturers to 
establish footholds m  the components industry and, sadly
there does not seem to be evidence of potential for this
type of breakthrough. The development of native component
manufacturers/capable of competition on the international
market/is an onerous task. Perhaps it is not a realistic
objective/ for if it were to be attempted, as is the case 
with many other sectors of Irish industry, it could not be 
achieved without considerable state backing
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING ARGUMENTS
6.1 Introduction:
In recent decades, an ostensibly neo-classical view has 
emerged as the dominant establishment position in 
development economics. Concepts immersed in the tradition 
of international economics have tended to supplant the 
opinions of earlier economists nurtured m  an environment 
more conducive to state involvement. This has found 
widespread receptiveness among policy makers m  late 
industrializing nations and this has been expressed m  such 
trends as that towards greater pnvitization.
Neo-classical practitioners contend that the most 
appropriate role for the state is to create the proper 
medium in which market forces can realize the optimal 
allocation of resources. It was decreed that the adoption 
of outward-looking policies, uniformly across all 
industries, represented the most effective approach to 
industrial development for LICs. Taken together, the 
evidence of the preceeding chapters calls into question key 
elements of the neo-classical argument.
For example, most neo-classicaIs seem to believe that market 
failure exists only m  isolated and rather inconsequential 
cases or does not exist at all.(l) They consider that by 
responding to market signals, industry will turn in the 
direction of efficient production capable of quickly 
reaching international levels of competitiveness. But as 
Pack and Westphal have demonstrated, reliance on 
neo-classical policies can often lead to market failures 
retarding investment and causing growth in manufacturing to 
be both slower and less efflcient.(2) Imperfections in the 
market also lead to constraints on the private sector*s 
ability to acquire the technical and marketing wherewithall 
necessary to achieve and sustain international 
competitiveness. The evidence surveyed in the earlier 
chapters suggests that infant industries m  LICs encounter
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special problems when attempting to enter markets dominated 
by companies from advanced nations.
To compensate for the perceived failure of outward looking 
policies, certain economists have advocated a more pervasive 
interventionist role for government. They believe the state 
should identify strategically important sectors, and promote 
them through selectively targeted price denominated policies 
and/or more direct forms of intervention.
6.2 INDIRECT (PRICE-DENOMINATED) SELECTIVE INTERVENTION:
This form of selective intervention covers mechanisms that 
operate indirectly by influencing market allocations. Such 
an approach is indicative of discrimination by the state in 
favour of industries deemed worthy of protection. This 
might include the introduction of selective tariffs and/or 
import quotas aimed at fostering the growth of indigenous 
producers. For example, m  South Korea during the Park era, 
initial rates of effective protection for specially selected 
sectors were frequently m  excess of 100%.(3) Another 
variation on this theme is the application of what have been 
referred to as selective 'market reserve' policies where 
discriminatory policies defend domestic producers' market 
shares.
Since the late 1970s market reserve policies have been an 
important contributory factor in the growth of Brazil's 
informatics industry. Between 1979 and 1985 some 200 
domestic companies employing 18,000 people increased their 
share of an expanding market from 22% to 51%. This growth 
was achieved at the expense of such American giants as 
International Business Machines and the Burroughs 
Corporation.(4) Discriminatory policies were instrumental 
in holding the market shares of these TNCs in check. 
Proponents of market reserve strategy argue that it is 
essential to Brazil's "scientific and technological 
development".(5)
■f.
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Nonetheless, these methods of selective intervention find 
little favour with free marketeers. They believe that the 
presence of a captive market only serves to accentuate the 
standard import substitution inefficiencies. But advocates 
of this form of intervention are convinced that any 
anti-export bias inherent m  these policies can be 
counterbalanced by persuasive inducement. Thus, producers 
are left in no doubt, that the ultimate objective is the 
attainment of international competitiveness. In the case of 
South Korea export performance has been the principle 
yardstick for measuring progress towards this goal. Infant 
industries have been expected to begin exporting very soon 
if not immediately after they commenced production.(6) This 
is in stark contrast to the classic import substitution
stance adopted in the past by Argentina, Ireland, Spain,
etc.(7)
The successful development of a motor vehicle assembly /
manufacturing industry, capable of reaching levels of 
international competitiveness is not unrelated to protection 
of the local market.(8) In both Japan and South Korea, 
local producers during the formative stages were jealously 
guarded from the effects of foreign competition. This
enabled producers to secure an adequate market for their
output, and a satisfactory rate of return on investment
which provided a foundation from which to launch incursions
into overseas markets. It has been argued that in the case 
of Hyundai, exports of the Pony were effectively subsidised 
by lucrative sales in the domestic market.(9)
6,3 DIRECT METHODS OF SELECTIVE INTERVENTION:
Direct methods of selective intervention may be used to 
supplement or reinforce indirect measures, or independently 
when it is not feasible or permissible to implement indirect 
methods. The ways that the state can engage in direct
selective intervention include the following* firstly, the 
government may become directly involved m  the allocation of 
working capital and investment finance to specified parts of
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the private sector. This may involve the allocation of 
grants or the provision of low interest loans to selected
industries This will facilitate a greater flow of
investment into these areas than is likely to occur under
free market conditions. In addition the state can ensure
that institutions specializing m  international marketing
and the promotion of technical innovation are closely
attuned to the particular requirements of selected
sectors.(10)
Secondly, by pressing for the formation of groups or 
consortiums of firms the government can mould strong market 
agents. Incentives, or perhaps when required legislation,
will help to encourage the consolidation of a number of✓
smaller enterprises into larger conglomerates.(11) Thirdly, 
where inducements or coercion fail to elicit the desired 
response from the private sector, the state may decide to 
set up a public enterprise m  the form of a joint venture 
with a private firm or a fully owned state company. It is 
imperative that any such enterprises be established as 
profit seeking concerns that operate independently of the 
state bureaucracy.
Many LICs have experienced significant amounts of direct 
government intervention in manufacturing industry. In 
general, such encroachments by the state do not inspire 
confidence in the ability of the government, acting as an 
economic agent, to furnish a positive contribution to the 
cause of industrialization. Free marketers are quick to 
argue that various economic woes afflicting LICs are 
attributable to a preponderance of state activity. It was 
not state intervention per se that caused problems, but the 
fact that it was happazard and unplanned
A case in point is the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) 
m  Spam. This institution was formed by the Franco regime 
m  1941 to promote industrial development, and to ensure a
t
state role in strategic sectors. It has been pointed out 
that the pattern of its company ownership and sector control 
defied economic logic:(12)
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"The intention of being a catalyst for 
industrial development was consistently 
tempered by the fear of alienating the 
main private companies. There was never 
a guideline for minimum or maximum in­
volvement m  any one sector. It was rare 
that INI owned companies completely unless 
it had been obliged to buy loss making 
companies from the private sector".(13)
Over the decades INI has emerged as a dominant feature on 
the Spanish economic landscape. Yet for all its weight it 
has been unco-ordinated and unwilling to use its authority. 
In essence, INI was used as a golden dustbin by the private 
sector.(14) During the Franco regime, INI was neither 
poorly staffed nor badly managed but it was constantly 
deflected from its objectives.(15) The private sector has
cynically cultivated an image of INI as a deflcit-ndden 
swallower of tax payers' money. In reality much of this
deficit arose out of INI's obligation to assume
responsibility for operations private enterprise had placed 
on its doorstep. This image persisted into the 1980s, even 
though the organization was radically altered.(16)
Finally, the state may intervene selectively with respect to 
policies governing the inflow of foreign capital and 
technology. Regulations restricting the activities of 
foreign enterprise were common m  LICs during the import 
substitution era. However, the neo-classical blueprint 
decreed that the free flow of capital and technology was a 
necessary prerequisite for self sustained economic growth. 
In particular this strategy is assumed to offer the best 
means of transfer of badly needed technical knowhow from 
more advanced countries to the periphery. In this respect, 
neo-classicals perceived the activity of TNCs to be a vital 
factor m  the breakthrough of LICs into more complex areas 
of production. The bulk of the evidence presented in the 
above chapters tends to point in the direction of extensive 
technological dependence with respect to most LICs. It
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appears that the elements of technology are not perfectly 
tradable.(17) Therefore, since the pursuit of technological
autarky is not advisable in all cases, selective
intervention can offer the best chance of exploiting the
gains available from international trade in technology.
For instance, the approach adopted by South Korea involved a 
significant departure from the neo-classical paradigm. 
During the Park era DFI inflows as well as transfers of 
proprietary technology, were subject to licensing 
control. (18) Therefore, lh much the same manner as Japan 
the Korean government were involved closely m  a screening 
process which facilitated a more optimal allocation of 
foreign capital and diffusion of technology than would have 
transpired under the aegis of neutral policies. Richard 
Luedde-Neurath concludes his study on DFI in South Korea as 
follows:-
"The view is taken that Korea was essentially 
on the right track when it screened, res­
tricted and controlled FDI, thereby integ­
rating it into its wider development strategy, 
and that the development of Korean firms may 
owe much to precisely such directive state 
interventions".(19)
In the absence of state guidance long term benefits may have 
been ignored because local investments m  technological 
effort would have been viewed as sub-optimal by private 
agents. In the case of Hyundai, for example, the least cost 
short term decision by the company would have been to 
concentrate exclusively on producing licensed designs. It 
is quite likely the company would have followed this 
approach rather than develop its own technology had it not 
been for the keen interest shown by the state.
In general, the evolution of motor industries m  LICs is not 
marked by abundant indigenous technological growth. Local 
innovations have largely been limited to minor modifications 
that cater for domestic tastes. But as Jenkins correctly
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points out, this process occurs within subsidiaries of TNCs 
and is therefore appropriated within the global network as 
distinct from the local economy.(20) Even locally owned or 
controlled enterprises are likely to continue to be heavily 
dependent upon outside assistance:
"The small size of such producers by the 
standards of the worldwide operations 
of the TNCs, means that their R & D ex­
penditures are on much too small a scale 
to keep pace with developments at the 
international level.(21)
6.4 CAN SELECTIVE INTERVENTION BE PRACTICED EFFECTIVELY?
It could be argued that governments should depart from 
standard neo-classical practice. But the perennial question 
asked by critics is: Is the state invested with the
necessary wherewithall and expertise to handle the tools of 
selective intervention successfully? It is fair to conclude 
that a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the process of 
selective intervention. Indeed, the ability of the state to 
intervene selectively cannot be automatically assumed, and 
as Pack and Westphal point out, most governments appear to 
lack the required capabilities.(22) Moving this difficulty 
to one side for a moment, it can be demonstrated that 3 
essential prerequisites underlie effective intervention.
Firstly, the over-riding objective behind selective 
intervention should be the attainment of international 
competitiveness within a specified time period Pertaining 
to this, in South Korea during the Park era the state left 
the affected parties in no doubt that subversion of policy 
instruments into rent seeking activities would not be 
tolerated:
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"You who are engaged in exports will have to 
cease relying too much on government support.
Instead you are urged to increase your self
help effort in full cognizance of the fact
that export promotion after all depends on
your own initiative."(23)
This is indicative of a view which sees markets and 
governments as having complementary roles in
industrialization. Markets are adept at dealing with the 
economic complexity one associates with industrialization, 
but markets suffer from imperfections. Therefore,
governments may have to intervene to achieve an efficient 
outcome.(24)
Secondly, selective intervention must be just that, 
"selective". Scarce resources must not be spread thinly
across a wide area, but rather should be concentrated in key
strategic sectors. For example, the costly mistakes made by
the South Korean authorities are at least partly the result
of the decision to promote too many industries at once.
Because selectivity was limited, scarce technical and
entrepreneurial capability was spread thinly over too many
infants.(25) With respect to protection it has been pointed
out that the less widespread the support, the less the
exchange rate becomes overvalued and discrimination against
exports is kept to a minimum.(26)
Thirdly, optimal efficiency is contingent upon the 
government's capacity to fine tune what has been termed its 
"collective" or "integrated" decision making
capabilities.(27) The introduction and monitoring of 
overtly selective instruments is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for effective intervention. An 
integral part of the process is the government's adeptness 
at performing the role of a central agent facilitating the 
exchange of information between firms. The threat of 
coercion should be kept in the background and used only as a 
last resort. The goal of policy is the building of a
working consensus between the various agents likely to be 
affected by intervention. To this end integrated decision
making ought to be imbued with flexibility. Decisions must
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be closely monitored and initial strategies altered on the 
basis of market and technical data being obtained as the 
procedure unfolds.(28)
Failure to mould policies in accordance with the above 
guidelines is certain to affect the overall potency of 
intervention. In light of the difficulty most countries are 
likely to face fulfilling these conditions, even proponents 
caution that extreme care must be exercised before an 
aggressive policy of selective intervention is embarked 
upon.(29) Sceptics believe that more pervasive state action 
runs the high risk of inducing industrialization only at the 
cost of creating a 'bastion of economic irrationality and 
political authoritarianism*.(30)
While there maybe some truth in this argument the evidence 
suggests that strictly outward-looking policies have failed 
to accelerate the accumulation of domestic skill and 
capital. The LICs are therefore faced with the task of
devising policies that incorporate elements of both market 
and intervention. As Luedde-Neurath so correctly points
out, governments of developing countries are faced with a 
difficult decision, they are "damned if they intervene but 
also if they do not intervene".(31)
6.5 IRISH INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY AND SELECTIVE INTERVENTION:
Chapters 2 and 5 elucidate two inherent shortcomings 
associated with Irish industrialization: firstly, failure
to occasion the development of strong indigenous exporters, 
and secondly, inability to maximize economy wide diffusion 
of the benefits from the influx of TNCs. Against this 
background, pockets of support emerged m  favour of a more 
pervasive role for the government in developing industry. 
In particular, a minority view among Irish economists has 
taken root which believes Ireland can learn from the South 
East Asian experience of selective intervention. However, 
the formulation and implementation of a coherent set of 
policies concerned with selective intervention in Irish
industry still faces stiff opposition.
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Firstly, the prevailing socio-political ethos in Ireland is 
infused with a distaste for any form of direct state 
involvement in industry. Mainstream politicians and
economists have expended considerable energy assiduously
cultivating an image which links state intervention with 
gross inefficiency. They argue that the inescapable 
consequence of government involvement is the flowering of
"revenue guzzling white elephants". These ideological 
perspectives are so deeply entrenched, that many forms of 
potentially effective selective intervention are likely to 
be dismissed or placed to one side to gather dust. 
Illustrative of this problem was the successful attempts by 
conservative forces to neutralize the powers of the National 
Development Corporation. When NAD Corp was eventually 
established in June 1986 the original intentions of its
proponents were largely over-ruled. Instead of a potent 
state vehicle for direct investment in industry what emerged 
was a poorly funded provider of equity capital without any 
explicitly defined function.
Secondly, even if the political will was to manifest itself, 
the state development apparatus as presently constituted is 
likely to frustrate any co-ordinated attempt at selective 
intervention. For instance, the capacity for integrated 
decision making central to the process of selective 
intervention is absent from development institutions.(32) 
Corresponding to the policy change of the late 1950s was a 
transfer of power away from the state departments to newly 
formed bodies. It is argued that these "quasi-independent" 
state institutions comprise part of a comprador elite to 
transnational capital.(33)
For many years the state was content to control the purse 
strings and to observe from a distance, as institutions such 
as the IDA devised a stream of incentives aimed at 
encouraging foreign and domestic private enterprise. The 
main objective appears to have been the stimulation of as  
many new start-ups as possible with scant regard for the 
medium and long term consequences. Furthermore, at no stage
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did the state or state development bodies display any overt 
interest in attempting to direct investment in the direction 
of pre-determmed targets. Notwithstanding current attempts 
at re-organization and greater selectivity, in the absence 
of a conserted attempt to enhance the state's powers of 
'integrated decision making', effective selective 
intervention will not be achieved.
Thirdly, Ireland's continued membership of the EEC 
solidified since ratification of the 1987 Single European 
Act limits the options of the state in relation to selective 
intervention. Many of the instruments discussed above are 
broadly lmcompatible with community philosophy regarding 
1 free trade, competition policy and state aid to industry. 
For example, agents adversely affected by discriminatory 
government policies are likely to draw the Commission's 
attention and have the legality of the policy investigated.
However, some room for manoeuvre exists both within^ the
context of grey areas in current regulations and through 
attempts - perhaps m  conjunction with fellow peripheral 
members - to influence the course of future EEC industrial 
policy.
Government agencies should co-ordinate co-operative research 
and development agreements between selected groups of 
companies.(34) Greater priority must be given to the 
promotion of technology transfers between transnational 
corporations and local manufacturers. Over the last 25 
years the incidence of joint ventures and/or licensing 
agreements between domestic and foreign industry have been
disappointing in the extreme. For this reason the
technology and joint venture programme introduced by the IDA 
is a welcome development. So far a total of 62 technology 
transfer agreements were signed by Irish companies with 
overseas partners m  1986, including 32 joint ventures and 
32 licensing arrangements.(35)
With respect to automotive components in particular it has 
been argued that parts producers should undertake joint R & 
D ventures with material manufacturers or electronics
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companies.(36) In relation to the Irish situation that 
the government is afforded the opportunity to forge links 
between local firms and foreign subsidiaries. The state 
would have to be prepared to invest in research facilities, 
and use whatever incentives or interventions necessary to 
bring the parties involved together.
6.6 CONCLUSION
This dissertation looked at aspects of theory and policy 
concerning industrial development m  Ireland and a selected 
group of LICs. Chapter 1 outlined the theoretical 
background to the debate on industrial development policy. 
It was shown that the dominant neo-classical position 
advocating outward -“looking industrialization diverged 
sharply from tho&e economists favouring greater state 
intervention.
Chapter 2 surveyed the literature on Irish industrial policy 
and development. Support was found for the argument which 
considers outward-looking policies to have failed in the 
task of developing a strong indigenous traded sector. 
Moreover m  Chapter 3 it was concluded that the promotion of 
a vibrant domestic manufacturing base m  LICs requires a 
departure from neo-classical thinking.
In LICs, the emerging motor industry's dependency on foreign 
capital and technology was described m  Chapter 4. It was 
argued that the ability of domestic producers to compete m  
international markets was conditional upon active 
intervention by the state. In Ireland subsidiaries of TNCs 
have played an important role in the development of both 
motor vehicle assembly and automotive component production. 
Chapter 5 concluded that the automotive components industry 
suffers from a number of the shortcomings often associated 
with foreign dominated sectors of Irish manufacturing.
Notwithstanding the dangers linked with government 
involvement m  the process of industrial development
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selective state intervention can yield beneficial results. 
However, the successful management of selective intervention 
may not be easily attained. For example, many of the 
measures used with apparent success m  South East Asia will 
not be appropriate m  an Irish setting. Nonetheless future 
policy making must provide for positive government 
involvement This is essential if domestic producers are to 
secure a share of now elusive foreign markets.
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APPENDICES
In the World Development Report study a country's trade 
orientation was classified by combining the following quant­
itative and qualitative indicators. The effective rate 
of protection, use of direct controls such as quotas and 
import licensing schemes, use of export incentives and 
degree of exchange rate over-valuation.
APPENDIX 1 A
1963 - 1973
Strictly Out- Moderately Out 
Ward Oriented Ward Oriented
Hong Kong 
South Korea 
Singapore '
Brazil
Cameroon
Columbia
Cost Rica
Indonesia
Israel
Malaysia
Thailand
Guatemala
Cote D'Ivoire
Moderately«- In 
Ward Oriented
Bolivia
Elsalvador
Honduras
Kenya
Madagascar
Mexico
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Philippines
Senegal
Tunisia
Yougoslavia
TStrongly In- 
Ward Oriented
Argentina
Bangladesh
Burundi
Chile
Ethiopia
Dominican Rep
Ghana
India
Peru
Sri Lanka 
Tanzania 
Turkey 
Zambia 
Uruguay.
1973 - 1985
Hong Kong 
South Korea 
Singapore
Brazil
Chile
Israel
Malaysia
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay
Cameroon
Columbia
Costa Rica
Cote D'Ivoire
Elsalvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Indonesia
Kenya
Mexico
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Senegal
Sri Lanka
Yougoslavia
Argentina
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Burundi
Dominican Rep
Ethiopia
Ghana
India
Madagascar
Nigeria
Peru
Sudan
Tanzania
Zambia
Source: World Development Report 1987, p. 83.
APPENDIX 1 A C o n t d .
It can be seen that over the period studied several countries 
changed groups. Accordingly Chile, Turkey, Uruguay, along 
with Pakistan, Sri-Lanka and Tunisia were judged to have 
moved m  the direction of greater outward orientation. 
In contrast, Bolivia, Cameroon, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cote 
D'Ivoire, Guatemala, Indonesia, Madagascar and Nigeria 
were considered to have shifted m  the opposite direction 
towards greater inward orientation.
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Japanese DFI m  Ireland 1973-1981
APPENDIX 2
Year Japanese Investor No's. Capt. Business Line Invest.
1973 Mitsui
Empld.
128
IR£m
8 . 8
Objectives 
Electrolytic d,e
1975 Asahi Chem. Indust. 250 7.5
Manganese 0- 
Acrylic Cotton e
1975 Asahi Chemical/ 
C. Itoh & Co. 1 1 0 3.0 Acrylic Spinning e
1975 Noritake Co. 275 1.3 Chmaware e, i , j .
1976 NEC Corp. 270 1.7 Electronic Pts. e,i,j.
1981 Fujitsu 253 8 . 6 Semiconductors
ICs c,d,e,j.
Key to Investment Objectives:
c = utilization of inexpensive labour and reduction of cost.
d = more profitable local production due to industrial
promotion and protection policies taken by host govern­
ments .
e = expansion of sales to local and third country markets.
Destination of Products 
i = local markets
j = third countries
Source: The above findings relate to a survey of
Japanese firms taken in December 1985. 
Japanese Overseas Investment, Toyo Keizai 
Shinposha Ltd., Tokyo 1986, pp. 168-169.
APPENDIX 3 A
S t r u c t u r e  o f  E x p o r t s  i n  s e l e c t e d  L IC s
Fuels/ Other Machinery Other Textiles
Minerals Primary Transport Manufact. &
Metals Commods. & Equip. Goods Clothing*
% % % % % 
1965-1985 1965-1985 1965-1985 1965-1985 1965-1985
Portugal 4 5 34 17 3 16 58 62 24 29
Argentina 1 5 93 77 1 5 5 13 0 1
S. Korea 15 4 25 5 3 36 56 55 27 23
Greece 8 19 78 31 2 3 11 46 3 23
Singapore 21 29 44 12 10 32 24 26 6 4
Spain 9 12 51 17 10 27 29 44 6 4
* Textiles & Clothing is a sub-group 
of 'Other Manufactured Goods'.
Source: Constructed from data contained in the
World Development Indicators, 1987 World 
Development Report.
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APPENDIX 3B
Japanese 
in Spain
Direct 
- 1970
Foreign Investment 
- 1984
Japanese
Investors
Capital 
Ratio %
No's. Line of Year 
Employed Business Started
Fmtsu Ltd 7.1 1 , 0 2 0 Electronics 1975
Green Cross 
Corp. 50 284 Pharmaceuticals
Ishi Kawa 
Jima 40 91 Storage Plants 1975
Kao Corp. 86.9 104 Surfactants 1979
Kao Corp. 75.2 140 Fatty Acids 1970
Kayaba Indus 25 331 Shock Absorbers 1983
Matsushita
Electric 86.7 - Electric Equip. 1974
Mitsubishi
Metal 100 60 Super-hard tools 1974
Nachi-Fuji 
Koshi 38 164
Ball & Roller 
Bearings
1976
Nissan Motor 86.78 7,085 Autos 1980
Sanyo Elect. 37 1,331 Audio Equip. 1978
Sony Corp. 80 150 Sound Equip. 1973
Suzuki Motor 7.98 4,216 Land Cruisers 1984
Suzuki Motor 36.6 293 Motor Cycles 1984
Yamaha Motor 50 208 Motor Cycles 1982
Yoshida
Kogyo
99.7 230 Fasteners 1970
Source: Constructed from data contained in Japanese
Overseas Investment 1986-1987, (Toyo Keizai 
Shmposha Ltd., Tokyo, 1986), pp. 148-149.
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APPENDIX 3C
Japanese Overseas Investment in Republic of Korea
Capital No. of Major
Japanese Investor Year % Ratio Employees Business Line
Alps Electric 1970 50 3,000 Electronic Parts 
(Gold Star)
Asahi Chemical Ind 1975 50 1,060 Polyester Filimenti
Citizen Watch 1978 100 1,600 Time Pieces
Fuji Electric
/
1974 32 1,982 Switch Boards 
(Lucky Group)
Hitachi Cable 1971 33.3 2,502 Electric Wire & 
Cables (Hyundai)
Kawasaki Heavy Ind 1973 5 2,449 Ship Repairs
Mazda Motor 1983 10 5,000 Automobiles (Kia)
Mitsubishi Corp. 1979 20 1,733 Bottles Tableware
Mitsubishi Corp. 1982 15 11,400 Automobiles 
(Hyundai)
Mitsumi Electric 1973 100 1,632 Electric Machinery
NEC Corp. 1974 20 3,008 Communications 
Equip. (Lucky Grp.
NEC Corp. 1970 20 2,800 TV Tubes (Samsung)
Nichicon Capacitator 1973 49 1,312 Capacitators
Nippon Chemi-Con 1972 33.3 2 , 0 0 0 Capacitators
Renown Inc. 1973 38 1,090 Mens Suits & 
Knit Shirts
Sumitomo Corp. 1977 33.3 1 , 2 0 0 Stereos, TVs
Teijin Ltd. 1969 1 1 2,969 Polyester Yarns
Taiyo Yaden 1973 100 1,250 Electronic Parts
Toko Inc. 1971 100 3,126 Electronic Parts
Tokyo Sanyo Elect. 1972 100 2,892 Tape Recorders
Tanyo Sanyo Elect. 1973 100 1,667 Silicon
Transistors
Toray Industries 1970 20 3,500 Polyester Yarns
Toray Industries 1972 28 2,496 Spinning, Weaving 
Dyeing
Yakuit Honsha 1971 38.3 1,573 Lactic Acids
Source: Constructed from data contained in,
Japanese Overseas Investment 1986/1987, 
(Toyo Keizai Shinposha Ltd., Tokyo, 1986) 
pp. 8-16.
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APPENDIX 4
Investment Objectives Behind Japanese Overseas 
Investment in the Automotive Industry
Japanese Investor
South Korea:
Diesel Kiki
Mazda
Nippon
Nippondenso Co. 
Taiwan:
Atsugi Motor Parts 
Bridgestone Corp. 
Diesel Kiki 
Hashimoto Kogyo 
Hino Motors 
Kayaba Industry 
Kinugana Rubber 
NIFCO Inc.
Stanley Electric 
Tokico Ltd.
Topy
Toyoda
Philippines:
Hino Motors 
Isuzu
Isuzu/C.Itol & Co. 
Kayaba Industry 
Nichimen Corp. 
Nissan
Nippondenso Co. 
Nissan Motor 
Nissho Iwai Corp. 
Mitsubishi Motors
AS/M Components
X
x
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Nos. Investment
Employed Objectives
337 d
5,000 d,e
350 d,i,t
432 c,d,e,i
260 c,d,i
551 e,i
10 e,i
100 d
163 d,e,i
270 c,i
100 d,e,i
15 c,i,e
51 c,e,j
23 e, i
40 c,e,i
204 e,i,j,t
1 1 0 e,i
704 d,i
30 d, e
45 e, i
27 d
60 d, i
342 d,e,l,t
235 e
347 d,e,i
349 d,e,h
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N o s .  I n v e s t m e n t
J a p a n e s e  I n v e s t o r  AS/M C o m p o n e n t s  E m p l o y e d  O b j e c t i v e s
Stanley Electric X 75 c , d , e , i
Showa Mfg. X 150 c , d , e .
Toyota Motor X 38
Toyota Motor X 1 , 283 d , e , i
Thailand:
Bridgestone X 703 c , d , e , i
Hmo/Mitsui & Co. X 787 e , i
Hino/Toyota X - d , i
Isuzu Motors X 633 d,  i
Isuzu Motors X 15 d
Japan Storage Battery X 230 d . e . D
Kawasaki Kisen X 214 d . i
Mazda X 318 d , i
Mitsubishi Corp. X 365 e
Diesel Kiki X 160 e
Nippon Gasket X 18 c , d , e , h
Nippondenso Co. X 342 d , e , i , t
Nissan X 250 d
Stanley Electric X 75 d . e . i
Toyota Motor X 1 , 283 d , e , i
Malaysia:
Asahi Glass X 145 e , i
Clarion X 184 c . e . j
Hino Motors X 181 d , i
Isuzu X 300 d , e , i , t
Kayaba Industry X 70 d , e ,  i
Mazda Motor X 431 d
Honda Motor X 90 d . i
NGK X - d , e
Nippondenso X 68 e
Nissan X 3 , 300 d,e, i
Toyota X 3 , 700 d, e
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N o s .  I n v e s t m e n t
J a p a n e s e  I n v e s t o r  AS/M C o m p o n e n t s  E m p l o y e d  O b j e c t i v e s
Portugal:
Toyota x 1,929 d,e, i
Spain:
Nissan x 7,085 e,i
Italy:
Nissan x - e,i,D
Mexico:
Nissan x 
Peru:
6,083 d, i
Nissan x 400 d, e, i
Toyota x 313 d, i
Brazil:
Showa Manufacturing X 180 c, d, i
Toyota x 363 d, i
Indonesia:
Asahi Glass X 362 e,i
Bridgestone Corp. X 849 c,d,e,i
Daihatsu Motor X 17 g . i
Hino Motors X 11 d,i
Honda Motor X 158 d,e, i
Isuzu Motors X 96 d,e, t
Kayaba Industry X 330 d, e, i, t
Nikko Electric X 6 d, i, j
Nippondenso Co. X 441 d,e, i
Suzuki X 574 d, i
Teijin Seiki X 262 i, t
Toyota Motor X 797 d,e, i
Toyota Motor X 56 d,e,i
Yuasa Battery 
»
X 430 c,d,e,i
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N o s .  I n v e s t m e n t
J a p a n e s e  I n v e s t o r  AS/M C o m p o n e n t s  E m p l o y e d  O b j e c t i v e s
India:
Mazda Motor 
Suzuki
Pakistan:
Suzuki Motor X 1,046 e,i,t
Ethiopia:
Yokohama Rubber x 600 c,i
China:
Isuzu Motors x - c,d,e,i,t
Key to Investment Reasons & Objectives
c = utilization of inexpensive labour and reduction of cost,
d = more profitable local production due to industrial pro­
motion and protection policies taken by host governments,
e = expansion of sales to local and third world country
markets.
Destination of products 
h = home, i.e. Japanese market,
j = third countries
l = local market
f = data collection
g = other purposes
t = gaming of royalties
The above findings relate to a survey of Japanese firms 
taken in December 1985. The survey was based on quest­
ionnaires sent to and returned from leading Japanese Corp­
orations, both listed and unlisted on the nations Stock 
Exchange, as well as telephone calls and other methods 
of enquiry. The results presented above represent a small 
section of this survey and refer to overseas investment 
decisions by Japanese Automotive Companies taken between 
the late 1950's and 1985.
Source: Constructed from data contained in, Japanese
Overseas Investment, (Toyo Keizai Shmposha 
Ltd., Tokyo 1986).
381
2,213
d,e
d,e,i
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APPENDIX 5A
CTT Group of Producers Supplying Equipment and Components 
to Vehicle Manufacturers (OEMs)
Company Nationality Products Location
Bruss KG(I) Ltd German Non Standard 
O Rings
Sligo,
Co. Sligo.
Donelly Mirrors U.S. Prismatic Mirror 
Glass
Naas,
Co. Kildare.
Donegal Rubber Ltd German Moulded Rubber 
Parts
Ballyshannon, 
Co. Donegal.
Filtertek BV U.S. Plastic Fuel 
Filters
Newcastle West 
Co. Limerick.
Frese(I) Ltd. German Car & Truck 
Mirrors
Manorhamilton , 
Co. Leitrim.
Garrett(I) Ltd. U.S. Turbo Chargers/ 
Impellers
Waterford,
Co. Waterford.
Hendricksons U.S. Suspension Units Cork,
Co. Cork.
Iralco Ltd. German Decorative Trim Collinstown, 
Co. Westmeath.
Kostal(I) Ltd. German Electric Compon- -* 
ents
Abbeyfeale, 
Co. Limerick
Krombert & 
Schubert
German Wiring
Harnesses
Waterford,
Co. Waterford.
Lapple Ltd. German Pressings, dies, 
Fixtures
Carlow,
Co. Carlow.
M & Q Plastics 
Ltd.
U.S. Rubber & Plastic 
Components
Raheen,
Co. Limerick.
Packard Ltd. U.S. Wiring Harnesses Tallaght, 
Co. Dublin.
Schlegel(I) Ltd. U.S. Door Seal Wire 
Carrier
Loughrea, 
Co. Galway.
Sempent(I) Ltd. German Radial Car Tyres Dublin,
Co. Dublin.
Sileir Ltd. G.B. Rubber Parts, Ballinrobe, 
Co. Mayo.
Siseir(I) Ltd. German Pneumatic
Cylinders
Galway,
Co. Galway.
Smiths Ltd. Irish Wiring
Harnesses
Wexford,
Co. Wexford
-  2 0 2  -
Company Nationality Products Location
Turnex Ltd. German Turned Parts Waterford,
Co. Waterford.
Wexal Ltd. Belgian Aluminium
Tubing
Enniscorthy, 
Co. Wexford.
Woco Ltd. German Plastic & 
Rubber Parts
Tullyleague, 
Co. Leitrim
CSP U.S.
1 - »-
Spark Components Naas,
Co. Kildare.
Beru German Glow Plugs Tralee,
Co. Kerry.
Mohawk U.S. Cutting Tools Shannon, 
Co. Clare.
H.P. CHemie German Sound Proofing 
Material
Waterford,
Co. Waterford.
RPL German Door Seals Mohill,
Co. Leitrim.
Tractech U.S. Traction
Differentials
Galway 
Co. Galway.
The companies listed above constitute CTT figures for total 
exports and employment for 198 5. IDA figures are higher 
as they also include firms like Tilitsons, Thermo King, 
Unilock, Triplex, Hanlons, Adtec, Bearcat, Highlife Tool, 
etc. in their statistics.
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APPENDIX 5B
Costs Associated with the Promotion of the Sector 
New Industry Grant Payments IDA-Designated Areas
Total Paid Total
Allocated 1983 Paid
ATW Ltd. 1,997,000 398,327 491,394
Borg Warner 1,971,100 73,055 868,437
Bruss 858,820 146,523 404,217
Donegal Rubber 1,158,200 352,262 540,362
Fresse 429,290 5,686 239,673
RPL Plastics 713,020 10,043 66,279
Shaeff Karl AG 699,961 7,593 348,729
Schlegel 1,505,544 40,048 1,080,833
Shamrock F & T 1,209,550 35,000 668,371
Thermo King 3,877,233 221,236 2,396,377
Tool & Gauge 687,480 9,755 407,949
WOCO 1,779,970 63,547 1,529,864
Emerald Rubber 825,000 391,623 633,008
Crown Controls 1,047,650 308,790* 983,706
* = 1982 18,759,818 2,013,488 10,659,199
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New Industry Grant Payments Non-Designated Areas
Total Paid Total
Allocated 1983 Paid
Bearcat 1,496,860 427,500 864,784
Champion 1,453,500 878,312 878,312
Douglas 272,132 18,534 272,117
Garrett 1,546,400 221,185 853,652
H.P. Chemxe 1,332,550 3,836 736,288
Hydro Hoist 459,880 77,572 239,090
Kostal 1,311,700 67,193 261,652
Lapple 4,025,467 75,658 3,260,390
M&Q 312,500 16,937 79,854
Packard 1,550,491 38,434 876 349
Poclain 3,985,470 137,820 1,038,377
Triplex 72,250 8,750 58,328
Turnex 809,200 7,755 522,911
Wexal 524,650 45,660 339,228
WVM 336,850 18,923 42,115
Donnelly Mirrors 574,100 45,660* 472,671
Iralco 172,000 17,000* 137,615
Prodieco 70,000 25,298* 38,346
20,306,000 2,132,027 10,972,079
* = 1982
Source: IDA Annual Reports
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APPENDIX 5C
The following is a copy of the request for information 
sent to the CSO. The data contained m  Tables 5. 6 and 
5.7 is part of the response received from the CSO. 
The information for the relevant time periods refer 
to companies in Group A only. It did not prove possible 
to obtain any data from the CSO concerning firms in 
Group B.
GROUP A PRODUCTS / COMPANIES
1. Wiring Harnesses
2. Tyres for Passenger Cars
3. Decorative Trim
4. Radiators
5. Impellers
6 . Car Mirrors
7. Seals
8 . Pressings
9. Spark Plugs
10. Rubber & Plastic 
Components for Cars
11. Glow Plugs
12. Suspensions
13. Sound Proofing
14. Traction, Differentials
15. Windscreens, Sun Roofs, 
Heated Rear View Windows.
16. Electric Components
17. Vehicle Safety Systems
18. Car Safety Alarms
19. Number Plates
20. Vehicle Seating
21. Roofracks
22. Turned Parts
23. Anti-Vibration Devices
24. Vehicle Bodies
25. Spring
26. Car Assembly
27. Wet Cell (i.e. car &
Truck Batteries)
28. Cellulose (i.e. Car) 
Paints
Kromberg & Schubert: Packard: 
Smiths.
Dunlop: Semperit.
Iralco
Wexal
Garrett
Donnelly: Frese.
Schlegel
Lapple
CSP
Bruss: Donegal Rubber:
Filtertek: M&Q; PSK; Sileir 
(Eurosil): WOCO: RPL: Plastics. 
Beru.
Hendricksons.
HP Chemie.
Tractech.
Triplex
Kostal
Anti Skid Controls
Daly Manufacturing 
Phoenix (Also Upholstery) 
Turnex.
Rubber Mountings Ltd.
CRV.
C & C Ltd: Springs of Wexford. 
Various
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GROUP B PRODUCTS /  COMPANIES
1. Truck Refrigeration Units
2. Industrial Vehicle Tyres
3. Carburettors
4. Fork Lift Trucks
5. Tipping Gears for 
Commercial Vehicles
6 . Shunting Equipment
7. Cutting Tools
8 - Welding
9. Automotive Fasteners
10. Excavator Components
11. Steps and Walkways
12. Armoured Cars
13. Ambulances
14. Rough Terrain Vehicles
15. Buses
16. Aluminium Pulleys
17. Hydraulic Assembly
Thermo King.
Bearcat 
Borg Warner 
Crown Control Ltd. 
Hydrohoist Ltd.
Unilok.
Mohawk: Procut: High Life: 
Prodieco.
Siseir
SPS International 
Schaeff Karl AG 
Redman Fisher*
Adtec Teo.
Hanlons.
ATW
Bombardier.
Douglas Engineering Ltd. 
Poclain Hydraulics.
Note:
We have included under each product heading companies 
we know to be involved - or to have been involved - 
m  the manufacturing of those products. In some cases 
there are other companies that were/are involved but 
not known to us; in other cases we mention no companies 
at all as we know the product is/was produced but do 
not know the names of the companies doing the producing. 
Where such companies are missing from our list, we hope 
that you will be able to improve matters by including 
any of our obvious omissions. In general, where more 
than 50% of output goes to the motor industry, the firm 
should be included, and where less than 50%, then ex­
cluded.
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Special IDA Expenditure Survey of 
Irish Automotive Sector
Group A - Survey of 16 Firms:
No. of Employees 
Sales
Sales ex PG
Raw Materials
Irish Raw Materials
Sought in (Services?)
Electricity
Fuel, Energy, Other
Transport
Imported Services
Total Wages
Rents Paid
Lease Costs
Interest
Depreciation
Average Wage:
1982 1983 1984 1985
1,803 2 , 2 2 1 2,388 1,821
44,777 79,765 105,595 80,205
43,829 72,047 94,961 75,658
17,322 34,045 45,808 33,006
3,549 2,804 2,669 2,448
13,406 16,667 19,089 16,731
0 385 2,487 2,259
2,172 2,575 1,219 1,107
0 591 3,219 2,409
279 2,625 5,503 5,357
14,703 20,672 25,367 21,604
14 140 345 327
138 406 247 232
1,278 1,218 1,609 1,236
1,377 2,049 2,540 2,307
8,155 9,308 10,623 11,908
The I.D.A. did not supply directly the names of the firms 
on which the above survey is based but it has been possible 
to find out that the 16 firms in Group A are from, the 
following list:
CRV Engineering 
Donelly Mirrors 
Frese
Hans J. Assemblers 
Iralco
Kromberg & Schubert
Tilltsons
RPL
Tyresoles
Schlegel
CSP
Bruss KG 
Garrett Ltd.
Irish Commercial Vehicles' 
Kostal Ltd.
Packard Electric 
Triplex 
Semperit 
Smiths
Donegal Rubber
and three other unidentified companies.
Source: Special survey conducted by IDA
June/July 1987.
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Group B - Survey of 5 Firms:
APPENDIX 5D ( C o n t d . )
1982 1983 1984 1985
No. of Employees 930 912 421 98
Sales 33,146 28,717 16,525 5,927
Sales Ex-Pc 10,028 10,269 6,485 b, 867
Raw Materials 20,877 16,963 7,751 3,040
Irish Raw Materials 6,498 3,946 1,472 152
Bought in (Services) 4,097 3,921 2,482 1,339
Electricity 0 68 93 0
Fuel, Energy, Other 375 719 689 607
Transport 0 65 273 169
Imported Services 969 995 200 250
Total Wages 6,881 7,077 4,764 1,293
Rents Paid 2 2 17 0
Lease Costs 0 57 77 75
Interest 144 177 82 29
Depreciation 189 406 190 20
Average Wage: 7,399 7,760 11,316 13,194
The information contained in the Group B survey refers 
to five of the following eight companies:-
Bombardier
Hanlons
Leyland Vehicles (Car Trailers)
Bearcat
Unilok
And three other unidentified companies.
Source: Special survey conducted by IDA
June/July 1987.
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Estimate of Cost Per Job Created m CTT Grou
of Automotive Component Manufacturers
Total Grant Total No. c
Company Allocated Paid 1983 Create
Bruss 858,820 404,217 76
Donegal Rubber 1,158,200 540,362 82
Frese 429,290 239,673 38
Garrett 1,546,400 853,652 1 1 0
Iralco 172,000 137,615 220
Kostal 1,311,700 261,652 165
Lapple 4,025,467 3,260,390 275
M&Q Plastics 312,500 79,854 85
Packard 1,550,491 876,349 1 , 0 0 0
Schlegel 1,505,544 1,080,833 135
Turnex 809,200 522,911 35
Wexal 524,650 339,228 85
WOCO 1,779,970 1,529,864 2 1 0
TOTAL: 15,984,232 10,126,600 2,516
The Table above contains data regarding a sample of 13 
firms, from the CTT Group of Component Manufacturers.
Source: IDA Annual Reports and Employment
Figures received from CTT.
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